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1
Introduction
This book springs from the knowledge that many people are wor-
ried about unemployment, concerned about the attendant loss of in-
come, and anxious about their ability to sustain the standard of living
to which they have become accustomed. Public programs that provide
temporary income support during periods of unemployment can ease
the anxiety and concerns associated with joblessness. Yet, unemploy-
ment protection programs themselves lead to other worries: adequacy
of program benefits, costs of administration, disincentive effects, the
extent of coverage, and potential long-term dependency. This list is by
no means comprehensive, but it does highlight various concerns about
unemployment protection programs. It is understandable that such pro-
grams should conjure up these worries. The challenge is to find suc-
cessful compromise between the competing sets of concerns. The
responses to these concerns differ in individual countries, but the re-
sponses reflect deliberate policy choices.
This book examines unemployment compensation (UC) through-
out the world. Unemployed workers in many countries receive cash
payments from UC programs. Such benefits provide income support
for temporary periods, replacing part of the loss of earnings caused
by unemployment. Unemployment compensation is a long-established
social protection program that is present in most of the world’s major
geographic areas. At the start of the twenty-first century, approximately
70 countries have UC programs.
While the subject has been discussed in a multitude of articles and
books, several recent developments have led to institutional changes in
the world economy, commonly described as globalization. With such
changes comes new information and new insight. Three important de-
velopments call for a general assessment of the current state of interna-
tional UC. First, the number of countries with UC increased sharply in
the 1990s with the introduction of new programs in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) and in the successor states of the former Soviet Union
(FSU).
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Second, the East Asian financial crisis saw a dramatic shift from a
path of high growth to a sharp decline in economic activity, damaging
both the economic and social fabric of countries in the region, particu-
larly in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand. Re-
sponses included the introduction of programs to provide income
support for the unemployed as well as increasing caseloads for estab-
lished programs.
Third, the structure and administration of UC programs have
changed in a number of countries. For instance, some recently imple-
mented changes in Bulgaria, Chile, Germany, and Korea have potential
for adoption in other countries. In particular, the new unemployment
insurance (UI) program in Chile presents a strong contrast not only
with UI programs in its own immediate past but also with other pro-
grams from the region and elsewhere in the world. Because of its
strong emphasis on individual accounts, its evolution will be watched
with interest by many countries. In Bulgaria, matching information on
benefit payments and covered earnings has resulted in improved benefit
payment accuracy.
These recent developments in the global economy present an op-
portunity for reviewing and assessing the challenges facing UC pro-
grams. This volume provides a self-contained discussion of UC that
requires no specific training in economics. While maintaining a rigor-
ous style, it is readily accessible and provides extensive material from
which to learn about developments, trends, issues, and problems re-
lated to UC. The broad coverage of topics makes it appropriate for a
wide audience, including policymakers and administrators of UC pro-
grams.
As the title suggests, a study of UC throughout the world covers a
wide range of issues. This book presents up-to-date treatment of the
subject by highlighting selected topics. While the book provides a
global perspective and reviews UC programs in a number of different
countries throughout the world, the specific problems addressed in the
final chapter are more relevant for developed countries.
The book has four principal objectives. The first is to establish the
link between macroeconomic performance in the product market and
the labor market and to argue for the necessary role of unemployment
protection. In the long run, growth in employment is influenced by
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growth in real output. This linkage shows that strong (or weak) per-
formance in the product market is transmitted to the labor market. And
when output growth slows, employment growth is adversely affected.
For workers and families who experience unemployment, income de-
creases and it is difficult to sustain the standard of living to which
one is accustomed. If self-protection, insurance, or coping mechanisms
leave the unemployed unprotected, then there is a definite role for pub-
lic programs of income support and other services. Strong real output
growth raises employment, reduces unemployment, and decreases both
the need for, and the costs of, unemployment protection.
The second objective is to provide an overview of UC programs
throughout the world, supported by case studies of individual countries
from four specific regions. The overview includes an accessible survey
of the prevalence and growth of UC by geographic area. It also under-
takes a statistical (regression) analysis of the determinants of UC in
countries. This is a logical way of analyzing the developments and
trends in international UC in the last 50 years.
The case studies are intended to help the reader understand the
unique issues facing UC programs in each region. For instance, persis-
tently high inflation is a particular problem in many South American
countries. Most of the countries in this geographic area have more than
one program that provides income security to the unemployed. Without
effective indexation provisions, however, high inflation would quickly
erode the real value of monthly UC benefits and benefits from other
programs.
The third objective is to introduce the reader to the issues of actuar-
ial costs of UC programs. Here the approach is quantitative and com-
parative, but the exposition is relatively nontechnical. The fitted
equations are straightforward algebraic expressions that depict macro-
economic relationships. With data increasingly available from interna-
tional organizations as well as individual country statistical agencies,
one can secure a wealth of information on labor market indicators, UC
program statutes, and quantitative data on UC program performance.1
This volume utilizes several of these sources of information.
Finally, three important problem areas of UC are examined: cover-
age, continuing benefit eligibility, and the activation of the long-term
unemployed. While these three problem areas extend across a broad
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range of countries, they differ for high-income compared to low-
income countries. The treatment of the issues is strongly oriented
toward high-income countries of the developed world, an in-depth
treatment that permits a more thorough discussion.
There are nine chapters in this book. Chapter 2 introduces several
topics relating to macroeconomic performance and provides important
background information for the rest of the book. First, it reviews key
indicators of economic activity for a sample of 150 countries, each
having a population of at least one million in 1999; the countries are
grouped into eight major geographic regions. The macroeconomic in-
dicators from the product markets of these economies include per-
capita real gross domestic product (GDP), real GDP growth, and the
inflation rate. This chapter highlights contrasts across the eight regions
for these indicators in the years from 1970 to 1995. Second, the chapter
reviews key labor market indicators, with attention on the measurement
of unemployment and the unemployment rate, emphasizing data from
labor force surveys. Finally, the chapter examines the linkage between
changes in real GDP and changes in employment for selected Organi-
sation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD) and
Asian economies. It finds a smaller response of employment to changes
in real GDP in Asian economies.
Chapter 3 briefly surveys several types of unemployment protec-
tion arrangements and then devotes primary attention to UC. It traces
growth in the prevalence of UC programs from 1949 to 1999 and ex-
amines the linkage between economic development and the presence
of UC programs across the 150 countries. The chapter also introduces
an actuarial framework useful for examining the cost of UC. In this
framework, costs are measured relative to the aggregate volume of
wages and salaries in a country’s economy. Costs as a percent of pay-
roll depend on three factors: 1) the underlying unemployment rate, 2)
the share of the unemployed who collect UC benefits (the recipiency
rate), and 3) the level of benefits relative to average wages (the replace-
ment rate). Given that the cost framework is general, it is used to com-
pare UC programs across countries. Quantitative estimates of UC costs
for the 1990s are calculated for a sample of 24 countries drawn from
the regions that account for most UC programs. The analysis shows
that the costs of UC are systematically higher in OECD countries than
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elsewhere. Finally, the chapter traces the increased importance of
unemployment assistance in countries where the unemployed are
supported by both unemployment insurance and unemployment assis-
tance.
Chapters 4–7 focus, respectively, on four specific regions of the
world: 1) Western European and the English-speaking OECD coun-
tries, 2) CEE and FSU countries, 3) Asia, and 4) Latin America and
the Caribbean. The problems of unemployment are examined in each
geographic area as well as questions of UC costs and program adminis-
tration. Problems specific to individual regions are addressed, such as
inflation in Latin America, activation of UC claimants in OECD coun-
tries, and the establishment of new UC programs in CEE-FSU and
Asian countries.
Chapter 8 examines three problem areas that extend across a broad
range of countries and regions: 1) UC coverage, 2) issues of continuing
UC benefit eligibility, and 3) policies to shorten the duration of unem-
ployment and UC benefit duration. Coverage issues are present for
countries at all levels of economic development, although the types of
coverage problems differ for high-income versus low-income coun-
tries. The analysis of continuing eligibility and benefit duration draws
mainly upon experiences of high-income countries. The chapter identi-
fies and discusses evolving practices intended to activate claimants,
such as mandating stricter work search requirements and revising (wid-
ening) the concept of suitable work. In particular, it discusses the use
of statistical profiling to identify the long-term unemployed and the
application of profiling in Australia, the Netherlands, and the United
States.
Chapter 9 provides concluding comments. It highlights selected
findings from this volume and offers some suggestions about the vari-
ous UC programs throughout the world.
The approaches that countries in various regions of the world have
taken in supporting the unemployed are diverse. We trust that the book
will provide useful information about country-specific programs as
well as highlight regional problems. We believe this volume should
serve as an up-to-date review of, and as a basis and inspiration for,
continuing work on UC. At the same time, we acknowledge that the
coverage of topics, while extensive, has left many issues unaddressed.
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Notes
1. A short list of international organizations include the International Labour Office,
the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Development
and Co-operation, the International Social Security Association, Eurostat, the Di-
vision of Foreign Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and the World Bank.
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Economic Performance
and Unemployment
This chapter introduces several topics relating to macroeconomic
performance. While this may seem to have little connection with unem-
ployment protection, it provides important background information for
understanding the context of unemployment protection and the specific
issues prevalent in various regions of the world. Readers more inter-
ested in a comparative analysis of unemployment protection arrange-
ments could start with Chapter 3. Specific issues addressed in detail
here are also revisited in later chapters.
The objective of this chapter is to establish the link between macro-
economic performance in the product market and the labor market and
to argue for the necessary role of unemployment protection. In terms of
macroeconomic variables, performance is translated into three standard
goals: high growth in real output, low inflation, and low unemploy-
ment. Countries with strong macroeconomic performance are charac-
terized by high rates of real output growth, low inflation, and low
unemployment. In the long run, growth in employment is influenced
by growth in real output. This linkage shows that strong (or weak)
performance in the product market is transmitted to the labor market.
Hence, when output growth slows, it adversely affects employment
growth.1 This chapter explores this relationship using time series data
from several large economies.
As noted above, when a country’s economic performance is strong,
the output of goods and services rises, causing increases in employ-
ment and hours worked. Yet, high unemployment rates can persist even
when aggregate real output grows at a reasonably rapid rate. This phe-
nomena has been especially noticeable in several advanced western
economies during the 1980s and 1990s. Some of this unemployment
persistence has been linked with the generous provision of benefits to
the unemployed as well as strong statutory measures to provide con-
tractual employment security. While different facets of this issue are
examined in subsequent chapters, this chapter examines the unemploy-
ment experience of the large economies using time series data.
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Increasingly, countries are using surveys of households to gather
labor market information such as employment, hours worked, unem-
ployment, and underemployment for each family member of working
age. Many countries still do not collect systematic information on un-
employment and underemployment. Hence, it is much more difficult
to assess labor market performance in these countries compared with
countries where labor force survey (LFS) measures are routinely col-
lected.
For workers and families who experience unemployment, income
decreases and the need for temporary income support and other ser-
vices increases. Poor economic performance causes not only increased
economic hardship but also increased social stress. For instance, crime
and marital stability are adversely affected by unemployment. The
problems caused by poor economic performance extend across econo-
mies at all levels of economic development.
High inflation can also affect the well-being of workers and fami-
lies through its direct effects on employment and real earnings and the
indirect effects of policies intended to reduce inflation. In addition,
high inflation will adversely affect income support programs such as
UI unless arrangements are made to maintain the real value of benefits
for recipients. While this topic is directly examined in Chapter 7, a
comparison of real output growth with population growth is presented
in this chapter to judge if growth is occurring at a sufficient pace to
potentially improve the average well-being of a country’s citizens.
In this chapter, the most important indicators of economic per-
formance are examined and discussed for a sample of the world’s
largest countries. These indicators are presented as a set of summary
tables for 150 countries combined into eight regional groups. A number
of important questions are answered in the subsequent discussion:
1) How similar are the countries within each region?
2) How large are the contrasts across regions?
3) What has been the economic performance of the regions over
time?
4) What is the relationship between growth in output and inflation?
5) How extensive is labor market information?
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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
The performance measures examined in this chapter are standard
macroeconomic indicators from the product market and the labor mar-
ket. Key measures in the product market are changes in average prices
(inflation) and changes in the level and growth of real output (GDP).
Countries with strong macroeconomic performance are characterized
by low rates of inflation, high levels of GDP, and high rates of real
GDP growth.
The most common measure of the level of economic development
used to compare different economies is per-capita GDP, annual GDP
expressed as a ratio to a country’s population. Estimates for most major
economies are available in publications of the World Bank. These esti-
mates include adjustments for the differing value of the currencies of
individual countries, termed purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates.
As discussed below, these measures vary widely across countries and
regions. Historical data on population growth and real output growth
is examined to provide a better understanding of the evolution of per-
capita GDP in individual countries and regions. Data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) are used to make these comparisons,
which show strong contrasts across countries and regions.
Key indicators of economic performance in the labor market are
total employment, total unemployment, and the unemployment rate.
Unemployed persons are defined to be those who are able to work and
are actively seeking work but unable to find jobs.2 This contrasts with
underemployment, where people have jobs but are involuntarily work-
ing short hours or working at jobs with skill levels below the level for
which they were trained.
The unemployment rate—the ratio of unemployment to the labor
force (the labor force is the sum of unemployment plus employ-
ment)—is usually expressed as a percentage. In the past, estimates of
unemployment and the unemployment rate were often based on counts
of persons registered as job seekers at local employment offices. In-
creasingly, however, countries are using surveys of households to
gather labor market information such as employment, hours worked,
unemployment, and underemployment for each family member of
working age. As will be seen below, however, many countries still do
not collect systematic information on unemployment and underem-
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ployment. Hence, it is much more difficult to assess labor market per-
formance in these countries compared to countries where LFS
measures are routinely available.
A SAMPLE OF LARGE COUNTRIES
To discuss economic performance from a global perspective, coun-
tries with populations of at least 1 million were selected. This 1-million
threshold excludes many small countries. For example, the 2001 edi-
tion of the IMF publication International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Yearbook displays economic data for 32 countries with populations of
less than 1 million. Combined, the total population of these countries
in 1999 was 9.9 million. Many other countries with small populations
are not included in the IFS Yearbook, such as the Caribbean islands of
Guadeloupe and Martinique, which are included in France for certain
statistical reporting.
Three countries with larger populations were also excluded from
the analysis. North Korea and Cuba, with populations of 23 million
and 11 million, respectively, in 1999, were not included because their
socialist ideology does not recognize the existence of unemployment.
The commonwealth of Puerto Rico, with a population of 4 million, was
excluded because its citizens are covered by the UI system of the
United States. The UI system in the United States operates with 53
administrative jurisdictions, the 50 states plus the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
The resulting sample of 150 countries had a total population of 5.9
billion in 1999, accounting for 99 percent of the world’s population.
As noted, data on economic performance for most of the 150 countries
are available from publications of the World Bank and the IMF, as well
as from statistical agencies in individual countries.
DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION FOR 150 COUNTRIES
IN 1999
Table 2.1 displays summary data for these 150 countries. The table
provides a geographic breakdown of the countries into eight major
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Table 2.1 Major Countries, by Region, in 1999, and Selected Regional Characteristics
Characteristics Countries
Population
(millions) Surface area
Population
density Output
Per-capita
output ($)
Population
shares (%)
Output
shares (%)
OECD-20 countries 20 718 30,956 23 18,770 26,142 12.1 46.0
Cent.-Eastern Europe 12 120 1,179 102 926 7,718 2.0 2.3
Former Soviet Union 16 291 23,844 12 1,523 5,235 4.9 3.7
East-South Asia 22 3,297 20,183 163 13,387 4,060 55.7 32.8
North Africa-Middle East 17 358 11,897 30 1,965 5,490 6.1 4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 639 23,840 27 932 1,458 10.8 2.3
South America 10 339 17,387 19 2,294 6,767 5.7 5.6
Cent. America-Caribbean 11 152 2,550 60 991 6,522 2.6 2.4
Total 150 5,914 131,836 45 40,788 6,897 100.0 100.0
NOTE: Population in millions, surface area in thousands of square hectares, output and per-capita output is GDP adjusted for purchasing
power parity (PPP) and stated in U.S. dollars. Population density and aggregate output are derived from data in other columns.
SOURCE: Data taken mainly from Table 1.1 of World Bank (2001). Other information taken from IMF (2001).
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regions. The first grouping, OECD-20 countries, includes 14 OECD
member countries from continental Western Europe plus 6 countries
where English is the main language (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Eight other
OECD member countries have been classified according to their geo-
graphic area. Thus, Japan and Korea are placed in East and South Asia;
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE); Turkey in North Africa and the Middle East;3
and Mexico in Central America and the Caribbean. Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Turkey, and Mexico are middle-income countries with per-
capita GDP measurably lower than the OECD-20 group of countries.
Placing Japan and Korea in East and South Asia also yields a larger
sample of high-income countries from this geographic area. Clearly,
other classifications are possible.
The breakup of the geographic block dominated by the Soviet
Union has yielded 28 successor states at this time. The table shows two
groupings that distinguish the CEE countries from those located within
the former Soviet Union (FSU) borders. Thus, the three Baltic Repub-
lics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are included within the 16 FSU
countries even though they are physically located in Eastern Europe.
Again, alternative classifications could have been made.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of independent coun-
tries with 42 in 1999. All other regions have between 10 and 22 coun-
tries. The population data demonstrate, however, the demographic
predominance of East and South Asia. The combined populations of
these 22 countries totaled 3.3 billion in 1999, representing 55.7 percent
of the worldwide total. Six of the 10 most populous countries are from
this region, and the average population was over 150 million in 1999.
China and India each have populations that exceed the totals for the
other seven regions displayed in Table 2.1. Removing these giants from
the region’s total would still leave East and South Asia with the largest
population across all eight regions.
Population density is also greatest in East and South Asia, with an
average of 163 persons per square hectare. The next highest average
density is in CEE, with 102 per square hectare. The low density for
the OECD-20 countries masks the diversity in density between the 14
countries from Western Europe (98 per square hectare) and the 6
English-speaking countries (14 per square hectare). The large land
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areas of Australia, Canada, and the United States dominate the latter
average while the averages for Western Europe and CEE are quite simi-
lar. The other major areas all have much lower population densities;
the density of 60 per square hectare in Central America and the Carib-
bean ranks third in the table.
Table 2.1 shows clearly that most of the world’s output is generated
in two regions. The countries of the OECD-20 and East and South Asia
produced $32.2 trillion of the world’s $40.8 trillion in GDP in 1999, a
combined 78.8 percent share of world GDP. The next largest regional
share was 5.7 percent in South America.
Probably the most striking feature of Table 2.1 is the data on per-
capita output, which is defined as GDP adjusted for purchasing power
parity (PPP). The average of $26,142 for the OECD-20 is nearly four
times the worldwide average of $6,897. Just one other region, CEE at
$7,718, has an average above the worldwide average. For five regions,
the averages in per-capita output fall into the range from $4,060 to
$6,767 or from 59 percent to 98 percent of the worldwide average.
The low average per-capita output of Sub-Saharan Africa, $1,458
or 21.1 percent of the worldwide average, is also a dramatic feature of
the table. This area’s population was 10.8 percent of the worldwide
total in 1999, but its output was only 2.3 percent of the worldwide total.
It is interesting to note that the large shares of output generated by
the countries of the OECD-20 and East and South Asia are achieved
by sharply contrasting avenues. The OECD-20 have relative modest
share of world population (12.1 percent) but high output per worker as
reflected in per-capita output. On average, the countries of East and
South Asia have large populations coupled with low output per
worker.4
Information is lost through aggregation when summary informa-
tion for 150 countries is combined into eight regional groups. Focusing
just on per-capita output, two important questions arise. How similar
are the countries within each region? And how large are the contrasts
across regions? One partial answer to the first question is provided by
looking at the coefficients of variation, the ratio of the standard devia-
tion to the average for each region. In 1999 these ranged from a low of
0.18 in the OECD-20 countries to highs of 1.15 in Sub-Saharan Africa
and 1.17 in East and South Asia. The remaining five regions had mea-
sures that ranged from 0.46 to 0.71. Thus, the region with the highest
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average income has the least relative variation in per-capita output
across constituent countries, and the two regions with the lowest aver-
age income have the highest relative variation.
One partial answer to the second question concerning the contrasts
across regions is provided in Table 2.1 with the per-capita output
means. A second approach is to examine the countries in the upper and
lower tails of the per-capita output distribution. Focusing on the top 30
countries (20 percent of the 150-country sample) clearly shows the
consistently high income of the OECD-20 countries. They account for
9 of the top 10 (Japan is the 10th), 16 of the top 20, and all 20 are
included in the top 30. Of the 10 not from the OECD-20, 5 are from
East and South Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Tai-
wan), 3 are from North Africa and the Middle East (Israel, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates), and 2 are from CEE (the Czech Republic
and Slovenia).
When the 30 countries with the lowest per-capita income are exam-
ined, the consistently low income of countries from Sub-Saharan Af-
rica clearly shows. All 10 with the lowest income are from this area as
well as 18 of the bottom 20, and 25 of the bottom 30. Of the remaining
5 countries in this group, 4 are from East and South Asia (Afghanistan,
Bhutan, Cambodia, and Nepal) and 1 is from North Africa and the
Middle East (Yemen).
Thus, East and South Asia is unique when the classification of
eight broad regions is used, having 5 countries in the top 30 and four
in the bottom 30. In all, 9 of the 22 countries from this region are
located in either the upper and or the lower tail of the per-capita output
distribution.
A third approach to the analysis of cross-country income differ-
ences is to fit descriptive regressions with regional dummy variables
used in the specification to ‘‘explain’’ per-capita output. As would be
expected, regressions for the years 1996 and 1999 yielded highly sig-
nificant findings and very similar patterns for the regional dummy coef-
ficients. By far the most significant dummy variable was for the OECD-
20 countries, which had a coefficient of $18,505 (the average deviation
from the excluded group, Central America and the Caribbean) and a
t-ratio of 11.2 in 1999 data. The next largest regional coefficient was
$3,386 for North Africa and the Middle East with a t-ratio of 2.0.5 For
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Sub-Saharan Africa the dummy coefficient was $2,882 with a t-ratio
of 1.9.
There was some suggestion of a relative change in regional income
patterns between 1996 and 1999, but the changes were generally small.
The largest change was an increase in the dummy coefficient for the
OECD-20 countries. Larger dummy coefficients were also recorded for
both CEE and FSU countries. This would be expected as these coun-
tries advance further into the transition from their former nonmarket
economic arrangements. Increased coefficients were also recorded for
countries in North Africa and the Middle East. In contrast, the coeffi-
cients for East and South Asia decreased in size, as did the coefficients
for South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The decrease in East and
South Asia would be expected as a consequence of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1999. The decrease for Sub-Saharan Africa reflects
continuing economic development problems for many of these coun-
tries.
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS,
1970–1995
In the product market, the rate of inflation and growth in real GDP
are two key indicators of macroeconomic performance. Experience
with market-based economic arrangements extends back for little more
than 10 years in CEE and FSU countries. The transition to a market
economy for many of these countries has been difficult, with major
reductions in real output and episodes of high inflation, particularly in
the first half of the 1990s. Because of the major structural break in
their economic and political systems, tracking performance over a long
period is much more difficult in CEE-FSU countries than in other
countries. As a consequence, this section excludes the CEE-FSU coun-
tries and instead focuses on the other six major regions with particular
attention to the period from 1970 to 1995.
The primary source for information on macroeconomic perform-
ance is the IMF publication International Financial Statistics Year-
book. Where data are available back to 1970 they are utilized, but the
time series are incomplete in many instances. For some countries the
data are available for a shorter period, and in several instances there
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are no published data for a lengthy period. In the ensuing analysis, the
potential number of countries is 122—the original 150 countries less
the 28 CEE-FSU countries. Counts of countries are shown in the fol-
lowing tables to provide an idea of the completeness of coverage
among the 122 countries in the six regions.
Table 2.2 summarizes information on inflation and growth in real
GDP. The inflation indicator is the (geometric) average annual rate of
increase in the GDP deflator.6 Most of the 101 countries with available
data experienced average inflation of less than 20 percent per year be-
tween 1970 and 1995. The all-country median inflation rate was 10.8
percent, and five of the six regional medians were between 7.3 and 12.6
percent.
Inflation in South America was consistently higher than in all other
regions. The median rate is 59.2 percent, and 9 of the 10 countries
had averages of 20 percent or higher. For 6 South American countries,
average inflation averaged 50.0 percent or more per year during these
25 years. The averages were between 50 and 99 percent in Bolivia,
Chile, and Uruguay, while Argentina, Brazil, and Peru had averages
that exceeded 100 percent. Across the other five geographic areas, only
two other country averages exceeded 100 percent (Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo and Nicaragua), and just four fell into the 50–99 percent
range (Israel, Mozambique, Turkey, and Uganda).
Most South American countries have one or more programs that
provide income security to the unemployed. Unemployment insurance,
severance pay, and social assistance programs are all present in this
geographic area. Given the persistently high inflation experienced in
the region, it is especially important to ensure that the value of pay-
ments is not eroded by high inflation.7 Indexation needs to be present,
and its provisions must be effective if such protection is to be provided.
Chapter 7 examines this topic in more detail.
Table 2.2 also summarizes real GDP growth rates for the same
geographic areas. In the period from 1970 to 1995 about half of the
countries experienced average real growth rates between 2.0 and 3.99
percent per year. Of the 17 countries with real growth below 2.0 per-
cent per year, 7 were in Sub-Saharan Africa and 4 each were in OECD-
20 countries and Central America and the Caribbean.
High real GDP growth rates were concentrated in East and South
Asia. Fourteen of the 22 countries had growth rates above 4.0 percent
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Table 2.2. Average Inflation Rates and Real GDP Growth Rates in Six Regions, 1970–1995
OECD-20
E. and So.
Asia
N. Africa &
M. East
Sub-Sah.
Africa
South
America
Cent. Am.
& Carib. Total
Countries 20 22 17 42 10 11 122
Average GDP
inflation rate (%)
0.00–9.99 16 11 6 13 0 1 47
10.0–19.99 4 7 2 9 1 7 30
20.0–29.99 0 0 1 2 3 1 7
30.0–49.99 0 1 0 3 0 1 5
50.0–99.99 0 0 2 2 3 0 7
100.0+ 0 0 0 1 3 1 5
Total reporting 20 19 11 30 10 11 101
Median 7.3 9.2 8.5 10.9 59.2 12.6 10.8
Average real
GDP growth (%)
Negative 0 0 0 2 0 1 3
0.0–0.99 0 0 1 3 0 1 5
1.0–1.99 3 1 0 2 1 2 9
2.0–2.99 11 0 2 7 4 1 25
3.0–3.99 5 4 1 8 1 4 23
4.0–4.99 1 3 2 3 2 2 13
5.0–5.99 0 2 3 3 2 0 10
6.0–6.99 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
7.0–7.99 0 4 0 0 0 0 4
8.0+ 0 3 1 2 0 0 6
Total reporting 20 19 11 30 10 11 101
Median 2.6 5.8 4.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4
SOURCE: IMF (1999, 2000, 2001); Council for Economic Planning and Development (2003).
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per year. Nine of the 13 countries with growth rates in excess of 6.0
percent per year were from this region. The median growth rate of
5.8 percent per year in East and South Asia was 2.4 percentage points
above the worldwide average of 3.4 percent. North Africa and the Mid-
dle East was the only other region where the median growth rate for
the period was above the worldwide average.
Since so much of the world’s economic output is concentrated in
the OECD-20 countries and East and South Asia, it is interesting to
compare their growth rates: the median was 2.6 percent for the OECD-
20 countries (the lowest across the six regions) and 5.8 percent for East
and South Asia. Using the ‘‘rule of 70,’’ real GDP would be expected
to double in 27 years for a typical OECD-20 country but in just 12
years for a typical country from East and South Asia.8
Five economies from East and South Asia are frequently described
as ‘‘Asian tigers.’’ The real GDP percentage growth rates for these five
are as follows: Hong Kong, 7.4; Korea, 7.9; Malaysia, 7.6; Singapore,
8.3; and Taiwan, 8.5.9 All five have above-average to high levels of per-
capita GDP. Of course, it will be interesting to see if this past high
growth can be sustained in the future.
The favorable potential effects of real economic growth can be
reduced or even nullified by a high rate of population growth. The top
panel of Table 2.3 summarizes population growth for the same 25
years. For the 101 countries that report data, the median population
growth was 2.2 percent per year. If this rate were sustained, the world’s
population would double every 32 years.
Large differences in rates of population growth are observed in
Table 2.3. The OECD-20 countries have low rates, with only one rate
as high as 1.5 percent per year. Of the 5 with growth rates of 1.0
percent or higher, 4 are the English-speaking former colonies of the
United Kingdom (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States). Germany had growth above 1.0 percent only because of reuni-
fication. All 14 West European countries plus Ireland and the United
Kingdom have population growth rates below 1.0 percent per year.
High population growth is found in two regions: North Africa and
the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Note that their medians, 2.9
and 2.8 percent, respectively, are substantially higher than the all-coun-
try median of 2.2 percent. Further, of the 23 countries with growth
rates above 3.0 percent per year, 18 are from these two regions. No
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Table 2.3 Average Population Growth Rates and Real Per-Capita GDP Growth Rates in Six Regions, 1970–1995
OECD-20
E. and So.
Asia
N. Africa &
M. East
Sub-Sah.
Africa
South
America
Cent. Am.
& Carib. Total
Countries 20 22 17 42 10 11 122
Average population
growth rate (%)
0.0–0.49 8 0 0 0 0 0 8
0.5–0.99 7 1 0 0 1 1 10
1.0–1.49 4 2 0 4 0 1 11
1.5–1.99 1 3 0 2 3 0 9
2.0–2.49 0 8 4 3 2 3 20
2.5–2.99 0 4 2 8 2 2 20
3.0–3.49 0 1 1 9 2 1 14
3.5–3.99 0 0 1 3 0 1 5
4.0 0 0 3 1 0 0 4
Total reporting 20 19 11 30 10 11 101
Median 0.5 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.2 2.5 2.2
Average growth in
per-capita real GDP (%)
Below 1.0 0 1 2 8 0 2 13
0.99–0.01 0 0 1 6 1 1 9
0.0–0.99 1 1 1 5 3 4 15
1.0–1.99 8 2 1 5 2 3 21
2.0–2.99 8 6 4 3 4 1 26
3.0–3.99 3 0 2 0 0 0 5
4.0–5.99 0 4 0 2 0 0 6
6.0 0 5 0 1 0 0 6
Total reporting 20 19 11 30 10 11 101
Median 2.0 2.9 2.1 0.4 1.7 0.6 1.5
SOURCE: IMF (1999, 2000, 2001); Council for Economic Planning and Development (2003).
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country from these two regions has a growth rate below 1.0 percent,
and just 6 of 41 have growth rates below 2.0 percent. Finally, note
that the population growth in East and South Asia and South America
matches the all-country average.
The bottom panel in Table 2.3 combines real GDP growth with
population growth to show the pattern of change in annual per-capita
real GDP. Highest growth occurred in East and South Asia. The median
of 2.9 percent for this region was almost exactly double the all-country
average of 1.5 percent. Nine countries from this region had per-capita
real GDP growth that exceeded 4.0 percent per year. Only three other
countries had such high growth, and all were from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Several countries in the OECD-20, North Africa and the Middle
East, and South America had above-average growth in per-capita real
GDP during these 25 years. In contrast, most countries in both Sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America and the Caribbean experienced
growth of less than 1.0 percent per year. The low medians in these two
regions fall short of the overall median, and the shortfalls are substan-
tial (0.4 and 0.6 percent, respectively) compared with the all-country
median of 1.5 percent. The situation in Sub-Saharan Africa seems es-
pecially serious, with low per-capita GDP (Table 2.1) as well as low
growth. High population growth may to be contributing to low growth
in per-capita real GDP in the region.
Considering the regional data summarized in Tables 2.1, 2.2, and
2.3, four final observations seem appropriate. First, there are wide dif-
ferences in average income across regions with very high income char-
acteristic of the OECD-20 countries and very low income characteristic
of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Second, sustained high rates of
inflation are characteristic of just one region, South America. Third,
rapid rates of economic growth were most pronounced in East and
South Asia between 1970 and 1995. Output grew much more rapidly
than the population, with a resulting high growth in per-capita real
GDP. Finally, low growth in per-capita real GDP occurred in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America and the Caribbean from 1970 to
1995, and a probable contributing factor was high population growth.
UNEMPLOYMENT AS A MACROECONOMIC INDICATOR
Within any economy, regardless of its level of per-capita GDP, the
bulk of household income is derived from labor market earnings. The
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inability to secure meaningful and remunerative employment spells
economic hardship for affected individuals and their dependents. Lack
of work also has deleterious consequences for mental health, family
stability, and participation in the wider society.
Inadequate demand for labor services for the working-age popula-
tion has two important manifestations: unemployment and under-
employment. As defined earlier, an unemployed person is able and
willing to work but unable to secure a job. An underemployed person
is in one (or both) of two situations: 1) the worker has a job but at a
skill level below that for which he or she has been trained, or 2) he or
she has a job but is working fewer hours than desired. Both aspects of
underemployment cause the earnings of affected persons to be less than
the earnings derived from standard hours of work at usual or customary
occupations.
Unemployment is more directly amenable to measurement than
underemployment. For a specific reference period, say last week, it is
comparatively easy to determine if a person was employed or not and,
if not, whether the person was actively trying to secure employment.
Underemployment is more difficult to measure, because an individu-
al’s desires regarding hours of work and/or the skills provided by past
training may not match well with the types of jobs available in the
labor market. In the aggregate labor market, unemployment and under-
employment are both high when demand for labor is deficient relative
to labor supply.
At the level of individuals and families, unemployment and under-
employment imply low income and economic hardship. When large
numbers of labor force participants are in these situations there are
macroeconomic consequences such as deficient aggregate demand and
needlessly low total employment. Because it is easier to measure than
underemployment, unemployment is a key yardstick for assessing a
nation’s economic performance. The unemployment rate (the ratio of
unemployment to labor force, expressed as a percentage) in most coun-
tries is as important or more important than the inflation rate and the
rate of real GDP growth as an aggregate indicator of economic per-
formance.
Unemployment is measured in three principal ways: as official un-
employment, registered unemployment, and/or from estimates based
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on LFSs. Many countries rely on more than one of these methods of
measurement.
Some countries publish periodic estimates of ‘‘official’’ unemploy-
ment. These estimates are derived by differing methodologies and may
incorporate information from periodic surveys or censuses of the labor
force, data from selected geographic areas (perhaps large cities), and/
or information on persons registered as job seekers with local offices
of the labor exchange. Official estimates may severely underestimate
total unemployment because of the inadequate frame (scope) of the
information used. The methodology of official estimates differs from
one country to the next. Even within a given country, official estimates
are sometimes subject to manipulation to improve the appearance of
the country’s unemployment situation.
Registered unemployment provides a count of persons registered
as job seekers with local offices of the public labor exchange. The
motives for registration are varied. Often the country will require regis-
tration for persons who receive UI benefits or other cash payments, or
who participate in temporary employment programs. Some registrants
may already be employed and seeking a better job through the labor
exchange. Others may not be actively seeking work, but they may reg-
ister to derive some benefit or service which requires registration. The
level of registered unemployment reflects the pervasiveness of the pub-
lic employment service (PES) in the economy. Its penetration is typi-
cally greater in urban areas than in agricultural and other rural areas.
In countries where the public labor exchange has only a limited pres-
ence in the labor market, registered unemployment will severely under-
estimate total unemployment.
Unemployment as estimated from a periodic LFS or census infor-
mation has the potential to portray comprehensive and unbiased esti-
mates of unemployment. Over the past 50 years, LFSs have become
well-established phenomena in many countries. Periodic measurements
of employment, unemployment, hours worked, and earnings using in-
formation drawn from representative samples of households have be-
come commonplace and are nearly universal in countries with high
per-capita GDP. Of the 150 countries covered by Table 2.1, 28 of the
30 with the highest per-capita GDP conducted LFSs in 1999, often on
a monthly basis. Information from these surveys permits close tracking
of short-term and longer-term developments in the labor market.
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Because an LFS poses questions regarding each household mem-
ber of working age, they provide valuable information on key labor
market outcomes. Not only is it possible to count the number of per-
sons unemployed, but it is also possible to obtain information about
their characteristics. If a country does not have a consistent and reliable
estimate of unemployment, it is difficult to assess the adequacy of un-
employment protection. In particular, counts of beneficiaries can be
compared with total unemployment, as well as the coverage of pro-
grams, access to benefits, and duration of benefits. Hence, an LFS can
be helpful in evaluating unemployment protection in countries with
income support programs. Given the importance of these surveys,
background information on the presence and frequency of LFSs around
the world follows.
LABOR FORCE SURVEYS
In the years since World War II, LFSs have become well established
in the statistical-economic measurement systems of many countries.
They provide macro information on the labor market through estimates
of the overall unemployment rate. Such surveys also help to pinpoint
problem areas in the labor market by gathering information on unem-
ployment and underemployment by age, gender, ethnicity, skill level,
and geographic area. The surveys also provide useful information on
hours worked, hourly compensation, total earnings, and other sources
of income. Because LFS data have many useful applications, they have
been adopted in numerous countries. In 1999, for example, 82 of the
150 countries included in Table 2.1 had an LFS.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide summary details on LFS growth from
1949 to 1999. Table 2.4 traces the growth in the number of independent
countries during these 50 years, with six end-of-decade counts of inde-
pendent countries in the eight major regions used in Table 2.1. Changes
by decade are also displayed. By 1999 there were nearly twice as many
independent countries as in 1949 (150 versus 78).10 As noted above,
the countries included in Table 2.4 account for the bulk of the world’s
population, 5.90 billion persons, or 99 percent of the worldwide total
in 1999.
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Table 2.4 Number of Independent Countries, by Major Geographic Area, 1949–1999
Independent countries 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
1949–1999
Change
OECD-20 countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 0
Central-Eastern Europe 8 8 8 8 8 12 4
Former Soviet Union 1 1 1 1 1 16 15
East-South Asia 15 19 20 22 22 22 7
North Africa-Middle East 11 14 16 17 17 17 6
Sub-Saharan Africa 3 10 36 39 40 42 39
South America 10 10 10 10 10 10 0
Cent. America-Caribbean 10 10 11 11 11 11 1
Total 78 92 122 128 129 150 72
Ten-year change 14 30 6 1 21
SOURCE: Rajewski (1998).
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Table 2.5. Countries with Labor Force Surveys, 1949–1999
Labor force survey 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
1949–1999
Change
OECD-20 countries 2 7 11 18 19 20 18
Central-Eastern Europe 0 0 0 0 0 10 10
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
East-South Asia 1 2 6 12 14 14 13
North Africa-Middle East 0 2 4 6 7 7 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 0 1 5 5 5
South America 0 0 5 8 10 10 10
Cent. America-Caribbean 0 0 2 5 8 8 8
Total 3 11 28 50 63 82 79
Ten-year change 8 17 22 13 19
SOURCE: Data mainly from a 1989 survey by the ILO (1990) and an ILO update survey (2001).
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Table 2.5 traces the increased LFS prevalence for the same period.
Only three countries had LFSs in 1949 (Canada, Japan, and the United
States). By 1999, however, the number had grown to 82, or 55 percent
of the 150 countries. Table 2.5 shows that a measurable rate of LFS
adoptions occurred during each decade. In all five decades, more than
10 percent of the countries that entered the decade without an LFS
adopted one during the decade.
Note the particularly fast pace of adoptions in the CEE-FSU coun-
tries during the 1990s. By 1999 18 of 28 countries mounted an LFS.
The pace of adoptions was particularly rapid among CEE countries,
with 10 of 12 supporting an LFS by 1999.11 Switzerland was the only
country outside the CEE-FSU region to adopt an LFS during the 1990s.
The scope and details of the surveys vary from country to country.
Table A.1 in Appendix A provides selected information about the LFS
conducted in each country. The table draws heavily upon work of the
International Labour Office (ILO). To elicit the details of the LFSs
present in member countries, the ILO conducted a survey in the late
1980s and again in 2001. Its questions spanned the details of sampling
and statistical reliability as well as the scope and item content of the
LFS questionnaires (ILO 1990).
Across the eight broad regions, the comparative scarcity of surveys
in Sub-Saharan Africa stands out—just 5 of these 42 countries have an
LFS. In two other regions—the FSU and countries of North Africa and
the Middle East—fewer than half the countries have one. Across the
other five regions, substantially more than half of the countries have an
LFS. All countries in the OECD-20 group and South America have an
LFS.
Labor force surveys vary in frequency from 1 to 12 times per year.
The bulk, however, have a frequency of 1, 2, 4, or 12. There have been
examples of countries mounting three surveys per year and China still
does this.12 Some countries such as Guatemala, India, and Syria plan
on surveys every two or five years while some also mount surveys on
an irregular basis. Of the 82 countries with LFSs identified in Table
A.1, all but 11 have at least one LFS per year.
Several countries now conduct a monthly LFS. Some countries
with 12 surveys per year release information for consecutive three-
month periods. Because their sample sizes are limited, data for adjacent
months are combined to reduce short-run noise in the estimates. Chile
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and Hong Kong both release information for adjacent three-month peri-
ods rather than for the individual months. Some countries, such as the
Netherlands, conduct surveys continuously. This practice helps to keep
interviewers continuously employed and reduces attrition among the
survey staff.
In several countries, particularly in South America, the surveys are
restricted to urban areas. Chile supports both a national survey and a
survey just for Santiago. Since unemployment in rural areas is likely
to be qualitatively different from urban unemployment, restricting the
geographic scope to urban areas is appropriate for many countries. As
economic development has progressed, several countries have ex-
panded the scope of their surveys from some initial (largest) urban
areas to more urban areas and/or the full country (e.g., Australia, Bra-
zil, Chile, and Mexico).
All surveys restrict the age group to whom the employment and
unemployment questions are posed. Increasingly the minimum age for
labor force questions is 14, 15, or 16 years, but younger ages are still
used in several countries. The minimum age in 1999 was less than 14
years in 20 countries, and most of these countries have below-average
per-capita GDP. Several countries (Chile, the Philippines, Portugal,
Thailand, and the United States) have increased the minimum LFS age.
As economic development progresses and schooling extends to older
ages, the LFS minimum ages have been raised.
While most societies expect workers to retire at some point in their
lives, some persons continue to work past the standard retirement age.
Only 12 countries place an upper limit on the age for asking labor force
questions. These upper age limits range from 59 to 74 years, with
64–66 and 72–74 being the most common. The LFS in most countries
continues to trace the labor force activities of persons after reaching
retirement age.
In nearly all surveys, the sequence of questions about employment
and unemployment posed to persons of working age starts with em-
ployment. Most surveys ask about employment during the preceding
week and treat it as a yes-no situation, with a very low threshold of
hours worked for defining employment. Typically, a person paid for
one or more hours of work during the week will be classified as em-
ployed. Unpaid family workers may require a higher threshold, such as
15 hours in the United States. Countries count persons temporarily
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away from jobs for reasons such as illness, labor disputes, holidays,
and vacation days as employed. With such a broad definition of em-
ployment, someone classified as employed may nevertheless be experi-
encing substantial economic hardship. Many are underemployed either
through involuntary work of less-than-preferred hours or work at wages
not commensurate with their skill level. Several countries attempt to
measure underemployment in their LFSs, but the ILO member coun-
tries have yet to establish a common definition of underemployment at
this point in time.
Since the distinction between being unemployed and being eco-
nomically inactive may not be obvious, LFS questions typically probe
to ascertain how much job search the person has done recently. In
contrast to the employment questions which refer to the past week,
unemployment questions often have a longer reference period. The
most common reference periods listed in Table A.1 are last week (35
countries) and the trio of four weeks, one month, and five weeks (34
countries). Observe, however, that nine countries have reference peri-
ods ranging from eight weeks to one year. These longer reference peri-
ods are usually found in countries with low per-capita real GDP.
Reference periods also vary systematically by broad geographic area.
For the OECD-20 countries, the reference period is either four weeks
or one month. In 14 of 18 CEE-FSU countries, a one-week reference
period is used. One-week reference periods are also common in East
and South Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, and South America.
Use of a longer reference period will increase the counts of unemploy-
ment while reducing counts of those classified as out of the labor force.
In all countries, regardless of the reference period, the interviewer
must classify each person of working age as either employed, unem-
ployed, or out of the labor force (economically inactive), and this often
poses difficult problems. Survey responses are not verified by external
information such as registration with the PES or documentation of re-
cent attempts to secure a job through direct contacts with employers.
Also, surveys in many countries recognize discouraged workers—
those who have stopped actively seeking work from a belief that no
jobs are available in the local labor market. At the level of individual
respondents, errors undoubtedly are made in assigning individuals to
the labor force status of being unemployed.
From one country to the next, the LFS concepts used to measure
employment and unemployment can differ. Cross-country differences
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in the LFS definitions of unemployment, however, are larger than in
the definitions of employment. One hour in paid employment during
the last week is widely used to define employment. For unemployment,
there is more variation in factors such as the job search reference period
and the amount and intensity of search activity required to be classified
as unemployed (as opposed to economically inactive). Also, differing
minimum ages for inclusion in the LFS have larger effects on estimates
of unemployment because young workers traditionally experience high
unemployment rates. Thus, care must be exercised in comparing unem-
ployment rates of different countries.
In recent years significant efforts have been made to construct
‘‘comparable’’ or ‘‘harmonized’’ measures of employment and unem-
ployment across countries. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Labor periodically issues labor force data based on U.S.
labor force concepts for 10 countries (the G7 countries plus Australia,
the Netherlands, and Sweden; see Sorrentino 1995). Eurostat of the
European Union (EU), the ILO, and the OECD also have developed
comparable labor force data for groups of countries. The OECD publi-
cation Labour Force Statistics now routinely displays ‘‘comparable’’
labor force, employment, and unemployment data for its 30-member
countries. The ILO also publishes annual estimates of employment and
unemployment for more than 30 of its member countries (Lawrence
1999), including several from outside the OECD. One factor encourag-
ing the increased comparability of cross-country LFS data is a set of
guidelines issued by the ILO for measuring the labor force, employ-
ment, and unemployment. Efforts to improve the cross-country compa-
rability of LFS data will continue.
While efforts to harmonize LFS measurement of employment, un-
employment, and unemployment rates have been significant, disparities
remain.13 One good example is provided by the different treatment of
passive job seekers in Canada and the United States. Someone whose
only job search activity consists of reading newspaper advertisements
about job openings is described as a passive job seeker. Such persons
are classified as unemployed in Canada but as out of the labor force in
the United States. Between 1977 and 1998 the gap between the Cana-
dian and U.S. unemployment rates grew from 1.0 percentage point to
3.8 percentage points (8.3 percent versus 4.5 percent in 1998). The
differing treatment of passive job seekers accounted for 0.1 percentage
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point of the difference in 1977 but 0.8 percentage point in 1998 (Table
1 in Sorrentino 2000). Thus, about one-fifth of the gap in 1998 was
caused by this single difference in the LFS measurement.
Table A.1 displays average LFS unemployment rates for several
countries during three periods: 1980–1989, 1990–1994, and 1995–
1999. Table 2.6 provides summaries of these rates. The countries in
Table 2.6 are arranged into four geographic regions, combining the
CEE and FSU countries and the South American, Central American,
and Caribbean countries (Lat.Am.-Carib.).14 For each of the 10 col-
umns in Table 2.6, average unemployment rates have been grouped into
six ranges. Mean, median, and number of included countries are also
shown. All distributions and summary measures are based on groups
of at least 11 countries. The countries in each region are weighted
equally even though their labor forces vary greatly in size. The CEE-
FSU averages appear just for the period 1995–1999 since many of their
surveys commenced only in 1993 or 1994.
The most striking feature of Table 2.6 is the contrast between coun-
tries in East and South Asia and those in the other regions. For all three
periods, most of the Asian countries had average unemployment rates
below 5.0 percent. For the other three regions, the majority of the aver-
ages were 7.0 percent and higher. The medians and means further em-
phasize the low Asian unemployment rates. All medians and means are
below 5.0 percent for the Asian economies while all are above 7.5
percent for the economies in the other regions. While the Asian median
and mean did increase between the 1990–1994 and 1995–1999 peri-
ods, the increases were relatively modest. Even with the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–1999, low averages still prevailed.
The medians and means for the CEE-FSU countries during the
1995–1999 period are the highest of all entries in Table 2.6. On aver-
age, high unemployment is more prevalent here than in the other re-
gions. Only two of these countries had unemployment rates below 7.0
percent during the 1995–1999 period while six had rates of 12.0 per-
cent or higher. Unemployment in the transition economies was highest
across all the regions where most countries undertake systematic mea-
surement of unemployment using LFSs.
High unemployment known from LFS data implies widespread
economic hardship for many individuals and families. This hardship
provides the prime reason why unemployment protections are needed.
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Table 2.6 Average Unemployment Rates, by Region, 1980s and 1990s
Average
unemp. rates
(%)
OECD-20
1980–99 1990–94 1995–99
CEE-FSU
1995–99
East and South Asia
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Latin America and Caribbean
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Under 3.0 2 1 0 0 4 7 4 0 0 0
3.0–4.99 3 1 4 0 5 2 4 3 3 3
5.0–6.99 2 5 4 2 1 1 2 2 4 2
7.0–8.99 4 3 4 2 0 1 1 0 6 3
9.0–11.99 6 8 6 5 1 0 1 7 0 3
12 and up 2 2 2 6 0 1 0 2 3 5
Median 7.6 8.7 7.7 11.2 3.2 2.4 3.8 9.8 7.8 7.8
Mean 8.1 8.7 8.4 11.2 3.9 4.1 4.6 9.9 8.3 9.5
Number 19 20 20 15 11 12 12 14 16 16
SOURCE: Data taken mainly from the ILO Web site: http://laborsta.ilo.org.
PAG
E
33
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.11236$
$CH2
04-15-05
08:16:15
PS
34 Vroman and Brusentsev
Unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance (UA), and other
programs help to cushion the impact of unemployment. Labor force
surveys provide important information about not only the numbers but
also the characteristics of those who experience unemployment. Sur-
veys can also be helpful in assessing the adequacy of unemployment
protections in countries with UI and UA programs. Unemployment
protection programs are examined in the next chapter.
To be most useful to economic and other policymakers within a
country, LFSs should be conducted on a continuing basis. Continuous
LFS information helps in the detection of business cycle developments.
It is also easier to interpret seasonal labor force developments if mea-
surements are made in different seasons. Finally, the presence of labor
market problem areas (e.g., dislocated worker unemployment, low-
skill unemployment, and youth unemployment) can be detected in
labor force data. Used in conjunction with other information, an LFS
helps to monitor labor market developments.
The preceding arguments for the merits of surveys are widely
known and appreciated. Mounting a repeated LFS, however, involves
costs and several technical issues in design, data processing, and inter-
pretation of survey information. Cost considerations are particularly
acute if a country has a modest or low level of income. Therefore, the
surveys are much more common in high-income countries than they
are elsewhere.
To examine the linkage between income (per-capita real GDP) and
the presence of an LFS, a set of regression relations are estimated. All
of the regressions use per-capita real GDP as a principal explanatory
variable. The relations also test for the presence of systematically dif-
ferent regional rates of LFS usage by using dummy variables to repre-
sent countries from different regions.
The analysis focuses not only on presence of an LFS in each coun-
try but also on the ongoing use of a LFS. To approximate ongoing use,
the reporting of LFS results to the ILO (or in own-country publica-
tions) is noted. Table A.1 shows how many years between 1990 and
1999 a country’s unemployment rate appeared on the ILO Web site.
Countries that reported unemployment rate data in six or more years
of the 1990s were considered as making ongoing use of their LFSs.
Of the 82 countries identified as having an LFS, 67 reported on their
unemployment rate for at least six years during the 1990s.15
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Table 2.7 displays four regressions fitted by ordinary least squares
to explain either the presence of an LFS in 1999 or ongoing use of an
LFS during the 1990s. All specifications include per-capita real GDP
as a variable, and two include regional dummy variables. All coeffi-
cients in the regressions are highly significant, with t-ratios of 3.3 or
larger. For the per-capita real GDP variable, the t-ratios were 7.2 or
larger. The fraction of variation explained ranges from 0.25 to 0.53.
Labor force surveys are much more likely in countries with high in-
come than countries with low income. Ongoing LFS use is even more
closely associated with per-capita real GDP than is LFS presence. The
coefficients and associated t-ratios for per-capita real GDP are larger
in the second pair of regressions than in the first pair. The adjusted R2s
and standard errors also suggest that the latter two regressions fit better
than the first two in Table 2.7.16
Note that the regional dummy variables make highly significant
contributions to explained variation in two equations. All three dummy
coefficients are positive, suggesting that the presence of an LFS and
Table 2.7 Regression Analysis of Presence and Ongoing Use of Labor
Force Surveys
LFS, 1999 Ongoing use of LFS, 1990s
Without With Without With
dummies dummies dummies dummies
Constant 0.314 0.091 0.178 0.053
Relative per-capita 0.232 0.266 0.268 0.303
real GDP (7.2) (9.2) (8.8) (11.6)
Dummy, CEE-FSU 0.347 0.357
(4.1) (4.7)
Dummy, East and 0.302 0.323
South Asia (3.3) (3.9)
Dummy, Latin America 0.569 0.592
and Caribbean (6.0) (7.0)
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.421 0.340 0.526
Standard error 0.432 0.380 0.405 0.343
Mean dep. variable 0.547 0.547 0.447 0.447
Number observations 150 150 150 150
NOTE: Regressions based on a sample of 150 countries with populations of one mil-
lion or more citizens in 1999. Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its
t-ratio. Per-capita real GDP measured relative to world average income. Individual
countries and regions identified in Table A.1.
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the ongoing use of an LFS are more likely in the three identified re-
gions even after controlling for the effects of income. The size of the
dummy coefficient and its significance are particularly noteworthy for
the CEE-FSU countries. Since per-capita real GDP is also included in
the regressions, the significance of the dummy variables suggests that
other sociopolitical factors present in these regions also are important.
The low-use countries are located in two regions: North Africa and the
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa.17 In short, it seems that income
differences and other sociopolitical factors each contribute to cross
country variation in both the presence of and the ongoing use of LFSs.
FULL EMPLOYMENT
The labor market in any economy is characterized by constant
churning as new jobs appear, old jobs disappear, and workers move
into and out of employment as well as into and out of the labor force.
Even when the labor market is functioning efficiently, a certain volume
of unemployment will accompany this turnover of jobs and workers.
While unemployment always exists, a low volume is to be expected if
the total number of jobs equals or exceeds the size of the labor force.
When labor supply and demand are in balance, the associated unem-
ployment rate can be termed the full-employment unemployment rate,
defined as the unemployment rate below which inflation tends to accel-
erate.18
Labor force surveys yield unemployment data that help to define
full employment. They provide estimates not only of the number of
unemployed relative to the total labor force but also the rate of unem-
ployment occurrences and the length of the spells for unemployed
workers. Full employment may be accompanied by a high volume of
new unemployment spells but short average duration of individual
spells. When demand for workers is deficient, unemployment spells
lengthen, increasing economic hardship for affected individuals and
families. The primary purpose of programs such as UI is to lessen these
hardships.
Long spells may also reflect the effects of inappropriate labor mar-
ket institutions. Two areas of concern that have been highlighted are
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employment protection legislation (EPL) and the provisions of unem-
ployment protection payments. Restrictive EPL provisions, such as
lengthy advance notice periods for mass layoffs and factory closings
and generous mandated severance packages, have been identified as
contributing to low accession rates, reducing new job openings, and
contributing to lengthened unemployment duration. Research on this
effect has been undertaken in OECD countries (Blanchard and Portu-
gal 2001; OECD 1999), where EPL indices were first developed. More
recently this work has been extended to countries in Latin America
(Heckman and Pages 2000) and the CEE (Riboud, Sanchez-Paramo,
and Silva-Jauregui 2001). Countries with more strict EPL provisions
are found to have longer unemployment duration. The effects of UI
benefits on unemployment duration have been documented in numer-
ous studies. One standard reference is a survey paper by Atkinson and
Micklewright (1991). Two aspects of UI benefit provisions are impor-
tant: high benefit generosity and long potential benefit duration. Both
operate to increase unemployment duration. Long unemployment dura-
tion is examined in more detail in Chapter 8.
Because labor market features and institutions differ across coun-
tries, it is likely that the full-employment unemployment rate also
varies across countries. One consequence of having comparable cross-
country labor force data is that a question such as this could be exam-
ined empirically. As more work on LFS comparability is completed,
progress in answering this question can be anticipated. In the interim,
it seems clear that observed unemployment rates within a given coun-
try reflect both the balance of supply and demand in the labor market
and the institutions that impinge on the labor market. The relationship
between these two factors may not be direct. Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000), for example, suggest that labor market institutions interact with
demand conditions to produce observed unemployment rates.
For this discussion, it is sufficient to note that the unemployment
rate is a very useful indicator for suggesting whether or not an econ-
omy is at full employment. Short-run changes in unemployment signal
movement toward or away from full employment. Comparisons of un-
employment rates across countries must be done with greater caution,
because of differences in both labor force measurement and in labor
market institutions, such as EPL and unemployment protections.
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THE LINKAGE BETWEEN OUTPUT GROWTH AND
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH
Economic performance in the product market and the labor market
of any economy are closely linked. The discussion to this point has
addressed economic performance in the two markets separately. Here,
their connection is explored with an empirical analysis of employment
change. When real GDP increases more rapidly, it typically causes
employment to increase at a faster rate. Since labor productivity usu-
ally increases each year, however, annual real output must grow simply
to keep aggregate employment from decreasing.
This section examines the association between real output growth
and employment growth using multiple regressions based on annual
data. The specification is straightforward: current and lagged output
growth affect employment growth. Including lagged output change
permits the total employment response to be spread over two years.
The relationship is fitted to data measured as annual changes (first dif-
ferences). It is expected that current and lagged changes in real GDP
will both exhibit a positive association with employment growth. It is
also anticipated that the intercept in the employment change relation-
ship will be negative, reflecting the effects of labor productivity growth
in reducing employment at a given level of output.
The investigation is restricted to countries in two broad geographic
areas: the OECD-20 countries and the countries of East and South
Asia. Countries from these two broad areas accounted for 78.8 percent
of real GDP among the 150 countries included in the analysis. The
regressions utilize LFS employment data, but because these data are
not available for long periods in many countries, the results are re-
ported for just 29 countries. Where possible, the estimation period
spanned the 32 years from 1971 to 2002. One objective of the analysis
is to compare the response of employment to output change across
these two broad geographic regions.
A priori one might expect to observe a larger employment response
to output changes in the OECD-20 countries than in the Asian coun-
tries for at least four reasons. First, real wages may be more flexible in
Asian economies. One contributing factor would be lower unioniza-
tion, which would give employers more flexibility in wage setting. To
the extent that wages (hourly compensation and/or year-end bonuses)
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adjust more in the short run to output shocks, there is a reduction in
the size of the needed employment response. Second, in some Asian
countries, employers may be more reluctant to sever workers when
demand decreases, resulting in a larger adjustment in hours per worker
than in OECD-20 countries. Third, self-employment is more prevalent
in Asian economies, which may add stability to overall employment.
The self-employed can adjust to shocks by varying their selling prices
(with an associated effect on their own income) to remain employed in
the face of changes in demand. Finally, the presence of a large agricul-
tural sector may allow urban workers to find alternative employment
more easily when they experience layoffs in cities. Having a larger
agricultural sector and closer family ties to that sector among urban
residents may cause this migration response to be larger in Asia than
in the OECD-20 countries. All four considerations imply a smaller
employment response in Asia.
Table 2.8 summarizes the key findings of the regression analysis.
The sums of the coefficients on current and lagged changes in real GDP
are displayed in ranges along with medians and means for countries in
the two geographic areas. The regressions themselves are displayed in
Table B.1 of Appendix B. Both tables provide strong evidence for a
Table 2.8 Regression Analysis of Employment Response Coefficients on
OECD-20 and East and South Asian Countries
Two-year employment
responses OECD-20 East and South Asia
0.80 6 0
0.70–0.799 6 0
0.60–0.699 0 1
0.50–0.599 0 1
0.40–0.499 2 2
0.30–0.399 2 1
0.20–0.299 2 1
0.20 2 3
Median 0.748 0.330
Mean 0.594 0.351
Number 20 9
NOTE: Employment responses are measured as the sum of coefficients on current and
lagged changes in real GDP. Most regressions use data that extend from 1971 to 2002.
SOURCE: Time-series regressions shown in Appendix B.
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systematically smaller employment response in the Asian economies.
It should be noted that the 9 Asian countries are drawn from the high
end of the per-capita GDP distribution. Table 2.1 indicated there are 22
countries from this area. The 9 included the 8 with the highest per-
capita GDP in 1999 along with Indonesia. The 11 Asian countries with
the lowest incomes were not included due to data unavailability.
Table 2.8 indicates that the employment responses are not only
larger in the OECD-20 countries but also that the disparities with Asian
countries are very large. The coefficient sum is 0.70 or larger for 12 of
the OECD-20 countries. No Asian country has a coefficient sum as
large as 0.70, and only 2 have sums as large as 0.50. The medians and
means show that the typical two-year employment response in OECD-
20 countries is about twice the size of the response observed in Asian
countries.
These regression findings have three implications. First, with a
smaller response of employment to output changes, it is likely that
unemployment rates would be systematically lower in Asian as com-
pared with OECD-20 countries. Second, since unemployment protec-
tion programs mainly serve those who are fully unemployed, as
opposed to underemployed, there may be less of a role for social pro-
tection programs in Asian economies because there is a smaller flow
into unemployment than in other geographic regions of the world. At
the same time, it is possible that there may be a greater role for coping
mechanisms in Asian economies. Finally, even though employment
may exhibit a smaller response to output changes, it does not follow
that recession-induced changes in poverty will be smaller in Asia than
elsewhere. Downward adjustments of wages and hours per worker also
cause family income to fall, causing increased economic hardship even
though a larger fraction of the labor force remains employed.
The following chapters examine unemployment protection ar-
rangements and contrasts in these arrangements in different areas of
the world. The analysis assumes that the unemployment rate provides
a good indication of the need for unemployment protection. It must
always be kept in mind, however, that each country’s unemployment
rate reflects macroeconomic performance in the product market. Strong
real output growth raises employment, reduces unemployment, and re-
duces both the need for, and the costs of, unemployment protection.
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SUMMARY
As the data and analyses presented in this chapter show, there is
great diversity in the geographic regions of the world. A number of
observations stand out clearly. First, most of the world’s output is gen-
erated in two regions: the countries of the OECD-20 and East and
South Asia, with a combined share of 78.8 percent of the world GDP.
There are different employment responses to changes in real output,
however, in these two regions. When real output changes, the employ-
ment responses are systematically smaller in the Asian economies
compared with the OECD-20 countries.
Second, the population data demonstrate the demographic predom-
inance of East and South Asia. This region experienced rapid rates of
economic growth between 1970 and 1995. Given that output grew
much more rapidly than the population, the result was high growth in
per-capita real output.
Third, the data on per-capita output show that the OECD-20 aver-
age is nearly four times the worldwide average, while Sub-Saharan
African is one-fifth of the worldwide average. Low growth in per-
capita real output occurred in both Sub-Saharan Africa and the region
of Central America and the Caribbean from 1970 to 1995. A probable
contributing factor was high population growth.
Fourth, the problems of high inflation and high unemployment tend
to be associated with specific regions. Sustained high rates of inflation
are characteristic of just one region, South America. Unemployment in
the transition economies of the CEE-FSU region during the 1995–1999
period was very high. On the other hand, for most of the Asian coun-
tries, the average unemployment rates have historically been low.
The final observation based on the presention in this chapter is the
increase in the prevalence of LFSs from 1949 to 1999. By the end of
the period, 55 percent of the 150 countries were conducting these sur-
veys. While all countries in the OECD-20 group and South America
have an LFS, the comparative scarcity of surveys in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica stands out. As well as providing information on labor market out-
comes, surveys can also be helpful in assessing the adequacy of
unemployment protection programs.
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Notes
1. The relationship between the unemployment rate and output was first proposed
by Arthur Okun in 1962 and became known as Okun’s Law. Okun’s Law states
that each percentage-point rise in unemployment is associated with a two-percent-
age point reduction in the annual growth of real GDP.
2. The Thirteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians adopted a stan-
dard definition of unemployment that is applied by member countries. The unem-
ployed comprise all persons above a specified age who during the reference period
were: 1) without work, 2) currently available for work, and 3) seeking work. See
Volume 4: Employment, unemployment, wages and hours of work (administrative
and related data), http://laborsta.ilo.org. National definitions of unemployment,
however, may differ from the recommended international standard definition. The
national definitions used vary from one country to another with regards to age
limits, criteria for seeking work, reference periods, and treatment of persons tem-
porarily laid off and of persons seeking work for the first time.
3. The term Western Asia is more geographically accurate than the Middle East even
though Middle East remains the more common usage.
4. The low average in East and South Asia is obtained despite the inclusion of Japan
and other high-income countries from this area. The demographic weight of Ban-
gladesh, China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan predominate in overall average per-
capita output for this region.
5. A t-ratio of 2.0 or larger is the normal criteria for significance in a test at the 0.05
level.
6. A parallel analysis was conducted of inflation in the Consumer Price Index with
results practically identical to those for the GDP deflator.
7. Inflation since 1995 has been much lower in South American countries than it
was during the period from 1970 to 1995. However, given their history, there
remains the risk of high inflation in future years.
8. The rule of 70 is a shorthand way to compute the time required for a value grow-
ing at a constant geometric rate to double. Doubling time is the ratio of 70 to the
percentage growth rate. For example, 70/2.6  26.9 years.
9. Interestingly, China’s growth rate of 10.0 percent for the 17 available years of
data (1979–1995) exceeded that of all five Asian tigers.
10. Table 2.4 identifies two periods when the number of independent countries in-
creased sharply. During the 1950s and 1960s the number increased as the Euro-
pean colonial empires were dismantled. The country counts increased most
noticeably in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 3 in 1949 to 36 in 1969. During these
two decades measurable increases also occurred in East and South Asia (from 15
to 20) and in North Africa and the Middle East (from 11 to 16). The rate of
change was comparatively slow during the 1970s and 1980s with the emergence
of only seven new countries. The pace then increased during the 1990s with the
FSU break-up and developments in the CEE causing most of the increase between
1989 (129) and 1999 (150). During these five decades the only change in the
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count for three other major areas (the OECD-20 countries, South America, and
Central America and the Caribbean) was an increase of one, the independence of
Trinidad and Tobago in 1962.
11. Of the eight FSU countries with an LFS in 1999, three are the Baltic Republics
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If these countries had been classified as CEE
countries, then the pace of adoptions in the CEE countries during the 1990s would
be even more rapid, that is, 13 of 15.
12. Until recently Bulgaria and Thailand had three surveys per year.
13. The following is a short list of areas where differences in national practices per-
sist: employed persons on extended leave, unpaid family workers, members of the
armed forces (career and conscripts), residents of group quarters, persons on lay-
off, the definition of job search, and the job search reference period.
14. Two regions are not included in this analysis due to the small number of countries
where unemployment rate averages could be assembled. For 1995–1999, the most
recent of the three periods covered by Tables A.1 and 2.6, averages could be
readily assembled for only four countries in the North Africa-Middle East region
and for no country in Sub-Saharan Africa.
15. For CEE-FSU countries where the LFS start date was often later than 1992, we
included in the ongoing use group those where the unemployment rate was con-
tinuously available in years following the establishment of the LFS.
16. All results were qualitatively the same when logit and probit equations were fitted.
17. The countries in the OECD-20 grouping are also excluded, but they all have
comparatively high incomes, at least twice the worldwide average.
18. Some economists use the term natural rate of unemployment; others use the non-
accelerating inflation unemployment rate.
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Unemployment Protection
The prevalence of UC differs markedly across the eight regions
covered by this book. It is nearly universal in OECD-20, CEE, and
FSU countries. The majority of countries in South America also have
UC programs. On the other hand, these programs are practically nonex-
istent in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America and
the Caribbean, and they are comparatively rare in East and South Asia.
Yet, unemployment protection does exist in the latter groups of coun-
tries, mainly in the form of active labor market measures (e.g., training
or temporary public jobs programs), severance pay, social assistance
(SA) programs, and social investment funds. Of course, these latter
kinds of programs are present in many countries throughout the world.
This chapter briefly surveys several types of unemployment protec-
tion arrangements throughout the world before devoting primary atten-
tion to UC. Unemployment protection programs focus on the current
labor force situation of a worker and provide income and other support
services to the unemployed. Note that unemployment is defined as
being without a job but being able to work, available to work, and
actively seeking work in the labor market.1 The subsequent discussion
addresses a number of questions:
• How can unemployment protection programs be classified?
• What has been the pace and pattern of adoptions of UC pro-
grams over time?
• What determines why countries have UC programs?
• How can the costs of UC programs be measured?
• How generous are UC programs?
As noted in Chapter 2, the labor market is characterized by contin-
uous turnover as new jobs appear, old jobs disappear, and workers
change jobs, move into and out of employment, and into and out of the
labor force. When jobs end, affected workers may be eligible for and
receive compensation, either from a public program or from their for-
mer employers. Some payments represent deferred compensation
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where entitlements were built up during past employment with a spe-
cific employer. Severance pay is a common form of deferred compen-
sation. Other payments are compensation for the unemployment caused
by job terminations. This chapter deals mainly with the second type of
payments, that is, compensation for unemployment.
DEFERRED COMPENSATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION
Unemployment protection and deferred compensation differ in
several important ways. Deferred compensation is backward looking,
basing eligibility and the size of the payment on years of past employ-
ment and the level of past earnings. Payments are commonly made as
a single lump sum disbursement, and current labor force status does
not affect eligibility. For a person with a given history of work and
earnings, the payment is the same if she/he is employed, unemployed,
or not in the labor force at the time of the payment.
Perhaps most important, the payment of deferred compensation
arises primarily from statutory requirements and the economic circum-
stances or needs of the employer. There is a need to reduce the size of
the workforce or a need for a complete shutdown of operations. For
workers who satisfy a minimum seniority threshold and whose termi-
nation is not for ‘‘cause,’’ the employer may have a statutory require-
ment to provide compensation.
While severance pay is the most common form of deferred com-
pensation, other payments with similar features include bonus pay-
ments for taking early retirement and bridge payments to span the
period between the date of termination and the date when the worker
reaches the minimum age for a retirement pension. These latter
schemes are similar to severance pay in that they compensate for a job
termination. The worker is not necessarily expected to remain active in
the labor force. Thus, they have features akin to pension payments.
In practice, severance pay is often linked to unemployment. Even
when a termination is foreseeable, an individual may not secure a new
job immediately after the termination. Thus, in many countries, sever-
ance pay is an important source of income to the unemployed. Most
typically severance pay is administered by the employer, and quantita-
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tive data on its performance (number of persons compensated, total
payments, and average payments per worker) are not commonly avail-
able.2
Severance pay has several drawbacks as a program for compensat-
ing the unemployed. First, the lump sum form of payment does not
encourage job search.3 For many individuals, there is a strong tempta-
tion to use up the severance before starting to search for new employ-
ment. Second, because the basis for entitlement is past work with a
particular employer, payments go mainly to persons with long tenure
(i.e., dislocated workers) and not to those with frequent job changes.
Workers with frequent job changes and repeated spells of unemploy-
ment may never achieve the minimum threshold of seniority needed
for eligibility. Nevertheless, they may warrant some form of social pro-
tection. Third, in situations where severance pay is a statutory mandate,
it may not be delivered when payment is due.4 If a firm experiences
bankruptcy, it may not be able to deliver required payments because
other creditors (the tax authority, banks) may have higher priority
claims to the firm’s assets. Reinsurance arrangements with the govern-
ment as guarantor could help in such situations, but these do not typi-
cally exist. Finally, mandated severance can inhibit restructuring in
transition situations. For instance, in many CEE and FSU countries,
employers were obligated to provide two or three months of severance
upon termination. A frequent result was the retention of workers but
with work schedules of zero hours or very short hours. Ultimately the
adjustments did occur, but the pace of change was retarded by the
severance payment requirement. More often than not, severance pay-
ments were not made in spite of the legal obligation.
Despite these limitations, severance pay is an important source of
income support for workers in some countries. Indeed, it is present in
countries of all income levels. Frequently, in countries with both UC
and severance pay, there are offset features which reduce UC when
severance is paid. Due to data limitations, however, the performance of
severance pay in stabilizing worker income and reducing poverty is not
well documented. The theme of severance pay in Latin American and
Caribbean countries is revisited in Chapter 7.
A wide variety of unemployment protection programs exist
throughout the world. Increasingly these programs require individuals
in receipt of benefit payments to provide evidence of active work
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search and/or other socially beneficial activities. The latter requirement
has various names in different countries: activation, reciprocal obliga-
tion, or mutual obligation. Without attempting to specify the full range
of possibilities, five types of programs can be identified. While addi-
tional possibilities could be added to the list, they generally would have
a less direct link to the job terminations than these five.5 The five types
of programs are 1) UI; 2) UA; 3) means-tested SA (also termed general
assistance or welfare) programs; 4) programs to provide temporary em-
ployment (through public works, public service employment, social
investment fund employment, or workfare); and 5) access to payments
of accrued rights from past employment (withdrawals from provident
funds or from individual savings accounts).
Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance makes payments to unemployed persons
who meet other eligibility criteria. To be initially eligible, the worker
must have a minimum level of past employment and/or past wages and
be separated from work under nondisqualifying conditions. Quits are
often disqualifying while layoffs usually are not. The person remains
attached to the labor force, and the common descriptor of this situation
is able and available for work. Payments of UI are made periodically
but with limited potential duration. In most UI programs, the level of
the periodic payment is positively linked to the level of past earnings,
and potential payment duration may also be linked to past work experi-
ence. Payments commence after serving a waiting period and terminate
when maximum potential benefit duration has been reached or the per-
son becomes reemployed. Many exceptions to this general description
of UI exist. For example, in Ireland and the United Kingdom, flat bene-
fits unrelated to past earnings are paid while Ecuador provides one
lump sum payment. The exceptions, however, are comparatively rare.
Unemployment Assistance
Unemployment assistance also is paid to persons without a job
who are able and available to work but with the additional constraint
of a means test. Income and assets must fall below designated thresh-
olds before the claimant can receive benefits. Potential duration of UA
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may or may not be limited, and payment levels typically vary by family
size and composition. Many member countries of the OECD provide
both UI and UA protection to the unemployed. Generally, UI is the
primary program, with UA paid to those who do not qualify for UI
and/or to those who have used up (exhausted) their UI entitlement. For
this book, the countries offering both protections will be considered as
having UI systems. Usually UI benefits are preferred by claimants, in
large part because payment levels are more generous than UA pay-
ments. Again, there are exceptions; for instance, average weekly UA in
the United Kingdom has exceeded weekly UI in recent years.
Across the 150 countries presented in Chapter 2, UI is much more
prevalent than UA. In 1999, 66 countries had either UI or UA. Coun-
tries with UI numbered 59, those with UA numbered 21, and 14 coun-
tries had both UI and UA.6 Ten of the 14 countries with both UI and
UA are from the OECD-20 group of countries (Table A.1).
Social Assistance
The unemployed may also be compensated under SA programs
that provide families and persons with a guaranteed minimum level of
income.7 While UA serves the unemployed with low income, SA pro-
grams serve the low-income population more generally, with most re-
cipients being families headed by single mothers, persons with physical
disabilities and other health problems, and the elderly who do not qual-
ify for standard old age pensions based on prior earnings and/or years
of work experience. Most SA recipients are not expected to be active
participants in the labor force. Unemployed SA recipients, however,
are usually required to register as job seekers at a public labor ex-
change and to be able and available for work.
The line separating UA and SA is not always clear. Typically UA
payments are the higher of the two, and the time sequence of payments
is UA first and then SA. The two programs differ in the support ser-
vices typically utilized, UA recipients using labor market services such
as job matching and training while SA recipients utilize a wider range
of services such as child care.
France and Germany are countries with UI, UA, and SA. In both
countries, data on unemployed recipients of SA are less generally
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available than data for UI and UA recipients. Several CEE-FSU coun-
tries make a clear distinction between unemployed SA recipients and
‘‘all other’’ SA recipients. They publish data that show numbers and
amounts of SA compensation for the two groups. Chapter 5 examines
unemployed SA recipients in CEE-FSU countries.
Temporary Employment
Several countries provide preferential rights to temporary employ-
ment for the unemployed. The employment measures are highly varied,
including (but not restricted to) public works, temporary public service
jobs, and employment in social investment fund projects and workfare.
The jobs are typically temporary in duration with rates of pay at, or
near, the minimum wage. Remuneration may be received as cash pay-
ments, but some projects also make in-kind payments (e.g., food). Eli-
gibility may be reserved for those who are unemployed, the long-term
unemployed who have exhausted rights to unemployment benefits, or
more broadly to those with low income. However, others besides the
unemployed may participate. Typically, participation is elective, but
workfare projects require participation in work (or training) as a condi-
tion for receiving SA payments. All of these arrangements have an
explicit quid pro quo, payments in return for work on a specified public
project. The discussion of social investment fund projects, common in
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, is revisited in Chapter 7.
Targeting presents an important challenge in temporary employ-
ment schemes. Programs often target geographic areas with high unem-
ployment. Administration is usually centered at the local level, and
local administrators may enroll others besides members of the target
population. Thus, payments may go to persons besides those for whom
the program was intended.
Accrued Rights from Past Employment
Provident funds are supported by contributions from employers
and workers into individual accounts. While their primary purpose is
to provide income support in retirement, these funds often allow for
preretirement early withdrawals for specific contingencies, such as
temporary illness or permanent disability. In a few countries, unem-
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ployment is one allowable contingency. While some share of the indi-
vidual’s account balance may be accessed, the potential payments are
strictly limited by the total balance. Hence, these programs are not
included in the book.
Individual savings accounts are similar to provident funds in that
their main objective is to provide income support in retirement, and
they also may permit early withdrawal under specified circumstances.
The administrator of individual savings accounts is often a private fi-
nancial management company that invests these savings in financial
market instruments and deposits interest earnings (net of fees) into
individual account balances. To receive ‘‘emergency’’ payments from
individual accounts, the person must satisfy specified criteria. If he or
she is unemployed, and this is an allowable contingency, documenta-
tion of termination from the employer and registration with the public
labor exchange are typically required. Because withdrawals for unem-
ployment are rarely allowed, these funds will not be discussed further.
Other Payments
As noted previously, other categories of payments could be in-
cluded in addition to the preceding five.8 The one additional program to
be noted here is special industry programs for the unemployed. Several
countries have established programs in narrow industries known to
have high rates of unemployment (e.g., fishing and construction). Typi-
cally, the industry is highly seasonal or subject to especially wide cy-
clical swings. Industry programs have sometimes preceded more
broad-based national UC programs and have yielded valuable lessons
in structuring national programs, such as in Argentina.
A Note on the Classifications Used
While the five types of broad-based unemployment protection pro-
grams introduced above are presented as distinct entities, in practice
there are programs that do not fit neatly into one of the categories. The
protection scheme in Ecuador makes a single lump sum payment to
eligible unemployed persons. Eligibility is based on previous employ-
ment, and the payment is related to past earnings. This scheme is
treated here as UI even though it does not feature periodic payments.
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The new system established in Chile makes payments to the unem-
ployed from individual accounts with balances linked to past contribu-
tions. However, this too is considered as UI since the program has a
job registration requirement, periodic (up to five) monthly payments,
and a degree of pooling; that is, there is a common fund to finance
payments to those who exhaust their individual accounts. Finally, pro-
grams in 14 countries including Germany and Slovenia are also treated
as UI even though these countries have dual UI-UA systems. After
exhausting UI payments, eligible unemployed persons can receive UA
conditioned on family income. As noted above, other features of a dual
system resemble UI; for example, payment levels are related to past
earnings and potential duration is limited. In the ambiguous situations,
an arbitrary element entered the classification decision. The final deci-
sion concerning the classification used (UI or UA) reflects a judgment
reached after weighing competing considerations.
For the rest of the discussion in this book, the term unemployment
compensation is used in reference to two unemployment protection
programs: UI and UA. Countries that offer UI, UA, or both are com-
monly described as having UC. The arguments for excluding the other
protections can be briefly stated. Social assistance, individual savings
accounts, and temporary employment schemes serve broader popula-
tions than the unemployed, for instance, families with low income and/
or the disabled. As noted above, severance pay represents deferred
compensation and not unemployment protection. Thus, while unem-
ployed individuals may receive payments from these other programs,
the programs do not exclusively or primarily compensate persons with-
out jobs who are attached to the labor force—those able, available, and
actively seeking work. Unemployment compensation as used in the
subsequent discussion refers to programs whose primary client base is
the unemployed.
PREVALENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION,
1949–1999
Unemployment compensation programs have become much more
prevalent over the past 50 years. Table 3.1 traces developments from
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Table 3.1 Growth of Unemployment Compensation Programs, 1949–1999
Countries with UC programs
1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999
1949–1999
ChangeRegion
OECD-20 countries 19 19 19 20 20 20 1
Cent.-Eastern Europe 0 1 1 2 3 12 12
Former Soviet Union 0 0 0 0 0 14 14
East-South Asia 1 1 1 3 4 6 5
North Africa-Middle East 0 0 1 3 5 6 6
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
South America 1 3 4 4 4 6 5
Cent. America-Caribbean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 22 25 27 34 38 66 44
Ten-year change 3 2 7 4 28
SOURCE: U.S. Social Security Administration (1999).
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1949 to 1999 among the 150 independent countries examined in Chap-
ter 2 and listed in Appendix A. The table shows six end-of-decade
counts of countries with UC programs in eight major regions of the
world.9
Between 1949 and 1999 the number of countries with UC pro-
grams tripled, increasing from 22 in 1949 to 66 in 1999. Note that UC
programs in 1949 were almost exclusively a phenomenon of the
OECD-20 countries. Among the countries of this group, only Portugal
did not have a UC program in 1949. Portugal added a program in 1975.
Three other countries with UC programs in 1949 were Chile, Japan (an
OECD country grouped with other Asian countries), and South Africa.
During the next four decades (the 1950s through the 1980s) the
number of countries with UC programs increased by 16, reaching 38
in 1989. This growth roughly matched the growth in the number of
independent countries so that the proportion with UC program in 1989
(38 of 129 or 0.29) was almost identical to the proportion in 1949 (22
of 78 or 0.28). Most of the new adoptions of UC programs (11 of 16)
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. The new adoptions were widely
dispersed across the world’s major geographic regions.
The pace and pattern of adoptions during the 1990s stand in sharp
contrast to developments of the preceding four decades. There were 28
more UC programs in 1999 than 10 years earlier. All but five adop-
tions, however, took place in CEE and FSU countries.10 The end of
Marxist-Socialist states was followed by an acknowledgment of unem-
ployment as a serious societal problem. The adoption of UC laws was
nearly universal in these countries.11 More countries instituted UC pro-
grams during this single decade than during the four preceding decades
combined. As of 1999, the proportion of countries with UC programs
had increased to 0.44.
The prevalence of unemployment compensation is clearly different
in the eight regions. It is nearly universal in three regions: the countries
of the OECD-20, CEE, and FSU. South America is the only other
region where a majority of countries (6 of 10) have UC programs.
These programs are practically nonexistent in Sub-Saharan Africa (2
of 42) as well as in Central America and the Caribbean (0 of 11). Only
6 of 22 East and South Asian countries had this form of social protec-
tion in 1999.12 For many countries, other forms of unemployment pro-
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tection also exist (including those discussed above), but they typically
serve a wider client base than just the unemployed.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION
The level of economic development as signaled by per-capita GDP
is closely linked to the presence of UC. This relationship is explored
with a multiple regression analysis of the 150 countries introduced in
Chapter 2. The estimates of per-capita GDP were based on PPP esti-
mates of GDP appearing in the World Bank publication World Devel-
opment Indicators and refer to 1999. Logistic and probit regressions
are fitted as well as regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Since the interpretation of OLS regression results is more transparent,
these regressions are emphasized in the discussion that follows.13
All regression equations measure the dependent variable as a dis-
crete (dummy) dichotomous variable where the absence or presence of
the feature under investigation is signaled by a 0 (absent) or 1 (present).
Four UC and labor market features are examined using a 0–1 frame-
work. These are presence of a UC program in 1999 (columns 1 and 2
in Table 3.2), adoption of a UC program between 1949 and 1999 (col-
umns 3 and 4), adoption of a UC program between 1949 and 1999 in
countries besides those in CEE-FSU (columns 5 and 6), and presence
of a UC program and LFS in 1999 (columns 7 and 8).
Besides per-capita GDP, the other explanatory variables are
dummy variables for three specific geographic areas: CEE-FSU coun-
tries, East and South Asia, and Latin America and Caribbean. These
three areas account for 28, 22, and 21 countries, respectively, in the
150 country data set.
The choice of specification is based upon two considerations: it is
parsimonious, and it permits the inclusion of all 150 countries. The
inclusion of a large number of countries extends the analysis of previ-
ous authors in this area. Of the existing literature, work by Vodopivec
(2004) and Simonetta and Wandner (2002) also use per-capita GDP to
explain the presence of UC. The analysis in both papers shows a posi-
tive and significant coefficient for per-capita GDP. These papers use
other variables in their specifications such as the average age of the
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Table 3.2 Regression Results for Presence and Adoption of Unemployment Compensation, 1949–1999
Presence UC 1999
No dummy
(1)
Dummy
(2)
Adopt UC 1949–99
No dummy
(3)
Dummy
(4)
Adopt UC 1949–1999
No dummy
(5)
Dummy
(6)
UC and LFS 1999
No dummy
(7)
Dummy
(8)
Constant 0.192 0.03 0.175 0.027 0.036 0.018 0.096 0.020
(4.1) (0.6) (3.2) (0.5) (0.8) (0.3) (2.3) (0.4)
Relative per-capita 0.248 0.275 0.262 0.212 0.236 0.230 0.277 0.296
real GDP (7.9) (11.0) (4.3) (4.6) (4.6) (4.4) (9.7) (11.2)
Dummy, CEE-FSU 0.687 0.739 0.436
(9.4) (9.4) (5.7)
Dummy, East and 0.008 0.044 0.039 0.023
South Asia (0.1) (0.5) (0.4) (0.3)
Dummy, Latin America 0.053 0.071 0.068 0.087
and Caribbean (0.6) (0.8) (0.7) (1.0)
Adjusted R2 0.292 0.568 0.123 0.500 0.170 0.158 0.386 0.490
Standard error 0.419 0.327 0.447 0.337 0.352 0.354 0.380 0.346
Mean dep. variable 0.440 0.440 0.344 0.344 0.180 0.180 0.373 0.373
Number of observations 150 150 128 128 100 100 150 150
NOTE: Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio. Per-capita real GDP measured relative to world average income.
Individual countries and regions identified in Table A.1. Excludes CEE-FSU countries.
SOURCE: Regressions based on a sample of 150 countries with populations of one million or more citizens in 1999.
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population, educational attainment, openness to international trade,
unionization, urbanization, and a dummy variable for countries that
signed the freedom of association convention. Unfortunately, variables
such as unionization rates are not readily available for all of the 150
countries in the data set.
The OLS regression results appear in Table 3.2. Per-capita GDP
enters with a significantly positive coefficient for all eight regressions.
Countries with higher incomes are more likely to have all of the indi-
cated features. Having UC in 1999, adopting UC between 1949 and
1999, and having both UC and an LFS in 1999 were all more probable
in high-income countries.
In the first two regression equations that explain the presence of
UC in 1999, note the importance of the dummy variable for CEE-FSU
countries. While the adjusted R2 increases from 0.292 to 0.568 when
the dummy variables were added, only the CEE-FSU dummy variable
is significant. Its coefficient has a t-ratio of 9.4, nearly as large as the
t-ratio for per-capita GDP. Note also that the coefficient on GDP be-
comes larger and more significant when this dummy variable is pres-
ent. The CEE-FSU countries are particularly likely to have a UC
program even though per-capita GDP is typically modest.
Very similar results are obtained in the regression equations shown
in columns (3) and (4), which examine the adoption of UC between
1949 and 1999. The CEE-FSU dummy variable is by far the most
significant variable in the equation (column [4]). From the positive and
significant coefficient on per-capita GDP, it is clear that countries with
high income were more likely than others to adopt UC programs during
these 50 years.
Since the CEE-FSU countries were unusually likely to adopt UC,
equations in columns (5) and (6) are fitted with these countries ex-
cluded. The coefficient for per-capita GDP remains significant in these
equations as well. Note that the dummy variables for the other two
geographic areas are not significant (columns 2, 4, and 6). Countries in
East and South Asia, and in Latin America and the Caribbean, are
neither more likely nor less likely than the average in having UC in
1999 and in adopting UC between 1949 and 1999.
The regression equations shown in columns (7) and (8) examine
the presence of both UC and a LFS in 1999. The coefficient on per-
capita GDP is somewhat larger in equations (7) and (8) than in equa-
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tions (1) and (2). The only significant region dummy variable in equa-
tion (8) is for CEE-FSU countries. This finding contrasts with equation
(2) in Table 2.7 where all three regional dummy variables have positive
and significant coefficients in explaining the presence of an LFS. The
result for equation (8) is not surprising given the other results displayed
in Table 3.2. Recall that the regional dummy variables for East and
South Asia, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, are not signifi-
cant in explaining the presence of UC in 1999 (column 2), nor the
adoption of a UC program between 1949 and 1999 (columns 4 and 6).
Consider the following simple verbal summary to supplement the
regression analysis of Tables 2.7 and 3.2, which describe the presence
of LFSs and UC programs in 1999. The presence or absence of both
an LFS and UC can be considered as cells in a two-by-two contingency
table. Across the 150 countries studied here, 56 countries had both an
LFS and a UC program in 1999 while 58 had neither. Of the remaining
36 countries, 26 had only an LFS while 10 had only UC. Eight of the
latter 10 were CEE-FSU countries which established UC during the
1990s without developing a survey-based measure of unemployment.14
This situation is especially common in FSU countries, where 6 have a
UI program but no LFS.
The 26 countries with an LFS but no UC program are dispropor-
tionately located in two regions: East and South Asia (8 countries), and
Latin America and the Caribbean (12). Policymakers in these countries
can track labor market developments through periodic household
survey-based measures of unemployment, involuntary short hours, and
wages, but there is no program that pays UI or UA benefits to the
unemployed. While other programs provide benefits and services to the
unemployed, support comes mainly from active labor market measures
(training, temporary public jobs programs), severance pay, SA pro-
grams, and social investment funds. Chapter 7 discusses these alterna-
tive support programs in the Latin America-Caribbean region.
Having a UC program is no guarantee that the program is effective
in meeting the needs of the unemployed. The program in a low-income
country will undoubtedly be very different from the program in a high-
income country, say, Germany. Some programs may compensate a low
share of the unemployed and/or provide very meager support payments
while others may be quite generous. The following sections introduce
and examine measures of UC recipiency, payment levels, and costs.
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THE COST OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Payments of UC benefits can be compared across countries using
a common metric. This section introduces an expression to characterize
the costs of UC benefit payments as a percentage of total wages. The
next section then examines the costs of UC programs for selected coun-
tries.
Benefit payments to the unemployed can be expressed as
(3.1) TBen  AWBen  NBen  52,
where
TBen  total annual benefit payments,
AWBen average weekly benefits,
NBen  the average weekly number of beneficiaries, and 52 con-
verts weekly benefit payments to an annual benefit flow (as-
suming payments are made weekly).
The right-hand terms in Equation (3.1) can be rewritten equiva-
lently as
(3.1a) TBen  (RRate  AWW)  ([NBen/Unemp] 
[LF  TUR])  52,
where
AWW  the average weekly wage,
RRate  the replacement rate (average weekly benefits as a ratio to
AWW),
Unemp  average weekly number unemployed,
LF  the labor force, and
TUR  total unemployment rate.
Note that the replacement rate in Equation (3.1a) measures benefit
payments relative to the economy-wide average weekly wage. Because
the incidence of unemployment is above average among low-skilled
workers, the average weekly wage of UC beneficiaries is lower than
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the economy-wide average weekly wage. Thus, RRate in Equation
(3.1a) could be expressed as the replacement rate for beneficiaries
times the ratio of their weekly wage to the overall weekly wage. In data
for the United States, the weekly wage of UI beneficiaries ranges from
80 to 90 percent of the overall weekly wage. This alternative represen-
tation would have the advantage of showing an average replacement
rate more directly relevant to labor supply decisions of beneficiaries.
A convenient metric for scaling (normalizing) the costs of UC is
annual wage and salary payments. This can be expressed as
(3.2) Wages  Emp  AWW  52,
where
Wages  total annual wages or the wage bill,
Emp  annual average employment, and
AWW  the average weekly wage.
This expression for the annual wage bill can be rewritten as
(3.2a) Wages  LF  (1  TUR)  AWW  52.
All terms in (3.2a) have already been introduced.
Dividing Equations (3.1a) by (3.2a) yields an expression for unem-
ployment benefit costs measured as a fraction of the wage bill:
(3.3) TBen/Wages  RRate  (NBen/Unemp)  TUR/(1  TUR).
The benefit-cost rate can be expressed as a fraction or as a percentage.
In a graphical exposition to be presented below, B ( TBen/Wages) is
shown as a percentage.
The left-hand side of Equation (3.3) is the cost of unemployment
benefits expressed as a fraction (or percentage) of the wage bill. This
cost rate has three determinants: the replacement rate, the share of the
unemployed who are compensated, and the unemployment rate. The
latter is largely a macro phenomenon that reflects the overall function-
ing of the economy. The replacement rate and the share who receive
benefits, in contrast, are influenced by policy choices made by a coun-
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try as well as factors that reflect the functioning of its labor market.
Statutory UC provisions and administrative procedures influence both
payment levels and the share of the unemployed who receive benefits.
When unemployment increases, there is a direct and obvious effect
on the cost rate in Equation (3.3); that is, total benefit payments in-
crease. Increased unemployment, however, also reduces the total wage
bill through a reduction in total employment. This enters explicitly into
Equation (3.2a) with the term LF  (1  TUR), which stands for total
employment. The employment reduction enters Equation (3.3) through
the final term, the denominator (1  TUR). Thus, as unemployment
increases, the benefit-cost rate increases for two reasons: increased
benefit payments and reductions in the total wage bill through reduced
employment.
The denominator in the left side of Equation (3.3) is the total wage
bill. This is smaller than total labor compensation because it excludes
fringe benefits (supplements to wages and salaries) and the income of
the self-employed. Total labor compensation or total GDP could also
be used in the denominator of Equation (3.3) to calculate the cost rate
for providing UC. These two alternatives were not selected for the
following reasons. The self-employed are excluded from UC coverage
in most countries because of moral hazard, that is, the temptation to
cause your own unemployment in order to collect UC benefits. Fringe
benefits are not measured as accurately as total wages and salaries.
Deriving a measure of weekly employee compensation would thus be
difficult in many countries, particularly those where the income side of
the national income accounts is not complete. Measures of average
weekly wages are much more readily available.15 If GDP were used,
some of the variation in the cost rate would reflect cross-country differ-
ences in labor’s share of total GDP as well as the explicit factors shown
in the right-hand side of Equation (3.3). Readers should note that the
OECD often uses GDP when it assesses the comparative costs of UC,
other passive measures, and active labor market measures.
Up to this point, the discussion of unemployment benefit costs has
not distinguished UI from UA payments. Regardless of the kind of UC
program offered by a country, its cost rate can be represented by Equa-
tion (3.3). Because the expression is generic, it is helpful in making
comparisons between UI and UA, showing the cost of each relative to
the total wage bill.
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One other feature of Equation (3.3) should also be pointed out. The
(NBen/Unemp) ratio is a summary measure of benefit availability, but
NBen is not nested within Unemp. Since both UI and UA can make
payments to persons with earnings, NBen is not a subset of Unemp. In
the United States, for example, almost 10 percent of weeks compen-
sated by the UI program go to persons with earnings who receive so-
called partial unemployment benefits. In Australia, nearly one-fifth of
UA recipients have earnings in the same period when benefits are re-
ceived, and NBen has exceeded Unemp in some years. Thus, the
(NBen/Unemp) ratio is best thought of as a macro indicator of benefit
availability where some recipients may not be unemployed.16
Typically, estimates of unemployment from an LFS (Unemp) and
UC beneficiaries (NBen) are derived from separate statistical reporting
systems. If the UC administrative agency does not effectively monitor
claimant eligibility, some beneficiaries could be unemployed while
others could be employed and/or inactive (out of the labor force). Thus,
the (NBen/Unemp) ratio could be high not only because entry re-
quirements are easy but also because eligibility is not effectively
monitored. When countries cross-classify benefit status with the three
labor force states (employed, unemployed, and inactive), some have
found that a measurable share of recipients are employed and/or
inactive.17
The ratio (NBen/Unemp) is also affected by the extent of UC cov-
erage. In the United States, coverage of wage and salary workers is
close to universal (97–98 percent). In several countries, however, cov-
erage is much lower for various reasons, including the exclusion of
small firms, industries such as agriculture, and the self-employed, and
the failure of covered firms to register. With lower levels of program
coverage, the (NBen/Unemp) ratio will be lower. Chapter 8 discusses
UC coverage in more detail.
In offering UC, a country may make explicit or implicit decisions
regarding the replacement rate and the recipiency rate. The product of
RRate and (NBen/Unemp) in Equation (3.3) shows the cost of UC per
percentage point in the unemployment rate. This product can be termed
a generosity index (G):
(3.4) G  RRate  (NBen/Unemp)
It is obvious that several different combinations of RRate and (NBen/
Unemp) in Equation (3.4) can yield a given level of G. For example, a
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G of 0.25 is possible either when both RRate and (NBen/Unemp) equal
0.50, or when RRate equals 0.25 while (NBen/Unemp) equals 1.00.
Countries have wide choice in establishing the levels of the two factors
that combine to determine G. Thus, the United Kingdom and the
United States have roughly similar levels of G (See Table 3.3 and chart
A in Vroman [2002b]), but the replacement rate (RRate) is much higher
in the United States while the recipiency rate (NBen/Unemp) is much
higher in the United Kingdom. Should a country decide to make a
cost-neutral change in its UC program, this could be accomplished by
changing RRate and simultaneously modifying (NBen/Unemp) in the
opposite direction.18
Regardless of the system used to provide UC—UI or UA or a
mixed system with both—the costs of benefit payments per percentage
point of unemployment can be characterized with G, the generosity
index. Empirical examples from UI systems and from UA systems are
explored in the next section.
The coefficient G also has macroeconomic significance. It is a gra-
dient that shows how much the cost of UC changes when the unem-
ployment rate changes. This can be seen by recalling the definition of
the benefit-cost rate (benefit costs relative to payroll or B) and substitut-
ing the definition of G from Equation (3.4) into the right-hand side of
Equation (3.3):
(3.5) B  G  TUR/(1TUR)
Thus, as unemployment increases the benefit cost rate also increases.
Individual countries may select a smaller or larger G depending
upon such factors as affordability and the size of perceived labor mar-
ket disincentive effects if generous access and/or high replacement
rates are provided. As will be seen, a wide variety of choices have been
made by individual countries.
COST ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
The preceding framework is useful for understanding the costs of
UC programs in individual countries and for making cross-country
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comparisons. Table 3.3 displays cost data from 24 countries: 12 are
from the OECD-20 grouping, while 4 each are countries from the CEE-
FSU region, East and South Asia, and South America. The sample
represents more than one-third of all countries with a UC program in
1999.
Table 3.3 identifies the type of UC program present in each country
along with unemployment and UC cost data from the 1990s. The data
in columns (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7) are, respectively, averages of five
variables: the unemployment rate, the recipiency rate, the replacement
rate, the generosity index (G), and the benefit-cost rate (B). Column (6)
shows estimates of G-based time series regressions for each country.
Appendix C provides details of the regressions.
The table also displays alternative summaries of the same cost data,
which emphasize the variability in each of the cost components, aver-
age costs by region, and average costs by type of UC program. Four of
these countries have UA programs while the remaining 20 have UI.
Seven countries, all in the OECD-20 group, offer both UI and UA
while 13 have stand-alone UI. Because the table has a large volume of
information, two supporting figures are used to summarize the salient
details.
Figure 3.1 plots the association between the unemployment rate
and the benefit-cost rate. Each country is represented with a letter (A,
C, O, or S) that identifies its regional classification. The low unemploy-
ment rates in the four Asian economies are ubiquitous, all between 2.0
and 3.2 percent. Countries from the other three regions display a broad
range of unemployment rates. Note also that the two highest unemploy-
ment rates are for countries from the CEE-FSU region, the region with
the highest average unemployment during the 1990s (recall Table 2.6).
Nearly half of the countries (11 of 24) had a benefit-cost rate of less
than 1.0 percent during the 1990s. The United States was the only
country from the OECD-20 group with such a low benefit-cost rate. Of
the 4 countries with cost rates above 4.0 percent, all were from the
OECD-20 group.
Observe the wide scatter of data points in Figure 3.1. If UC gener-
osity were similar across countries, the data points would cluster
around a line that would rise monotonically from the origin (lower left
corner) and increase steadily while moving to higher unemployment
rates. A regression confirms the weak association between the unem-
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Table 3.3 Unemployment Compensation Costs in Selected Countries during the 1990s
Country
UC
System
(1)
TUR
(%)
(2)
NBen/Unemp
(3)
RRate
(4)
(G)
(5)
Regression
estimate
of G
(6)
B (%)
(7)
OECD-20
Australia UA 8.87 0.95 0.29 0.27 0.24 2.46
Austria UI-UA 3.82 1.32 0.34 0.45 0.43 1.73
Canada UI 9.54 0.60 0.45 0.27 0.28 2.62
Denmark UI 7.70 1.03 0.51 0.53 0.51 4.12
France UI-UA 11.23 0.82 0.53 0.44 0.41 4.82
Germany UI-UA 10.20 0.76 0.48 0.36 0.32 3.73
Ireland UI-UA 12.07 1.42 0.27 0.38 0.28 4.50
Netherlands UI-UA 6.16 1.43 0.58 0.84 0.58 5.27
New Zealand UA 7.82 1.14 0.32 0.36 0.32 2.83
Portugal UI-UA 5.53 0.77 0.47 0.36 0.18 2.11
United Kingdom UI-UA 7.18 0.85 0.18 0.15 0.18 1.09
United States UI 5.76 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.12 0.67
CEE-FSU
Bulgaria UI 16.66 0.39 0.29 0.11 0.11 1.83
Slovakia UI 13.74 0.81 0.28 0.23 0.19 3.14
Estonia UA 8.46 0.26 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02
Ukraine UI 9.50 0.13 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.32
Eastern and Southern Asia
Hong Kong UA 2.55 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.06 0.09
Japan UI 3.04 0.38 0.39 0.15 0.17 0.46
Korea, South UI 3.20 0.06 0.36 0.02 0.03 0.11
Taiwan UI 2.04 0.04 0.36 0.02 0.07PAG
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Table 3.3 (continued)
Country
UC
System
(1)
TUR
(%)
(2)
NBen/Unemp
(3)
RRate
(4)
(G)
(5)
Regression
estimate
of G
(6)
B (%)
(7)
South America
Argentina UI 12.23 0.06 0.41 0.02 0.02 0.29
Brazil UI 6.58 0.30 0.51 0.15 0.11 0.90
Chile UI 7.29 0.07 0.06 0.004 0.02 0.03
Uruguay UI 9.44 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.14
All 24 countries
Simple average 7.94 0.61 0.33 0.22 0.20 1.81
Standard deviation 3.61 0.45 0.14 0.21 0.16 1.69
Coeff. of variation 0.46 0.75 0.43 0.93 0.81 0.93
Simple averages by region
OECD-20 12 7.99 0.95 0.40 0.38 0.32 2.99
CEE-FSU 4 12.09 0.40 0.22 0.10 0.09 1.33
E. and South Asia 4 2.71 0.14 0.34 0.05 0.09 0.18
South America 4 8.89 0.14 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.34
Simple averages by type
of UC Program
UA 4 6.93 0.61 0.24 0.17 0.16 1.35
All UI 20 8.15 0.59 0.36 0.23 0.20 1.90
UI-UA 7 8.03 1.05 0.41 0.42 0.34 3.32
UI alone 13 8.21 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.12 1.13
NOTES: TUR is total unemployment rate (%), NBen/Unemp is the recipiency rate, RRate is the replacement rate, G is the UC generosity
index, and B is the benefit-cost rate (%). See text for further discussion.PAG
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Figure 3.1 Unemployment Compensation Benefit-Cost Rates for Selected Countries in the 1990s
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68 Vroman and Brusentsev
ployment rate and the benefit-cost rate. The estimated slope as shown
in Figure 3.1 is 0.193, but only 11 percent of the variation in the cost
rate is explained by knowing the unemployment rate. This regression
line is explicitly drawn. Its slope of 0.193 is an estimate of average
UC generosity (G) for these 24 countries. The predicted cost rates at
unemployment rates of 5.0, 10.0, and 15.0 percent are 1.01, 2.14, and
3.40 percent, respectively.19
The fact that several data points reside a long distance from this
line serves to emphasize that UC benefit generosity is highly variable.
Countries with above-average generosity are located above the regres-
sion line while those with a G below 0.193 are below the line. An
example of this variability is provided by the United States, which had
an average unemployment rate of 5.76 percent during the 1990s. The
regression-based estimate of the U.S. cost rate (B) is 1.18 percent of
payroll whereas the actual average, column (7) of Table 3.3, was only
0.67 percent. Actual U.S. costs were less than 60 percent of the cost
rate projected by the regression.
Interestingly, the regression line in Figure 3.1 almost perfectly di-
vides the countries by region. There are 11 data points above the re-
gression line and 13 below it. Ten of the 11 countries above the line
are from the OECD-20 group. The other country is Slovakia from the
CEE-FSU group.20 The 2 OECD-20 countries that fall below the re-
gression line are the United Kingdom and, as already noted, the United
States. All 4 countries from East and South Asia, all 4 from South
America, and three CEE-FSU countries are located below the regres-
sion line. Brazil and Japan are the countries from their respective re-
gions that are located closest to the regression line.21 Eight countries
had an average G less than 0.04 during the 1990s: 3 from Asia, 3 from
South America, and 2 from the CEE-FSU region.
Appendix C reports regression results for estimating benefit gener-
osity using time series data from these countries. Again, G is estimated
using Equation (3.5); that is, homogeneous regressions linking the UC
cost rate with the unemployment rate. These estimated slopes are dis-
played in column (6) of Table 3.3. Generally, the regression-based esti-
mates of G closely match the estimates based on averages from the
1990s (column 5). High UC benefit generosity is a phenomenon of the
OECD-20 countries.
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As noted previously, a given level of UC benefit generosity can
be achieved by different combinations of the recipiency rate and the
replacement rate. Figure 3.2 shows estimates of both, again using data
from Table 3.3. Across the 24 countries, replacement rates range from
0.58 (the Netherlands) to 0.06 (Chile), with an average of 0.33. Reci-
piency rates during the 1990s were even more variable than replace-
ment rates. The range was from 1.43 (the Netherlands) to 0.04
(Taiwan), with an average of 0.61. Five countries had average recipie-
ncy rates that exceeded 1.0 during the 1990s while 7 had recipiency
rates below 0.20.
The visual impression from Figure 3.2 is that the recipiency rate
is much more variable than the replacement rate. This impression is
confirmed in Table 3.3, where the coefficients of variation for each can
be compared. As noted in Chapter 2, the coefficient of variation is a
statistic that describes relative variability using the ratio of the standard
deviation (a measure of variation) to the mean of a variable. Thus, the
coefficient of variation for the recipiency rate is 0.75 whereas for the
replacement rate it is 0.43. Using this measure of relative variability,
the recipiency rate was 74 percent more variable than the replacement
rate for these 24 countries during the 1990s, that is, 0.75/0.43  1.74
or 74 percent higher.
A second comparison may be more vivid. Rank both measures in
Figure 3.2 from top to bottom and remove the three highest and the
three lowest from the set. Then compare the highest and lowest of the
remaining 18. For the recipiency rate, these ratios are 1.034 and 0.068
for a high-to-low ratio of 15.2. For the replacement rate, the corre-
sponding ratios are 0.51 and 0.18 for a high-to-low ratio of 2.8. The
wider variability of the recipiency rate than the replacement rate again
emerges. Countries have made a wider range of (explicit and/or im-
plicit) choices regarding recipiency rates than their choices of replace-
ment rates.
Since UC benefit generosity is the product of the recipiency rate
times the replacement rate, it is instructive to introduce selected levels
of generosity in Figure 3.2. The figure displays four iso-generosity
lines, that is, schedules with G values of 0.02, 0.10, 0.25, and 0.40.
Eight countries have a G value close to 0.02 while 10 have a G value
that exceeds 0.25. The latter are all OECD-20 countries while the for-
mer are all from the other three broad regions.
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Figure 3.2 Unemployment Compensation Replacement Rates and Recipiency Rates for Selected Countries
in the 1990s
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Three countries have made quite different choices to achieve a
common level of generosity of 0.15. Brazil combines middle-to-low
recipiency (0.30) with a high replacement rate (0.51) while the United
Kingdom has high recipiency (0.85) but a low replacement rate (0.18).
Japan has intermediate levels of both recipiency (0.38) and its replace-
ment rate (0.39). Other pairings, apparent in Table 3.3, can also be
seen in Figure 3.2: Bulgaria and the United States at G  0.11–0.12;
Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal at G  0.36–0.38; and
Austria and France at G  0.44–0.45. Across all 24 countries in Figure
3.2, the high generosity indices of Denmark and the Netherlands stand
out as does the low generosity index of Chile.
The cost experiences for the four regions are also summarized in
Table 3.3. These averages again illustrate the high costs and high bene-
fit generosity of the OECD-20 countries. Average generosity was 0.38
during the 1990s, and only the United Kingdom and the United States
had generosity indices lower than 0.20. When average recipiency rates
and replacement rates are compared across regions, it is clear that high
recipiency is the factor most responsible for high generosity in the
OECD-20 countries. Their average recipiency rate during the 1990s
was 0.95, roughly twice the CEE-FSU average of 0.49 and nearly seven
times the averages of 0.14 for both the Asian and the South American
countries included in this analysis.
Summaries of data by type of UC program are also shown. When
averages for all UI and all UA programs are compared, the recipiency
rates are the same at 0.61, but the average UA replacement rate is lower
(0.24 compared to 0.35).22 Because the average UA replacement rate is
the lower of the two, so too is UA generosity (0.17 compared to 0.23)
and average UC costs (1.35 percent compared to 1.90 percent). For this
broad comparison, UA is the less expensive of the two UC systems
because of its lower average replacement rate.23
The final two lines of the table compare countries that offer UI as
a stand-alone program with those having both UI and UA. The biggest
contrast between these two is found in their average recipiency rates:
0.36 for UI-alone programs and 1.05 for combined UI-UA programs.
Access to benefits is much easier in countries with the combined pro-
grams. The lowest recipiency rates among the seven with both UI and
UA were 0.77 in Portugal and 0.76 in Germany. While the combined
programs also have higher replacement rate averages, the differences
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are more modest, for example, 0.41 versus 0.32. Average unemploy-
ment rates are quite similar for the UI-UA and UI-alone programs.
Thus, the three-to-one difference in average costs (3.32 percent versus
1.13 percent) arises almost totally from differences in benefit generos-
ity, that is, average G values of 0.42 and 0.13. The combined UI-UA
programs cost more mainly because of easier access to benefits by
unemployed workers.
The average cost data indicate that UA is not necessarily less ex-
pensive than UI. The average cost rate for the 13 UI-alone programs
(1.13 percent) was lower than the 1.35 percent cost rate for the UA
programs during the 1990s. When their generosity indices are com-
pared, the average is somewhat higher for the UA programs (0.17) than
for the UI-alone programs (0.13). Thus, if a country wishes to operate
a low-cost UC program it can be done with either UI or UA. The
statutory and administrative details that determine the recipiency rate
and the replacement rate are the key elements in determining the level,
the generosity index and the cost of a UC program (either UI or UA)
at a given level of unemployment.
THE CHANGING MIX OF BENEFICIARIES:
UI VERSUS UA
Program costs and long duration in benefit status have become
increasingly important policy concerns in the provision of UC benefits
in the OECD-20 countries. These concerns are a major motivation be-
hind initiatives to ‘‘activate’’ the unemployed. With UC cost concerns
as a key background consideration, it is relevant to note that the mix of
beneficiaries within combined UI-UA systems has been changing
towards an increased share of UA beneficiaries. Since UA benefit levels
are typically the lower of the two, this change has an obvious implica-
tion, a tendency to reduce UC benefit costs.
Table 3.4 summarizes trends in the mix of beneficiaries between
1960 and 2000 among the seven countries with combined UI-UA sys-
tems. It shows the UA share of beneficiaries for years at the start of the
past five decades and the changes between 1960 and 2000. For five of
the seven countries, there was a sharp increase in the UA share. France
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Table 3.4 UA Share of Beneficiaries in Mixed UI-UA Systems
Change
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960–2000Country
Austria 0.12 0.16 0.31 0.41 0.29
France 0.22 0.22
Germany 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.35 0.46 0.24
Ireland 0.42 0.40 0.48 0.71 0.60 0.18
Netherlands 0.21a 0.35 0.63 0.49c 0.28
Portugal 0.69b 0.45 0.46c 0.23
United Kingdom 0.30 0.32 0.46 0.75 0.82 0.52
a 1975.
b 1986.
c 1998.
and Portugal were the two countries with different patterns: There was
essentially no change in France (between 1990 and 2000) while the UA
proportion decreased in Portugal. The latter trend has a very simple
explanation. Portugal initiated UC in 1975 with a UA system. This
changed to a combined UI-UA system in 1985–1986. Since 1990, the
UA share of days compensated in Portugal has ranged from 0.36 to
0.46 with no discernable trend.
For the other five countries, the increases in the UA share of weeks
compensated have ranged from 0.18 in Ireland to 0.52 in the United
Kingdom. For Ireland and the Netherlands, the changes were partially
reversed during the 1990s as the strong economic performance in both
countries saw large decreases in the number of UA recipients. The
continuing increase in the UA share in the United Kingdom during the
1990s was influenced by a shortening of the maximum duration of UI
benefits from 12 to 6 months in 1996. Thus, five of the six countries
with combined UI-UA systems consistently present throughout recent
decades have experienced a large scale shift in the mix of beneficiaries
toward UA.
The most likely explanation for the increase in the UA share of the
combined UI-UA caseload is the continued and growing incidence of
long-term unemployment, that is, unemployment spells that last more
than 12 months. Chapter 8 examines long-term unemployment and
documents its growth and persistence in OECD-20 countries and its
very high incidence in CEE-FSU countries.
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SUMMARY
This chapter introduced and briefly discussed a broad range of un-
employment protection arrangements before narrowing the focus to
UC. The following observations were made:
• There has been a growth in the prevalence of UC programs since
1949, with a particularly large increase in the 1990s. Most of
the increase in this decade reflects widespread adoption by CEE-
FSU countries.
• The presence of UC is closely linked to the level of economic
development. Countries with high income were more likely than
others to adopt UC programs during the 50 years covered in this
book.
• Countries with an LFS but no UC program are disproportion-
ately located in two regions: East and South Asia, and Latin
America and the Caribbean. Policymakers in the countries of
these regions can track labor market developments through peri-
odic household survey-based measures of unemployment, but
there is no program that pays UC benefits to the unemployed.
• The costs of UC benefits depend on three factors: the UC reci-
piency rate, the replacement rate, and the underlying unemploy-
ment rate in the labor force.
• A descriptive analysis for a sample of 24 countries drawn from
the world’s major geographic regions shows that, on average,
UC costs and generosity are highest in the countries from the
OECD-20 group. Programs from other regions are typically
much less generous.
• Costs are also systematically higher in countries that provide
both UI and UA benefits to the unemployed when compared to
UI- and UA-alone countries.
• For countries with combined UI-UA systems of unemployment
protection, there has been a trend toward an increased propor-
tion of UA beneficiaries relative to UI beneficiaries.
The nearly 70 countries with UC programs face a variety of situa-
tions regarding macroeconomic performance, unemployment rates, ac-
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cess to benefits, and program financing. The next four chapters extend
the discussion of UC program experiences in four broad geographic
groupings: 1) the OECD-20 countries, 2) CEE-FSU countries, 3) East
and South Asia, and 4) South America. Some problems are common to
countries in all regions. These include providing for adequate program
financing, extending coverage to small enterprises, and ensuring that
UC-related labor market distortions are limited in scale.
On the other hand, some problems are much more pronounced in
particular regions. For instance, unusually long benefit duration is a
feature in OECD-20 and CEE-FSU countries, ensuring protection
against inflation is a unique problem facing many countries in South
America, and effective implementation of new UC programs is a chal-
lenge facing Asian and CEE-FSU economies. Given these differences,
the next four chapters pay particular attention to the regional aspects
of unemployment protection.
Notes
1. See Chapter 2.
2. For example, the OECD database on social expenditures explicitly identifies sev-
erance pay in one of its tables. Across the 29 member countries, just 6 reported
expenditures on severance pay for 1998. Only 2 countries reported data for every
year between 1990 and 1998. Information on numbers compensated is even less
common than expenditure data.
3. Given the relatively long history of UC programs, there is a large literature ac-
counting for their disincentive effects on job search. The adverse effects of sever-
ance pay has received less attention, and data limitations restrict comparative
research.
4. For example, MacIsaac and Rama (2001) estimate that only about half of those
eligible for severance pay in Peru actually receive a payment.
5. Other systems that serve terminated workers include early retirement programs,
disability programs, qualification training and retraining, group loan funds, and
support for small business start-ups.
6. Vroman (2002b) examines UI and UA programs with attention to their compara-
tive costs and labor market disincentives.
7. Livelihood protection programs in Asia are also a form of SA program.
8. Programs related to trade and structural change, such as trade adjustment assis-
tance, could be added to the list.
9. The geographic classification used in Chapter 2 underlies Table 3.1.
10. Six countries outside the CEE-FSU area added UC programs: Algeria, Argentina,
Korea, Mauritius, Taiwan, and Venezuela, but one (Ghana) discontinued its pro-
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gram for a net increase of five. It should also be noted that three CEE countries
already had UC in 1989: Bulgaria, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia.
11. The only 2 of these 28 countries without a UC program in 1999 were Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan created a program shortly after independence but
eliminated it in the mid-1990s.
12. In 2004, Sri Lanka and Vietnam were considering adopting a UC program, and
Thailand started to make benefit payments in midyear.
13. The results were not sensitive to the method of measurement: OLS, logit, or
probit.
14. The countries are Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Kyrgistan, Mongolia,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The other two with UC but no LFS are Iran and
Iraq.
15. In the empirical measures examined below, the average weekly wage refers to the
nonagricultural sector. For many countries estimates are available from the ILO
Web site: http://laborsta.ilo.org.
16. The usual LFS convention is to count people as unemployed only if they have
been looking for work but had no hours worked during the reference week of the
survey. In other words, people with both hours worked and hours of unemploy-
ment during the reference week are counted as employed. Persons in these situa-
tions are commonly described as underemployed. Underemployment as discussed
in Chapter 2 is a broader concept that can also encompass persons working full
time but at a skill level below that for which they were trained.
17. For example, see Table 8.5 in OECD (1994). Data for registered unemployed
were matched against labor force status (employed, unemployed, or inactive) in
Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The pro-
portion of registered unemployed who were not unemployed under the LFS defi-
nition ranged from 23 percent (Finland) to 63 percent (the Netherlands).
18. In practice, the changes would probably occur gradually. Changing the actual
provisions of a functioning program is more difficult than changing terms in a
mathematical expression such as Equation (3.4).
19. This relationship has some curvature because the unemployment term in Equa-
tions (3.3) and (3.5) enters as the ratio of the unemployment rate to 1 minus the
unemployment rate.
20. Slovak UC benefit generosity nearly matches the regression estimate. The actual
cost rate for Slovakia of 3.14 percent is just slightly higher than the regression-
based estimate of 3.07 percent.
21. The predicted and actual values for Brazil they are 1.36 and 0.90 percent, respec-
tively, while for Japan they are 0.61 and 0.46 percent, respectively.
22. Because the UA sample has only four countries, each of the four has a large effect
on the averages. For example, the average recipiency rate is high in Australia
(0.95) and New Zealand (1.14) but low in Estonia (0.26) and Hong Kong (0.09).
23. A comparison of UI and UA programs which emphasizes costs and labor market
disincentive effects is given in Vroman (2002b). That analysis focuses on the cost
experiences of three countries: Canada and the United States, which have UI
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systems; and Australia, which is the largest of the four countries with UA noted
here. For all three countries, there have been important changes in UC generosity
and costs during the past four decades. Details of changes in UC costs for these
three are provided in Vroman (2002b). For both Canada and the United States,
the direction of UC generosity and costs has been downward, particularly for
Canada during the 1990s.
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Part 2
Regional Aspects of
Unemployment Protection
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4
Unemployment Compensation in the
OECD-20 Countries
We commence the regional analysis with the OECD-20 countries
for a number of obvious reasons. First, these countries have the longest
continuous experiences with UC programs and a rich historical record.
Second, they have influenced the programs adopted in later years by
countries in other regions. While the influence of France and the United
Kingdom on the UC programs in other countries, particularly former
colonies, is most obvious, the UI programs of Germany and the United
States have also influenced programs established elsewhere. Third, a
wide range of social protection programs and more complete data re-
porting systems in the OECD-20 countries combine to yield a wider
array of data. As a result, a broader set of quantitative analyses can be
undertaken for these countries.
The OECD-20 countries have high average per-capita income, ex-
tensive social protection arrangements, and well-developed statistical
reporting systems. Because of these features, they present several di-
mensions of information for analysis. Not only is labor market infor-
mation more extensive, but it is also more readily available than in
other regions. Finally, potential analyses are facilitated by the efforts
of the OECD, Eurostat of the EU, and the ILO to standardize labor
market and social protection information, efforts that have advanced
further than in other regions.
As noted in Chapter 3, some problems in UC programs are com-
mon to all countries, while other problems are much more pronounced
in specific regions. Unusually long benefit duration is a particular prob-
lem in the OECD-20 countries. Through their long historical experi-
ences, particularly developments since the mid-1970s, these countries
have come to recognize the negative aspects of UC in contributing to
long-term unemployment and dependency among a subset of their
labor forces. This realization has resulted in initiatives to ‘‘activate’’
the unemployed; that is, institute labor market policies have been de-
signed to shorten the duration of unemployment and increase the likeli-
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hood of reemployment. Recognition of the negative aspects of UC has
been heightened by OECD analyses of social exclusion and the poten-
tial negative effects on unemployment, both high unemployment rates
and long unemployment duration, caused by the full array of labor
market and social protection programs, not just the UC program.1 Aca-
demic research has reinforced this conclusion by emphasizing the in-
teraction effects between downward deviations in output and labor
market institutions in causing persistently high unemployment.2
This chapter first highlights the similarities and differences in the
labor markets of the OECD-20 countries before presenting individual
experiences of UC programs in five countries: Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Attention is given to Germany, one
of the three large economies in mainland Europe, because it has been
characterized by high unemployment rates for more than 20 years, a
problem that was exacerbated with the reunification of East and West
Germany in 1989. Moreover, Germany is currently undertaking an ex-
tensive reform of its UC program in light of this persistent unemploy-
ment problem.
Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, four small- to
medium-sized economies, are used as a case study because they are
viewed as success stories in terms of employment growth and unem-
ployment. The contrast with Germany makes the recent experiences of
these four countries all the more interesting, particularly since their
success has occurred in the face of certain institutional conditions that
are often cited as impediments to low unemployment.
The final section of the chapter examines expenditure data on ac-
tive labor market measures in the OECD-20 countries. Given that the
most troubling aspect of the higher unemployment was a significant
increase in the duration of unemployment spells, the emphasis within
the OECD has been to ‘‘activate’’ the unemployed. It is argued that
activation should shorten the average duration of unemployment spells.
Public policies to foster activation would be expected to change the
composition of labor market spending. This expectation is tested in a
set of regression equations using data on spending obtained from the
OECD social expenditure database for both active and passive labor
market measures. Data availability constrains the analysis to changes
in the active-passive mix from 1985 for all OECD-20 countries and
changes back to 1980 for four countries.
PAGE 82................. 11236$ $CH4 04-15-05 08:16:26 PS
Unemployment Compensation in the OECD-20 Countries 83
LABOR MARKET INDICATORS
Table 4.1 displays summary labor market information for the
OECD-20 countries. The data on unemployment duration (the percent
unemployed 52 or more weeks), the ratio of registered to total unem-
ployment, and the part-time employment share (columns [1], [2], and
[6], respectively) all refer to averages for the decade of the 1990s.
In contrast, the information on coverage proportions and employment
protection legislation (EPL) indices (columns [3]–[5]) were assembled
at the OECD and refer to the late 1990s or 2000. The bottom rows of
Table 4.1 present simple (unweighted) averages for all 20 countries and
averages for four subregions.3
A striking feature of the table is the diversity shown by each indi-
cator. The long-term unemployment share varies over a wide range.
The lowest percentage is observed for the United States (8.9 percent)
while percentages above 50 percent are observed in five countries. The
average of the long-term unemployment share across the 20 countries
is 36.7 percent.
Unemployment duration varies systematically across the four sub-
regions, being shortest for English-speaking and Scandinavian coun-
tries and longest in southern European countries. During the 1990s the
percentage unemployed 52 or more weeks in the four southern Euro-
pean countries was approximately twice the percentages for English-
speaking and Scandinavian countries. The extent of diversity by sub-
region is illustrated with a simple variance decomposition of the Table
4.1 data. Regional dummy variables ‘‘explain’’ about one-third of the
variation in the percent with 52 or more weeks.4 Thus, within the
OECD-20 countries, there are strong contrasts by subregion in the
prevalence of long spells of unemployment.
Across the OECD-20 countries, most unemployed persons register
as job seekers with the public employment service (PES). The average
ratio of registered unemployment to LFS unemployment is 1.01 for the
18 countries with available data. Only in the United States did this ratio
fall below 0.50. Unlike unemployment duration, no strong association
is found between the prevalence of registration and subregion.5 Use of
the PES is ubiquitous within the OECD-20 countries. When workers
become unemployed they routinely register with the PES. Much of
their motivation is that registration is a requirement for UC eligibility.
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Table 4.1 Selected Labor Market Indicators for OECD-20 Countries, 1990s
Subregion
Unemp.
52 or more
weeks (%)
(1)
EOR/LFS
(2)
Nonag.
emp.
share
(3)
Nonag.
employees,
emp. share
(4)
EPL
index
(5)
Part-time
emp.
share
(6)Country
Australia Eng. 30.7 0.98 0.95 0.83 1.2 0.25
Austria W. Eur. 26.9 1.46 0.94 0.86 2.3 0.11
Belgium W. Eur. 61.8 1.48 0.98 0.82 2.5 0.16
Canada Eng. 13.9 0.60 0.96 0.81 1.1 0.19
Denmark Scan. 27.5 1.26 0.97 0.90 1.5 0.18
Finland Scan. 28.4 1.17 0.93 0.84 2.1 0.09
France W. Eur. 39.1 1.01 0.96 0.91 2.8 0.14
Germany W. Eur. 44.7 0.99 0.97 0.88 2.6 0.14
Greece S. Eur. 52.3 0.50 0.80 0.54 3.5 0.08
Ireland Eng. 60.3 1.51 0.92 0.80 1.1 0.14
Italy S. Eur. 63.2 n/a 0.95 0.69 3.4 0.10
Netherlands W. Eur. 47.8 0.85 0.97 0.86 2.2 0.29
New Zealand Eng. 24.8 1.37 0.91 0.77 0.9 0.22
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Norway Scan. 18.5 0.86 0.96 0.91 2.6 0.21
Portugal S. Eur. 44.7 n/a 0.87 0.71 3.7 0.09
Spain S. Eur. 53.4 0.73 0.93 0.77 3.1 0.07
Sweden Scan. 23.3 1.14 0.98 0.89 2.6 0.25
Switzerland W. Eur. 27.6 1.00 0.95 n/a 1.5 0.23
United Kingdom Eng. 37.1 0.89 0.98 0.87 0.9 0.23
United States Eng. 8.9 0.37 0.97 0.91 0.7 0.14
Simple averages
20 countries 36.7 1.01 0.94 0.82 2.2 0.16
Subregions
English-speaking 29.3 0.95 0.95 0.83 1.0 0.19
Scandinavia 24.4 1.11 0.96 0.88 2.2 0.16
Western Europe 41.3 1.13 0.96 0.86 2.3 0.18
Southern Europe 53.4 0.62 0.89 0.68 3.4 0.08
NOTE: See text for a more complete description of column headings. n/a  information not available. EOR: Employment office
registration; EPL: employment protection legislation.
SOURCE: Data on registered unemployment from the ILO. Data on the percent unemployed 52 or more weeks and various employment
shares from OECD (2001b). Employment protection legislation index from OECD (1999, Table 2.6).
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However, other services such as job referrals, counseling, testing, and
access to training programs are also utilized by some job seekers. In
many countries, the PES is under increasing pressure to provide these
adjustment services to its clients.
Columns (3) and (4) present information pertinent to UC coverage.
They display the proportion employed in nonagricultural industries and
the proportion employed as wage and salary workers in the nonagricul-
tural sector, respectively. The averages for these two series are 0.94
and 0.82. Across the 20 countries, approximately four in five workers
are employed in a situation where UC coverage might be anticipated.
Note the regional contrasts within the OECD-20 group of countries.
For both series, countries in southern Europe have smaller proportions
than elsewhere; for example, 89 percent work in nonagricultural indus-
tries and 69 percent work as nonagricultural wage and salary workers.
These lower proportions are characteristic of all four southern Euro-
pean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). These countries’
rankings of the column (4) proportions were 16, 18, 19, and 20. Only
New Zealand had a similarly low proportion of nonagricultural wage
and salary workers (i.e., below 0.80).
Column (5) in Table 4.1 shows there is wide diversity across these
countries in the EPLs that govern employment contracts and dismissal.
The OECD has been computing comparative EPL indices that extend
back to the late 1980s. The original work by Grubb and Wells (1993)
was extended in the OECD Jobs Study (OECD 1994). More recently,
the scope of EPL has been expanded from its original focus on statu-
tory provisions governing terminations from permanent and temporary
jobs to include mass dismissals (Grubb 2001). The EPL indices shown
in Table 4.1 recognize all three areas. In each area, these ordinal indices
are derived as averages of several underlying indicators. The 22 indi-
vidual indicators cover factors such as the length of advance notice to
be given, the amount of severance pay to be provided, restrictions on
the number and duration of temporary employment contracts, and spe-
cial notification requirements for mass dismissals. Each indicator
ranges in value from 0 (greatest employer discretion over dismissals)
to 6 (greatest restrictions on employer discretion).
Across the OECD-20 countries the average EPL index was 2.0, but
ranged from 0.7 (United States) to 3.7 (Portugal). Systematic contrasts
in EPL indices by subregion are also apparent. The English-speaking
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countries have uniformly low EPL indices, the six lowest in the table
(all below 1.3), while the indices for the southern European countries
are the highest (all exceeding 3.0). Not surprisingly the EPL indices
are closely correlated with the regional dummy variables. Over 80 per-
cent of the variation in the EPL indices was explained by a regression
using regional dummy variables. While the indices are generally close
to the overall average for countries of Western Europe and Scandinavia,
they are uniformly low for English-speaking countries and uniformly
high in southern Europe.
Finally, column (6) shows there is wide diversity in the prevalence
of part-time employment across the OECD-20 countries. The full range
during the 1990s was from 0.07 in Spain to 0.29 in the Netherlands.
Note also the low shares present in all four southern European coun-
tries. This diversity is relevant for UC coverage and is revisited in
Chapter 8. To anticipate the discussion of UC coverage in Chapter 8, it
is a common practice to exclude at least some part-time workers from
UC eligibility. Given the differences in work patterns by gender, reduc-
ing access to UC among part-time workers has a disproportionate ef-
fect on women.
To summarize, as shown in Table 4.1, the OECD-20 countries dis-
play quite diverse labor market indicators, but systematic differences
by subregion are also apparent. Generally, the English-speaking coun-
tries are characterized by relatively short average unemployment dura-
tion and low EPL indices, suggesting above-average employment
flexibility. At the opposite extreme, the countries of southern Europe
have the longest unemployment duration, the lowest nonagricultural
employment proportions, the highest EPL indices, and the lowest part-
time employment proportions. Note that the Scandinavian countries
achieve relatively short unemployment duration but have an implied
middling level of employment flexibility.
For four of the six indicators in Table 4.1, note the extreme values
shown by the United States. It ranks lowest in the percent with unem-
ployment of 52 or more weeks, lowest in the ratio of registered-to-
survey unemployment, highest in the nonagricultural wage and salary
employment share, and lowest on the EPL index. Within the context of
these 20 advanced market economies, the United States is an outlier. It
grants employers the greatest latitude in decisions over staffing and
worker retention, and its labor market functions with the lowest degree
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of worker contact with the PES. Job changing is largely a phenomenon
of individual decisions in the private market. This undoubtedly influ-
ences U.S. researchers and policymakers in examining the functioning
of the labor markets in the other OECD-20 countries.
THE EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Over the past four decades the majority of the OECD-20 countries
have undergone similar unemployment experiences. From the 1950s to
1973 unemployment rates were generally low but increased sharply
from 1974 to 1976 and then again from 1980 to 1983. A third period of
increased unemployment occurred between 1990 and 1993. Sustained
economic expansions of the mid- to late 1980s and for most of the
1990s caused noticeable decreases in unemployment from earlier cycli-
cal peaks. Even at the end of the especially long expansion of the
1990s, however, unemployment rates during the period 1999–2001 in
most OECD-20 countries had only returned to levels of the mid-1970s,
not to the levels of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Figure 4.1 traces the average unemployment rate for these coun-
tries between 1959 and 2001. Two series are shown, the mean and the
median, both based on data from 19 of the OECD-20 countries. Be-
cause Switzerland did not conduct an LFS before the 1990s, it is ex-
cluded from the chart. The mean unemployment rate was derived from
19 unemployment rates, weighting each country by the size of its labor
force. The United States has the highest weight in this series. The U.S.
labor force accounted for about 40 percent of the total between 1975
and 2001.
The mean and median differed considerably in the early years.
Prior to 1976, the mean was consistently the higher of the two, exceed-
ing the median by 1.0–1.8 percentage points in most years, and the
average differential was 1.3 percentage points (e.g., 3.4 percent versus
2.1 percent). During these years the large countries of this group had
systematically higher unemployment rates than the small countries.
The United States in particular had above-average unemployment in
many of these years. Between 1959 and 1973 the number of countries
with unemployment rates below 2.5 percent ranged between 9 and 13
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Figure 4.1 Weighted Mean and Median Unemployment Rates, 19 OECD Countries, 1959–2001
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1959 1965 1975 1985 1995 2001
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
(
%
)
Mean
Median
1970 1980 1990PAG
E
89
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.11236$
$CH4
04-15-05
08:16:29
PS
90 Vroman and Brusentsev
and averaged 11. During these 14 years, no annual unemployment rate
exceeded 7.5 percent in any of the 19 countries.
The convergence of the median and the mean after 1976 has per-
sisted through 2001, with the largest difference being 0.95 percentage
points in 2001. For the years 1977 to 2001 the respective averages of
the mean and the median were 8.0 percent and 7.7 percent. Unemploy-
ment rates below 2.5 percent have been extremely rare in recent years.
Between 1982 and 2001 there were only seven instances of such low
rates, most recently in Sweden between 1988 and 1990.
Along with the increases in the means and medians shown in Fig-
ure 4.1 has been growth in the number of countries with very high
unemployment rates. The first annual average for any country to ex-
ceed 10 percent occurred in 1980, followed by a maximum rate above
12.5 percent in 1981, and a rate above 15 percent in 1982 (Spain in all
three instances). Between 1981 and 1999 the number of countries with
double-digit unemployment rates ranged from four to eight and aver-
aged six. Several of the OECD-20 countries have had persistently high
unemployment during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, while
the average unemployment rate (both mean and median) has gone
through periods of large decreases during both the 1980s (between
1983 and 1990) and 1990s (between 1993 and 2001), several individual
countries have continued to experience persistently high unemploy-
ment rates.
Figure 4.2 documents some of the diversity of unemployment ex-
periences by tracing developments for seven individual countries be-
tween 1959 and 2001. Note that five of the seven (all but Ireland and
Italy) had very low unemployment rates between 1959 and 1973. Most
then experienced large increases in unemployment from 1974 to 1976
(all but Austria and Italy), and all seven had large increases between
1980 and 1983.
France, Germany, and Italy have been characterized by high unem-
ployment rates for more than 20 years, consistently above 8.0 percent
in France and Italy in every year since 1982 and consistently above 7.0
percent in Germany during the same period. While all three countries
have experienced reductions in unemployment since the mid-1990s,
their average unemployment rates during the period 1999–2001 ranged
from 9.8 percent (France) to 10.9 percent (Germany). Since these three
have the largest economies in mainland Europe, their experiences are
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Figure 4.2 Unemployment Rates for Seven OECD Countries, 1959–2001
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especially important for judging the overall condition of the labor mar-
ket in the OECD-20 countries.
Figure 4.2 also traces unemployment rate developments for four
small- to medium-sized economies: Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and the
Netherlands. In terms of unemployment, these countries can be de-
scribed as four success stories since each had an average unemploy-
ment rate of 5.0 percent or lower during the 1999–2001 period.
Ireland’s reduction in unemployment was particularly dramatic since
its rate averaged 14.2 percent during the 1980s and again between 1990
and 1995. Very large reductions in unemployment also took place in
Denmark during the 1990s and in the Netherlands between 1986 and
1992 and again after 1996. Austria is the only country of the seven to
have experienced persistently low unemployment throughout the years
between 1959 and 2001.
Because of the diversity of unemployment experiences, it is impor-
tant to highlight the developments in selected countries. The following
two sections present case studies of the various experiences with em-
phasis on developments in UC programs and other labor market inter-
ventions. Attention is devoted first to Germany, one of the three large
high-unemployment countries, and then to Austria, Denmark, Ireland,
and the Netherlands, the four small to medium countries mentioned
above.
GERMANY
Germany provides income support to the unemployed through
three separate programs: UI (Arbeitslosengeld), UA (Arbeitslosenhilfe),
and SA (Sozialhilfe). The UI program has rather generous support,
with replacement rates of 60 and 67 percent, respectively, for single
persons and those with dependents. The work history requirement is
modest (covered work in 12 of the 36 months prior to unemployment),
and potential benefit duration ranges from 12 months (under age 42)
to 32 months (age 55). Unemployment assistance provides a lower
replacement rate (50 or 57 percent with dependents) and potentially
unlimited duration for those who exhaust UI. In the past, UA also com-
pensated persons with between 5 and 12 months of covered earnings
(out of the past 36 months), but this entitlement has been eliminated.
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Social assistance, which is entirely financed and administered by local
governments (lander), is available to those ineligible for UI or UA and
for some UI and UA (mainly UA) recipients with low income. During
2001, there were about 1.7 million monthly UI beneficiaries with an
additional 1.4 million receiving UA, 0.8 million receiving only SA, and
about 0.15 million receiving both UA and SA.6 Spending for the three
programs totaled more than 85 billion German deutsche marks in 2001,
with UI and UA accounting for DM48 billion and DM25 billion, re-
spectively.
The merger of the two formerly separate parts of Germany has
been accompanied by widespread job losses and high unemployment
in the areas of the former East Germany.7 Employment in eastern prov-
inces is now more than 3.5 million lower than at the time of unification.
This reduction has been accomplished through seven adjustments:
1) early retirement, 2) migration to the west, 3) commuting to jobs in
the west, 4) temporary public employment, 5) training, 6) reduced
labor force participation among women, 7) and large increases in open
unemployment. The eastern provinces account for less than 20 percent
of employment in unified Germany, but they accounted for about 40
percent of combined UI–UA spending and more than 35 percent of the
combined UI–UA caseload in 2001.
The cost of unemployment protection in Germany has been consis-
tently high since unification, averaging above 4 percent of payrolls be-
tween 1992 and 2001. The persistence of high costs and of high
unemployment rates has stimulated broad interest in reforms of unem-
ployment support and reemployment programs. Thus, the most recent
years stand in sharp contrast with the 1980s and early 1990s when the
provisions of the unemployment support programs were stable. Several
changes became effective in 1998, and new reform proposals are pend-
ing implementation in 2004.
The structures of the local and regional apparatus that administers
the employment offices and active labor market measures have been
modified. While local offices have traditionally been characterized by
strong compartmentalization of functions and extensive federal regula-
tion of detailed activities, the reforms confer greater flexibility and
autonomy on local offices. Funding which had previously had been
closely tied to individual reemployment support activities was modi-
fied to provide more general grants. Local offices were given greater
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authority to determine the appropriate mix of active measures. In-
creased communication across local offices and regions was encour-
aged with the expectation that improved knowledge of best practices
would favorably influence administration throughout Germany.
Implementation of the administrative changes started in 1998 and
1999. The changes included several modifications to the UI and UA
programs:
• UA eligibility was ended among persons with earnings in just 5
to 12 months of the past 36 months prior to unemployment.
• The new calculation of monthly benefits used earnings in the
past 12 months, as opposed to the past 6 months, frequently
causing a small reduction in the average used to calculate
monthly benefits.
• Evidence of active work search was required of beneficiaries,
if requested, a change from simply being available for work.
Procedures to administer this requirement are still being devel-
oped.
• The disqualification period for quits was lengthened from 8
weeks to 12 weeks.
• The definition of suitable work was modified to emphasize the
monetary thresholds of job offers, a change from a requirement
that the offer was to be in one’s established occupation. During
the first three months of benefits, an offer would be suitable even
if the job paid 20 percent less than the prior job. The allowable
wage rate reduction was increased to 30 percent during months
four to six and then after six months to any job paying more
than the monthly UI benefit.
• The age limits to qualify for more than 12 months of potential
benefits were raised.
• There was an explicit recognition that the primary responsibility
for securing a new job resides with the worker and the employer
rather than with the administrative agencies.
A common thrust of theses changes was to reduce access to benefits,
benefit duration, and payment levels. All of the changes can be de-
scribed as measures either to reduce the amount of income support or
to encourage the activation of claimants.
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Reforms were also implemented to encourage nonstandard em-
ployment arrangements. The terms of UI support were broadened
among several groups, for instance, part-time workers, those desiring
training, seasonal workers, those working short hours, and persons in-
terested in starting businesses. Measures were also taken to encourage
displaced workers to take jobs with lower pay than their previous jobs.
The generic term used in Germany to describe labor market activities
involving atypical forms of employment is ‘‘transitional labor mar-
kets.’’8 Details of specific changes in these areas are varied, but they
share a common characteristic: encouragement and support for workers
to try new work as opposed to just waiting for jobs to reappear in their
previous occupations.9
It is too early to determine the effects of the preceding changes on
the labor market and unemployment. The previous stability in labor
market programs, especially the passive measures, has ended with the
changes already enacted. To this point, the changes in administrative
procedures, such as increased local decision making, have been more
fundamental than the changes in UI and UA, which have been more
incremental. Further reforms of active and passive measures are under
way.
The potential range of further reforms in Germany remains very
wide. First, additional changes to the administrative apparatus that sup-
ports active and passive labor market measures are being considered.
Currently UI and UA are administered by the national labor office
(Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit) while SA has local administration though
welfare offices. Preparations for merging the functions of the two sepa-
rate administrations are under way. Second, implementing more client-
friendly local administrative arrangements, including the possibility of
offering ‘‘one-stop’’ services at local offices, has strong adherents.
Third, regional funding issues are also being examined. Geographic
areas of high unemployment face constraints in financing SA benefits,
resulting in lower expenditures for public investment. The weak econo-
mies of some areas, particularly in the eastern provinces, create the
dual problems of high benefit costs in supporting the unemployed and
high SA financing costs which are partly supported by revenues gener-
ated regionally and locally.
While the final form of the changes that emerge from current dis-
cussions is not certain, it is clear that a broad spectrum within Germany
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is committed to ‘‘do something’’ about the high unemployment. Fur-
ther reforms that reduce access to passive income support and stress
activation can be expected. It also seems likely that a merger between
the two separate administrative apparatuses will occur. More than
likely, further evolution toward increased autonomy and flexibility for
local employment offices can be expected. Finally, a continuing chal-
lenge will be to foster greater prosperity in Germany’s eastern prov-
inces. To achieve this, active labor market measures and economic
development initiatives will likely play an increasingly important role
while a reduced role for passive income maintenance may be antici-
pated.
FOUR OECD-20 ECONOMIES WITH LOW
UNEMPLOYMENT
Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands have achieved low
unemployment in recent years. The explanation for their success was
the subject of a book by Auer (2000). While his analysis utilized data
through 1996–1997, more recent years have witnessed a continuation
of low unemployment in Austria and even further reductions in unem-
ployment rates in Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, as illustrated
in Figure 4.2.
Their success has occurred in the face of certain institutional con-
ditions that are often cited as impediments to low unemployment, for
example, strong unions and extensive systems of social protection for
the unemployed. All four have realized important gains in employment
while larger neighbors have experienced little or no employment
growth. This contrast makes their recent experiences all the more inter-
esting.
Auer (2000, Chapter 3) identifies three broad factors that contrib-
uted to employment growth and reduced unemployment in the four
countries: macroeconomic policies, social dialogue, and labor market
policies. The focus of the subsequent description is primarily on labor
market policies, but the other two areas have been crucial for achieving
consistently strong economic performance. While the discussion em-
phasizes experiences common to all four countries, important special
factors were also operative in individual countries. For instance, there
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has been a large volume of foreign direct investment in Ireland and a
successful implementation of widespread part-time work arrangements
in the Netherlands.
Favorable macroeconomic outcomes, such as strong output growth,
high employment growth, and low inflation, partly reflect conservative
fiscal policies (small government deficits) and actions that support in-
ternational trade. All four countries are open market economies. His-
torically, exports have been large (from 35 to 60 percent of GDP) and
have grown as a percentage of GDP over time. Exports have contrib-
uted to strong output growth and strong employment growth. Support-
ing their open-economy stance has been monetary policy that tied their
currencies to that of large partners (earlier the German Mark, now the
Euro) and did not try to influence domestic interest rates.
While all four economies have strong labor union movements, they
also have longstanding traditions of social dialogue. The social partners
frequently meet to participate in key societal decisions such as national
wage policy and hours of work for the standard work week. Given that
agreement in key areas has usually been achieved, wage growth has
been moderate. This, in turn, has contributed to low inflation, both for
domestic products and exports.
Auer (2000) provides a detailed review of the changes in both ac-
tive and passive labor market measures in the four countries. The un-
employment protection systems in all countries allow for very long-
term benefit recipiency, either through UI alone (Denmark) or through
UI followed by UA (Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands). Further-
more, all four countries modified UI–UA during the 1990s in one or
more of the following ways: shorter maximum potential benefit dura-
tion, lower replacement rate, stricter entry eligibility and closer moni-
toring of continuing eligibility through increased work search
requirements, and a more flexible definition of suitable work.
For working-age persons who do not have jobs, the distinction be-
tween being unemployed and not being in the labor force is often diffi-
cult to make. Thus, the reforms of passive measures in these countries
have extended to closely related programs such as early retirement,
permanent disability insurance, and sick leave. Early retirement and
permanent disability awards have operated to reduce labor supply and
open unemployment. Measures to restrict access to these benefits have
also been implemented. While details of the changes have varied, im-
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portant components have included reducing replacement rates, the in-
troduction of experience rating of employer sick leave contributions,
and more frequent reviews of continuing disability. Support for phased
(gradual) retirement has grown as an alternative to simply offering
early retirement.
The traditional measures of active labor market policy have also
undergone several revisions. While the contribution of these measures
to reduced unemployment has been modest, they have been more im-
portant in Denmark and Ireland than in Austria and the Netherlands.
Auer (2000) identified three correlates of successful interventions.
First, the content of worker training was close to the requirements of
jobs offered by businesses. Second, active measures targeted the needs
of the unemployed (assessment) and were appropriate to local labor
market conditions. And third, smaller and more tailored employment
programs were pursued.
Evolutionary changes in the structure of service provision also oc-
curred. Three aspects of change have been decentralization, ‘‘tripartiza-
tion,’’ and allowing an increased scope for private placement activities.
The details of the changes have varied by country. While Ireland actu-
ally moved the Employment Service from the Labor Ministry to the
Department of Enterprise and Trade, regional tripartite advisory struc-
tures were established in the three other countries. The results have not
always been as positive as hoped, particularly in the Netherlands, but
moving the locus of decision making to lower geographic levels and
eliciting more participation from the social partners is viewed posi-
tively in all four countries. Growth in private placement activities has
occurred in all four countries with the activities of temporary help
agencies in the Netherlands assuming a major role in job matching.
An administrative question facing these countries is the degree of
integration of the benefit payment function with the provision of labor
market services. Austria has integrated these two activities, but the
functions remain separate in the other three countries. Auer (2000)
noted that recipiency rates seem to be higher in countries where the
functions are separated. The explanation, he speculates, may be that
UC recipients are free from the need to actively search and/or from
effective monitoring of their search activities. There is recognition that,
at a minimum, greater coordination is needed, if not full integration of
the payment and service provision functions.
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A common stylized fact across all four countries is that they con-
tinue to have very high UC recipiency rates, even with the variety of
changes that have occurred in both active and passive measures and the
structure of labor market program administration. The average ratios
of UC beneficiaries to unemployment for recent periods were: Austria
(1995–1999), 1.33; Denmark (1995–1999), 0.98; Ireland (1995–1999),
1.58; and the Netherlands (1995–1998), 1.63. In Denmark, Ireland, and
the Netherlands, unemployment decreased markedly after 1995 (Figure
4.2). For all three countries, there was a common pattern between the
UC recipiency rate and the unemployment rate: the UC recipiency rate
increased significantly as unemployment declined. In other words, UC
caseloads declined but much less rapidly than unemployment. Average
ratios of the late 1990s were much higher than, say, the 1980s, when
decade averages ranged from 0.90 to 1.13. This empirical ‘‘fact’’ sug-
gests that high UC recipiency rates do not preclude countries from
reaching low unemployment. If the other elements of a country’s eco-
nomic structure are strong (high growth in real GDP, strong net exports,
low inflation), then low unemployment can be achieved even with high
UC recipiency rates.
Finally, it should be repeated that the four countries are small to
medium in size. Their combined labor forces totaled 17 million in
2001. Compare this to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, which
each had a labor force of 24–30 million and Germany with a labor
force of 40 million. Overall, the success these four countries achieved
in lowering unemployment has had little impact on aggregate unem-
ployment in the OECD-20 countries.
EXPENDITURES ON ACTIVE LABOR MARKET
MEASURES
There is an emphasis within the OECD to ‘‘activate’’ the unem-
ployed. This is not a recent phenomenon. Initiatives to encourage reem-
ployment commenced in the 1980s and intensified during the 1990s.
Following the first energy crisis of 1973–1974, unemployment rates
increased significantly for most member countries and, as shown in
Figure 4.1, the average unemployment rate has remained stubbornly
high during subsequent periods of economic expansion. The most trou-
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bling aspect of the higher unemployment was a significant increase in
the duration of unemployment spells. Many of the long-term unem-
ployed seemed reluctant to change industries and/or occupations but,
rather, opted to wait for former jobs to reappear. In the interim, they
utilized the payments paid by UC and other social protection programs
as a primary source of income.
Activation changes the terms of the implied contract between the
benefit recipient and the state. Previously UC benefits were received as
a matter of right by individuals who were unemployed through no fault
of their own, had sufficient past employment to satisfy base period
work requirements, and met the conditions of continuing eligibility
(that is, able and available to take suitable work if offered). Responsi-
bility for reemployment resided primarily with the state through its
Employment Service. Policies of activation change this responsibility
by placing a greater burden on the unemployed person to secure reem-
ployment. One aspect of activation is to require active job search by
the claimant and, if requested, provide evidence of job search activities
as a condition of continuing eligibility for UC benefits. In some coun-
tries, this means greater reliance on skills assessments and periodic
meetings with job counselors to develop and review reemployment
plans developed jointly with the claimant. In short, activation means
requiring the unemployed to take affirmative steps to secure reemploy-
ment. Undertaking more active job search, undergoing training, start-
ing new micro-enterprises, and broadening the geographic scope of job
search are all examples of activation among the unemployed. If such
actions are not pursued, then the claimant may be denied UC benefits.
It was anticipated that through activation, the average duration of un-
employment spells would be shortened.
Public policies to foster activation would be expected to change
the composition of labor market spending. For recent years, the OECD
has published member country data on spending for both active and
passive labor market measures in their social expenditures database.
The data on spending for passive measures usually extend back to 1980
and back to 1985 for active measures. Thus, changes in the active-
passive mix of spending can be traced from 1985 and even back to
1980 for a few countries. The OECD database tracks spending on three
passive measures (UC benefits, early retirement payments to the unem-
ployed, and severance pay) and five active measures (training, youth
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measures, subsidized employment, support of the disabled, and em-
ployment services and administration). For all OECD-20 countries,
spending for UC is the largest category of passive spending, but there
is wide diversity in the mix of spending on active measures. Expendi-
tures on training are largest in 6 countries, but each of subsidized
employment, support of the disabled, and employment service admin-
istration is largest in 4 individual countries. Thus, within the OECD-
20 countries, spending on active labor market measures defies easy
summarization.
The individual countries of the OECD-20 group display wide vari-
ability in the share of spending devoted to active labor market mea-
sures. Across 19 countries (all but Italy), the average of the percent of
spending directed to active measures during the years 1985 to 1998
was 36.5 percent. The full range extended, however, from 21.7 percent
in Spain to 59.9 percent in Sweden. The high percentage in Sweden
reflects a long-standing emphasis on training, public employment, and
other active measures in preference to UC and passive measures. For
the individual countries, the average share spent on active measures
appears in the final column of Table 4.2, discussed below. Six countries
spent between 20 and 30 percent for active measures while active
spending fell into the 30–40 percent range in seven. The percentages
were 49 percent or higher in the remaining 4 countries.
Table 4.2 displays country-specific regression results for the share
of spending devoted to active measures. Typically, the regressions
cover the 14 years from 1985 to 1998 (the most recent year available
from the OECD), but the time periods vary by country depending on
data availability. Primary interest centers on the trend in the proportion
spent on active measures.
The regression equations utilize simple trend-cycle specifications,
with cyclical controls being the unemployment rate for the current year
and the previous year. During a cyclical downturn, spending on passive
measures increases rapidly as the number of UC recipients increases
and benefit duration also rises. Thus, the proportion spent on active
measures would be expected to decrease. A priori, the sign of the coef-
ficient on lagged unemployment is ambiguous, as there could be lagged
effects on passive spending, but exhaustion of UC benefits and a re-
sponse of active spending could both cause the active share to increase
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Table 4.2 Regression Results for Percentage of Expenditures on Active Measures, 19 OECD Countries
Constant
Unemp.
rate TUR lag
Trend
1985 Years Adj. R2
Std.
error
Durbin-
Watson MeanCountry
Australia 14.8 1.74 2.42 0.66 1986–00 0.415 4.4 1.58 26.6
(1.8) (1.6) (2.2) (2.5)
Austria 16.3 0.92 0.50 0.44 1985, 0.212 5.2 0.66 25.7
(0.7) (0.1) (0.1) (0.7) 1990–98
Belgium 24.5 0.53 0.86 0.49 1985–98 0.510 1.5 2.52 31.4
(6.7) (0.9) (1.6) (3.9)
Canada 20.1 2.56 2.63 0.66 1985–99 0.863 1.5 1.55 26.7
(6.0) (5.5) (5.6) (7.4)
Denmark 25.8 0.83 0.36 1.03 1985–98 0.926 1.3 1.57 24.4
(11.0) (2.7) (1.1) (11.7)
Finland 47.3 1.73 0.13 0.51 1985–98 0.944 1.6 1.88 36.2
(48.8) (8.2) (0.6) (2.7)
France 16.8 1.00 0.56 1.63 1985–98 0.959 1.5 0.93 33.8
(3.4) (1.5) (0.8) (12.6)
Germanya 71.1 2.12 0.97 1.24 1985–98 0.731 2.4 2.33 49.3
(13.9) (1.9) (0.9) (3.2)
Greece 74.9 0.73 4.53 1.34 1985–98 0.136 5.5 1.02 40.1
(4.2) (0.2) (1.3) (1.5)
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Ireland 38.1 1.05 0.57 0.40 1985–98 0.864 1.3 1.22 34.7
(6.2) (3.1) (1.5) (2.1)
Netherlands 62.1 2.80 0.60 1.12 1985–98 0.812 1.4 1.92 27.7
(10.7) (4.1) (1.0) (4.5)
New Zealand 60.8 3.44 1.73 1.27 1986–00 0.777 3.7 1.53 37.3
(1.5) (3.4) (1.7) (4.6)
Norway 57.9 7.64 4.24 0.94 1985, 0.776 3.8 2.24 49.9
(11.6) (4.4) (2.2) (2.5) 1988–98
Portugal 84.9 5.69 2.04 1.30 1986–98 0.753 4.3 1.51 53.4
(13.2) (3.9) (1.6) (4.0)
Spain 23.5 1.44 1.20 0.40 1985–98 0.367 4.7 1.98 21.7
(2.2) (2.7) (2.2) (1.3)
Sweden 76.2 2.68 1.44 1.34 1985–98 0.951 2.1 1.58 59.9
(65.1) (5.1) (2.8) (5.1)
Switzerland 52.1 19.23 3.39 3.34 1985–98 0.912 4.2 2.20 41.5
(21.8) (8.3) (1.5) (5.2)
United Kingdom 77.9 6.59 2.80 0.84 1985–98 0.871 2.6 1.63 38.8
(11.7) (8.7) (3.6) (3.6)
United States 64.0 4.08 0.59 0.23 1985–99 0.718 2.4 1.20 34.4
(9.7) (3.4) (0.5) (1.2)
NOTE: TUR lag: the unemployment rate from the previous year.
a Regression also includes a dummy variable: 1 for the years 1991–1998, 0 for earlier. Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of
its t-ratio.
SOURCE: OECD database on social expenditures.
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in the later stages of a downturn. The linear trend is included to test for
secular changes in the percent spent on active measures.
The current unemployment rate enters with a negative coefficient
in 17 of 19 equations and has a significant t-ratio in 13. Neither of the
2 positive coefficients is significant. Six of the coefficients on lagged
unemployment are negative but not one is significant, while 6 of the 13
positive coefficients have t-ratios of 2.0 or larger. For several countries,
spending on passive measures increases rapidly as unemployment rises
and reduces the share spent on active measures. The increase is not
sustained, however, in the following year, and the spending mix moves
back towards its prerecession level. This pattern of opposite signs for
current and lagged unemployment is present in 14 of the 19 countries;
for 11 of the 14, at least one of the two t-ratios on the unemployment
variables is significant.
Major interest in Table 4.2 centers on the coefficients for the trend
variables. Thirteen enter positively and 10 have t-ratios of 2.0 or larger.
Five of the remaining 6 trends, however, have negative coefficients that
are also significant. The regression results suggest that the share of
spending on active measures increased in about two-thirds of the coun-
tries while it decreased in the other 6. Just 4 of the 19 trend coefficients
were not significantly different from zero.
The fit of the equations in Table 4.2 are generally good, with 14
adjusted R2s above 0.70. Also, the standard errors exceed 4.0 percent
in only five countries. Given these measures, the regression equations
perform reasonably well in explaining the active-passive mix of
spending.
For four countries information on spending for active measures is
available from 1980 or 1981, and this allows analysis of the active-
passive mix for a longer period.10 Since the emphasis on activation has
been greater in the 1990s than it was previously, the acceleration in the
trend toward active measures is tested. The regression results, however,
are not significant. Observe that Denmark and Spain do have positive
trends in the regression results of Table 4.2. A test for an acceleration
of the trend towards active spending during the 1990s, however, yields
a negative coefficient in all four countries, and two of the four coeffi-
cients are significantly negative. For this quartet of OECD-20 coun-
tries, evidence from the 1990s suggests a trend away from spending on
active measures.
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Considering these results along with those presented in Table 4.2,
four conclusions can be drawn. First, the share of spending on active
measures varies with the unemployment rate, decreasing in years when
unemployment increases. Second, for many countries, the mix between
active and passive labor market measures reverts in the following year
towards the prerecession mix. Third, while the trend in the share of
spending was positive in about two-thirds of the OECD-20 countries,
there was a significant group where the trend from 1985 to 1998 was
for a decreased share of spending on active measures. Finally, extend-
ing the analysis back to 1980 in four countries, did not support the
hypothesis that the trend in the mix towards active measures acceler-
ated during the 1990s. The emphasis on active measures in OECD
policy discussions is reflected only to a modest extent in actual
spending.
SUMMARY
Our principal conclusion is that the OECD-20 countries display
quite diverse labor market indicators. Moreover, there are systematic
differences by subregion: the English-speaking countries, the countries
of southern Europe, and the Scandinavian countries. The United States
is shown to be an outlier. Yet, the institutional features of the U.S. labor
market are used by researchers as the model for examining the labor
markets of other OECD-20 countries.
Over time, there has been an increase in the number of countries
with very high unemployment rates, and several countries continue to
experience persistently high rates. France, Germany, and Italy have
been characterized by high unemployment for more than two decades.
Since these three countries have the largest economies in mainland
Europe, their experiences are especially important for judging the over-
all condition of the labor market in the OECD-20 region.
Germany has been characterized by high unemployment rates for
more than two decades. In light of this persistent problem, Germany is
currently undertaking an extensive reform of its UC program. At the
time of writing, the final form of the changes is not certain. What
is clear is that active labor market measures, economic development
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initiatives, and changes in administrative structures will figure promi-
nently in the reform initiatives.
The unemployment experiences of smaller OECD-20 countries are
different. Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, four small-
to medium-sized economies, can be described as success stories terms
of unemployment. Much of the success has been attributed to particular
institutional features, macroeconomic policies, and specific labor mar-
ket interventions. Yet the success these four countries achieved in low-
ering unemployment has had little impact on aggregate unemployment
in the OECD-20 countries.
Finally, the regression results suggest that the share of spending on
active measures varies with the unemployment rate, decreasing in years
when unemployment increases. For many countries, the mix between
active and passive labor market measures changes back to the pre-
recession mix in the following year. The results also suggest that the
share of spending on active measures increased in about two-thirds of
the OECD-20 countries and decreased in the other third. For the subset
of four countries with longer expenditure series, the regression results
are not significant. Overall, the emphasis on active labor market mea-
sures in OECD policy discussions is not consistently reflected in actual
spending.
Chapter 8 examines a closely related topic: policies to shorten the
duration of unemployment. This particular problem is present not only
in the OECD-20 countries but also in the CEE-FSU countries to be
examined in the next chapter.
Notes
1. Prominent examples include the first volume of the OECD jobs study (OECD
1994) and a summary analysis of social exclusion (OECD 1998).
2. Examples include papers by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Blanchard and
Portugal (2001).
3. Throughout this discussion, the term average refers to the simple (unweighted)
average.
4. The regressions utilize dummy variables for three of the four regions. The ad-
justed R2 is 0.33.
5. The adjusted R2 using regional dummy variables to explain the registered-to-
survey unemployment ratios is only 0.08. Note that two countries from southern
Europe are not included in this analysis. If they were included, a stronger associa-
tion might be observed.
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6. See Reissert (2001).
7. Prior to unification, unemployment data for East Germany were not available as
the socialist ideology of the former regime did not recognize the existence of
unemployment. See Eurostat of the EU and the ILO Web site for data since unifi-
cation.
8. A discussion of transitional labor markets is given in Schmid (1998).
9. See section 4.3 in Reissert (2001).
10. These four countries are Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.
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Unemployment Compensation in the
CEE-FSU Countries
More than a full decade has now passed since the collapse of the
political systems in CEE and the FSU countries. The economic transi-
tion that followed these political changes has lasted longer and has
been much more difficult than was anticipated in the early 1990s. Ini-
tially, real output declined precipitously, and the pattern of recovery
has varied widely in the region. As of 2001–2002, the recovery of real
output to previous levels (e.g., 1989), still had not occurred in several
successor states. The closing of state-owned enterprises entailed large-
scale worker dislocations in all countries from this region. Economic
hardship has been widespread, especially among older and younger
workers, individuals with lower levels of skill, and families residing in
communities once dominated by large state-owned enterprises.
The large scale of the economic dislocations experienced through-
out the region was accompanied by increases in poverty and other indi-
cators of economic hardship. These countries have also experienced
important changes in basic demographic indicators. For instance, there
have been large reductions in marriage and birth rates and a significant
increase in the rate of emigration, particularly among the young and
highly educated. For nearly all CEE-FSU countries, average life expec-
tancy has declined, especially among men. Regional economic dispari-
ties have become more exaggerated as strong growth in the capital
cities and some other urban areas stands in contrast to worsened condi-
tions in former centers of manufacturing and in most rural areas.
High rates of unemployment, explored in the first section of this
chapter, provide a clear signal of the economic distress experienced by
the people of this region. High unemployment and other indicators
of economic hardship highlight the need for strong income support
arrangements among workers and their families. A description of UC
programs and other income support programs for the unemployed is
presented in the second section of the chapter. Two developments in
UC programs are explored in the third section: UI benefits administra-
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tion in Bulgaria and the revision of UI financing in Russia. While both
changes are discussed within the context of country-specific experi-
ences, each change addresses a problem that is present in several CEE-
FSU countries.
CEE-FSU UNEMPLOYMENT
The labor markets in these countries have been characterized by
high unemployment rates and unemployment spells of very long aver-
age duration. More than half of the 28 countries from the CEE-FSU
area initiated new LFSs in the 1990s. In many countries, the surveys
commenced between 1992 and 1994, yielding time series of survey-
based unemployment rates that now span up to 10 years. Additionally,
all countries from the CEE-FSU area operate a PES, providing a sec-
ond potential source of data on unemployment, that is, registered un-
employment.
Average unemployment rates are illustrative of the high and persis-
tent unemployment in these 28 countries during the four-year periods
of 1994–1997 and 1998–2001. Table 5.1 displays average unemploy-
ment rates for the two periods from LFSs and from registration at em-
ployment offices. Besides displaying averages for the individual
countries, Table 5.1 also shows separate all-country averages for the
CEE and FSU countries where unemployment rates are displayed for
both periods.
Several features of Table 5.1 are noteworthy. First, double-digit
unemployment rates are ubiquitous in the LFS data. Sixteen of the 28
countries had average unemployment rates of 10.0 percent or higher.
Only one country averaged less than 5.0 percent, the Czech Republic
during the 1994–1997 period. Second, high unemployment is also pre-
dominant in the registration data for the CEE countries but not in the
data for FSU countries. In the former group of countries, 11 of 13
entries are 10.0 percent or higher; only the Czech Republic had a rate
below 5.0 percent, during the 1994–1997 period. For FSU countries,
in contrast, unemployment rates are low in the registration data, and
only 2 of 20 averages exceed 10.0 percent. This regional contrast in
the registration-based unemployment rates is examined below.
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Table 5.1 Unemployment Rates and Unemployment in CEE-FSU Countries, 1994–2001
LFS unemployment rate (%)
1994–1997 1998–2001 Change
EOR unemployment rate (%)
1994–1997 1998–2001 Change
EOR/LFS
ratio
1994–2001
Region and
country
Central and Eastern
Europe
Albania NS NS NS
Bosnia NS NS NS
Bulgaria 16.3 16.6 0.3 12.9 16.6 3.7 0.95
Croatia 9.9a 14.2 4.3 19.9 1.42
Czech Republic 4.3 8.1 3.8 4.3 0.98
Hungary 10.1 6.8 3.3 10.9 9.6 1.3 1.31
Macedonia 36.3 50.6c 14.3
Poland 12.8 14.7 1.9 13.6 14.0 0.4 1.04
Romania 7.2 6.7 0.5 1.19
Serbia 20.8
Slovakia 12.5 16.8 4.3 13.4 16.9 3.5 1.11
Slovenia 7.7 7.0 0.7 1.67
Averagee 10.1 11.4 1.3 12.7 14.3 1.6 1.21
Former Soviet Union
Armenia 8.4 10.7 2.3
Azerbaijan NS NS NS 0.9 1.2 0.3
Belarus NS NS NS 3.0 2.2 0.8
Estonia 9.2 12.0 2.8 0.39
Georgia NS 12.6
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112Table 5.1 (continued)
LFS unemployment rate (%)
1994–1997 1998–2001 Change
EOR unemployment rate (%)
1994–1997 1998–2001 Change
EOR/LFS
ratio
1994–2001
Region and
country
Kazakhstan NS NS NS 2.8 3.8c 1.0
Kyrgistan NS NS NS 2.8 3.1c 0.3
Latvia 17.2a 13.9 3.3 6.8 8.4 1.6 0.55d
Lithuania 16.3 15.0 1.3 6.1 10.5 4.4 0.52
Moldova NS 9.0b 1.3 2.0 0.7 0.21b
Mongolia NS NS NS
Russia 9.8 11.6 1.8 9.4 0.27d
Tajikistan NS NS NS 2.6
Turkmenistan NS NS NS
Ukraine 7.4a 11.5 4.1 1.3 5.0 3.7 0.31d
Uzbekistan NS NS NS
Averagef 12.0 12.8 0.8 3.7 5.2 1.5 0.38
NOTE: NS  no LFS. All averages give equal weight to included countries. EOR  Employment office registration. Unemployment
rates are in percent; change is percentage-point change.
a Croatia, 1996–1997; Latvia and Ukraine, 1995–1997.
b Moldova, 1999–2001.
c Macedonia, 1998–2000; Kazakhstan and Kyrgistan, 1998–1999.
d Latvia and Ukraine, 1995–2001; Russia, 1994–1999.
e Average of eight countries in LFS data, ratios of registered unemployment to LFS unemployment and four countries in registration data
(Macedonia excluded).
f Average of five countries in LFS data, nine countries in registration data, and of six countries in registration data.
SOURCE: Data taken mainly from the ILO Web site.PAG
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Third, no data are shown for several countries. While this partly
reflects the fact that LFSs are not administered, it also reflects the un-
availability of data which have been collected. Ten of the 28 countries
at present do not have an LFS, mainly FSU countries.1 Several entries
are blank, however, because countries do not readily publicize data
collected through LFSs or registration. No entries appear for Albania,
Bosnia, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan. These countries do
not routinely make available such basic labor market information as
the national unemployment rate.
Finally, perhaps the most surprising aspect of Table 5.1 is the num-
ber of situations where the average unemployment rate in the period of
1998–2001 exceeds the average for the 1994–1997 period. The table
displays 28 changes in the average unemployment rates and 20 changes
are positive. All four sets of changes in the overall averages are also
positive. Throughout the region, the unemployment situation was gen-
erally worse from 1998 to 2001 than it was from 1994 to 1997.
The explanation for the high and even increasing unemployment
rates involves several considerations. The Russian financial crisis of
1998 affected not only Russia but also several of its trading partners in
the region. The war in Kosovo affected nearby countries, such as Bul-
garia. Slovakia experienced higher unemployment in 1998–1999,
which seemed linked to a change in the political administration. De-
layed implementation of economic reforms contributed to higher un-
employment in several countries towards the end of the 1990s.
An important policy debate of the 1990s concerned the speed of
the transition to a market economy with individual countries adopting
different policies. Within the most western of the CEE economies,
Hungary and Poland are generally perceived as promoting a speedy
transition, sometimes termed shock therapy, while the Czech Republic
and Slovakia generally followed a more deliberate agenda. The Hun-
garian experience seems to provide support for the merits of the speedy
approach as the average unemployment rate dropped 3.3 percentage
points in the later period. Unemployment increased, however, in Po-
land in the 1998–2001 period. The large increase observed for Slovakia
was at least partly due to the effects of a change of political regime;
the Mecir administration lost the fall 1998 elections, and unemploy-
ment started to increase shortly afterward. It appeared that there was a
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shift towards a more restrictive fiscal policy prior to the change of
political administration.
Among the other countries with lower average rates of unemploy-
ment during the 1998–2001 period, Latvia and Lithuania could be de-
scribed as pursuing policies to achieve a speedy transition. Small
reductions in average unemployment, however, also occurred in Roma-
nia and Slovenia—countries that followed comparatively gradualist ap-
proaches. Thus, no overall pattern is apparent regarding the speed of
the transformation and the time paths of the unemployment rates for
the countries located wholly within continental Europe.
The five countries that succeeded the former Yugoslavia have fol-
lowed a distinct time path strongly influenced by military conflict. Only
Slovenia avoided extensive fighting (or major infusions of refugees)
within its borders during this decade. Because military activities were
spread across several years, the unemployment data from the other four
countries (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia) reflect an admix-
ture of the effects of the economic transition (which commenced before
the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia) and the military conflicts. Observe
that the four highest averages in the table (Croatia in 1994–1997, Mac-
edonia in both periods, and Serbia in 1998–2001) are from these coun-
tries. Of these countries, only Croatia and Slovenia have LFS data in
Table 5.1.
It is widely recognized that the economic transition commenced
later in FSU countries than in CEE countries. During the first half of
the 1990s many FSU countries tried to function with as little change
as possible from the Soviet era. Because LFSs are less common in FSU
countries, developments in unemployment for several must be inferred
from the data on registered unemployment. For every FSU country
except Belarus, the 1998–2001 average exceeded the 1994–1997 aver-
age in the registered unemployment data. For both Russia and Ukraine,
a similar pattern is also observed in the LFS-based unemployment
rates.
Table 5.1 also indirectly reveals important contrasts between the
countries in the two groupings. Seven of the CEE countries along with
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will probably enter the EU during the
present decade.2 Note that each of these countries displays LFS-based
unemployment rates in Table 5.1. All have UC programs along with
other income support programs for the unemployed. All operate with
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a PES that serves the majority (or at least a large fraction) of the unem-
ployed. Strong contrasts across these countries, however, are seen in
the ratios of registered unemployment to LFS-based unemployment.
For eight CEE countries, the ratios ranged from 0.95 to 1.67, averaging
1.21 during the 1994–2001 period. Among six FSU countries, the ra-
tios ranged from 0.21 to 0.55, averaging 0.38 during the same years.
Note that the three in the latter group with the highest ratios are the
three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Their average
ratio of 0.49 is nearly double the average of 0.26 for the other three
FSU countries (Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). The penetration of the
PES into the labor market, however, is clearly much greater among the
CEE countries than among the Baltic republics.
UNEMPLOYMENT PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS
Unemployment was not officially recognized in the socialist eco-
nomic systems of the CEE-FSU countries. Prior to the 1990s, however,
UC programs were available in several CEE countries. For instance,
Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Yugoslavia had enacted UC
legislation prior to their transition to market-based economic systems.
The pretransition UC statutes authorized short-term benefits (up to
three months) with low levels of means-tested income support.3 No
performance data have been found for these programs, but some of
their features have persisted in current UC programs. In parts of former
Yugoslavia means testing of unemployment benefits continued through
the mid-1990s.
Following the collapse of the Soviet block, market-based economic
systems were adopted, particularly in the CEE countries. While it was
recognized that the transition to a market economy would entail dislo-
cations and unemployment, it was anticipated to be short run. New UC
programs were enacted in the vast majority of the successor countries
and, in most cases, the new program was a UI program. The rate of
adoptions was rapid, with 18 countries enacting UC laws in 1991 and
four in 1992. With the single exception of Kazakhstan, which ended
its program in 1996, these UC programs have continued to function
down to the present.
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Because both the UC programs and the phenomenon of open un-
employment were quite new, there were many surprises in the early
years of the 1990s. Two were the rapid increase in unemployment and
the unexpectedly high level of UC costs. While the initial program
provisions were often modest compared to functioning systems in
Western Europe, the new UC programs experienced unexpectedly high
costs and difficulties in administering benefits. Because actual UC
costs were so much higher than anticipated, pressures to balance pro-
gram expenditures with revenues emerged in the very first years of
operation. Adjustments to the funding imbalance included changes in
UC statutory provisions and in administrative rules with the objective
of reducing access to benefits, benefit duration, and payment levels.
On average, these pressures emerged more quickly in the CEE
countries than in the FSU countries because the former group evolved
away from the previously centrally planned systems at a much faster
pace. Employment collapsed at a faster rate in the CEE countries and
unemployment increased more rapidly. For many FSU countries, in
contrast, the most rapid pace of economic dislocation occurred during
the mid-1990s.
Developing the appropriate administrative and policy responses to
the severe dislocation in the labor market presented major challenges.
Several legislative changes were enacted in individual countries, espe-
cially those with a large UC client base. Labor market policy initiatives
emphasized both active and passive measures, but within a budgetary
environment of inadequate resources and a labor market with persis-
tently high average unemployment duration.4
Appendix D provides some details of the evolution in UC program
statutes and other support for unemployed persons (either ineligible for
UC or those who exhausted UC benefits). Table D.1 focuses on 12
countries (7 CEE and 5 FSU) selected from the 28 CEE-FSU countries.
Two selection criteria were used: 10 countries have been invited to join
the EU during the next few years and two countries, Russia and
Ukraine, have the largest populations of all countries in the CEE-FSU
region. These 12 countries have UC programs serving measurable
numbers of clients and all support an LFS so that the UC recipiency
rate can be assessed.
From the outset, the UC programs in these countries experienced
funding problems because the volume of recipients persistently ex-
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ceeded initial expectations. While their detailed provisions have not
been particularly generous when compared to OECD-20 countries,
benefit costs often exceeded the payroll tax revenues that support most
UC programs, necessitating support from the general budget. In some
countries, payments to eligible persons were not made or were partial
and/or made after long time delays. The problem of payment arrears
was more widespread in FSU countries where local and regional gov-
ernments often had partial responsibility for financing UC benefits.
Thus, pressures to restrict UC access and benefit levels were encoun-
tered from the first years of operation. Table D.1 displays four UI pro-
visions for 1991, 1997, and 2001 for the 12 countries. Because the UC
programs were new, they were the subject of frequent legislation. The
table shows that during both periods (1991–1997 and 1997–2001) nu-
merous restrictions on benefits were enacted. For both periods, the
number of UC restrictions exceeded the number of liberalizations by a
ratio of about two to one.
Faced with both UC funding problems and long-duration unem-
ployment, these countries all modified their existing SA programs in
the early to mid-1990s to provide benefits to the unemployed. Pay-
ments were allowed for both individuals ineligible for UC (due to inad-
equate prior work experience or other disqualifying circumstances
related to the job separation or the prior receipt of UC benefits) and
those who had exhausted UC benefits.
Boeri and Edwards (1998) examine these developments through
the mid-1990s for the CEE countries (outside the areas affected by
military conflicts). They show that adoption of this two-tier UC-SA
strategy was universal among their sample of countries.5 The final two
columns of Table D.1 focus on developments in SA for the unemployed
through 2001. All 12 countries continue to provide SA to the unem-
ployed. In about half the countries, SA is available without time limits
for those satisfying the means test and other eligibility criteria.
Table D.2 provides data on UC recipiency and costs for four coun-
tries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, and Ukraine) using the cost frame-
work developed in Chapter 3. These annual data span the period from
the mid-1990s to 2000–2001. Data for the UI programs show them to
have modest recipiency rates and low replacement rates. Based on just
their UI programs, generosity is generally low but considerably higher
in Bulgaria and Slovakia than in Estonia and Ukraine. Despite having
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low generosity, the programs in Bulgaria and Slovakia have experi-
enced UC cost rates that consistently have exceeded 1.0 percent of
covered payrolls, reflecting high unemployment.
Unemployed SA recipients in both countries represent a sizeable
share of the combined caseload. The SA component consistently repre-
sented more than 60 percent of the combined caseload in Slovakia
between 1995 and 2000. From 1999 to 2001, SA recipients averaged
35 percent of the combined caseload in Bulgaria.
Payment levels for SA recipients are higher (relative to UI payment
levels) in Slovakia than in Bulgaria. Thus, the higher caseloads caused
by paying SA benefits to the unemployed have differing total cost im-
plications. In Bulgaria, total costs (UI plus SA) were only about 27
percent higher for the six-year period from 1995 to 2001 but 38 percent
higher from 1999 to 2001. In Slovakia, total costs were 158 percent
higher when SA benefits paid to the unemployed were added to UI
costs.
Policies have been initiated to reduce reliance on SA benefits
among the unemployed in both Bulgaria and Slovakia. Slovakia
sharply reduced the generosity of SA benefits by lowering the payment
level after 12 months to half of the initial level, a policy first initiated
in 2001. Commencing in late 2002, Bulgaria has required mandatory
participation in its new initiative ‘‘From Social Assistance to Employ-
ment’’ for all unemployed SA recipients in benefit status for more than
one year. Refusal to participate causes sanctioning in most individual
situations. The initiatives in the two countries have the common objec-
tive of hastening the return of able-bodied, working-age SA beneficia-
ries to employment.
Recognizing the presence of SA as well as UC benefits to the un-
employed causes a substantial increase in measured recipiency rates
and total costs. An analysis that does not incorporate the SA compo-
nent of unemployment protection costs in CEE-FSU countries would
be seriously incomplete. To secure the requisite data, acquiring SA data
presents a larger challenge than obtaining UC cost data. It is absolutely
essential to obtain this information in order to gain a full picture of the
actual cost of providing income support to the unemployed in these
countries.
More than likely, the prospect of accession to the EU during the
present decade will influence the UC programs in the 11 CEE-FSU
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countries nominated for admission.6 Harmonization of social protec-
tion systems will be a motive for change and an ongoing concern.
While the largest cost implications of this harmonization involve pen-
sion benefits, there will also be effects on UC statutes. Recent changes
in Estonia’s UC program are illustrative of changes that may take place
elsewhere. Legislation enacted in 2002, with benefit provisions effec-
tive in 2003, moved the previous flat benefit system towards a more
traditional earnings-based UI system (all four UI provisions covered
by Table D.1 were changed by this legislation). As a result, average
benefit levels in Estonia are expected to more than triple after the new
provisions are fully in place. It is likely that other countries may also
introduce liberalizing changes, the underlying motivating factor being
the prospect of EU accession.
Instituting liberalizations in UC benefits in labor markets with high
open unemployment rates will not immediately alleviate unemploy-
ment problems. In the longer run, closer ties to the EU can operate to
improve efficiency and economic performance. The outcome will de-
pend in part on macroeconomic and labor market policies.
BULGARIA AND RUSSIA: TWO SHORT STORIES
Certain developments specific to individual CEE-FSU countries
merit a brief analysis because they illustrate changes motivated by per-
ceived structural flaws in the design and/or administration of the exist-
ing UC programs. While both changes are discussed within the context
of individual country experiences, each change addresses a problem
that exists in several CEE-FSU countries.
Benefit Payments in Bulgaria
The emergence of the gray economy has been widespread through-
out in the CEE-FSU countries. The administration of UI tax collections
and benefit payments needs to recognize and try to offset the actions
of claimants and employers in this area.7
Starting in 2002 Bulgaria embarked upon a major consolidation
of its benefit payments administration. The National Social Security
Institute (NSSI) has traditionally administered the payment of social
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insurance benefits for retirement, disability, and survivorship. In 2002,
the NSSI was authorized to administer payments for UI and for short-
term sickness and maternity leave. These payments had traditionally
been administered by the State Employment Service (now the Employ-
ment Agency) and directly by employers, respectively.8 The change-
over in benefit payments administration is slated to continue into 2004
and 2005.
Since 1997 the NSSI also has been collecting monthly earnings
records for workers covered by the public pension system (hereafter,
earnings records). The main purpose of the collections is to develop
earnings histories for individuals to be used in pension determinations
at retirement. During 2002, the NSSI conducted cross-matches between
UI benefit payments and its earnings records and found that about 10
percent of recipients had full monthly earnings during the same months
when benefits were received.9 The scale of the overlap between benefits
and earnings confirmed suspicions about the abuses associated with
social protection payments and had been one factor in the decision to
consolidate benefit payments administration under the NSSI. The net
effect of the cross-matches, coupled with attendant publicity about
cross-match activities, is to target UI payments more effectively to un-
employed persons.
The failure to declare earnings is a major administrative problem
across many UI programs, but program administrators often do not
have a good means for timely identification of such situations. If the
failure to report covered earnings arises solely from the claimant’s ini-
tiative, a cross-match with earnings records can be most productive, as
illustrated by the Bulgarian experience. To perform such a cross-match,
an effective information technology (IT) structure is needed. Four re-
quirements are necessary. The first is effective establishment and en-
forcement of a system of unique identification numbers for individuals.
Second, timely access to electronic micro data on benefit payments is
required. Third, earnings records for individuals must be available in a
timely manner. Finally, there must be high level policy interest and IT
technical support for cross-matches of different administrative activi-
ties. Bulgaria has both the necessary IT capability and an administra-
tive structure where benefits records and earnings records for
individuals can be accessed by the NSSI. Even with all four conditions
present, however, collusion between employers and workers can vitiate
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the effectiveness of cross-matches. The Bulgarian initiative works in
cases where the earnings are reported. Persons who work ‘‘off the
books’’ would elude detection.
Bulgaria will further consolidate benefit payments administration
under the NSSI in the near future. In 2004, the payment of UI, sickness,
and maternity benefits will become the responsibility of NSSI. The
long-run vision is for NSSI to administer all payments of social protec-
tion benefits. The consolidation will permit the NSSI to more easily
detect unwarranted duplication in the receipt of benefit payments as
well as the simultaneous pairwise occurrences of earnings with the
receipt of benefits for each program within its administrative domain.
UI Financing in Russia
In 2002, Russia instituted a major overhaul in the financing of its
UI program. The change shifted the locus of tax collection responsibili-
ties away from the regional (oblast) governments to the national gov-
ernment. In many FSU countries, the collection of payroll taxes has
been primarily the responsibility of regional governments. This decen-
tralized arrangement has characterized the collection systems that sup-
port public pension programs, health programs, and labor market
programs. While this financing arrangement worked relatively well
during the Soviet era, it has proved difficult to effectively extend col-
lections to the new business entities that have emerged during the eco-
nomic transition. As the economic transition has proceeded, revenues
have lagged further and further behind the amounts needed to finance
social benefits.
The underlying premise for payroll tax collections was that aggre-
gate receipts would be sufficient to cover benefit costs, but that deficits
and surpluses would exist for individual geographic areas. Each region
was to retain a fraction of its initial collections and submit the remain-
der to a central authority. The central authority, in turn, would return
these monies to the oblasts on an as needed basis.10 In practice, it be-
came increasingly difficult to finance social programs for two reasons.
Aggregate revenues became increasingly insufficient and surplus re-
gions avoided submitting part of their revenues to the central tax au-
thority. As a result, payment arrears developed and were largest in the
regions with financing deficits. This problem has been most acute for
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the pension programs because their costs are highest and account for
the largest share of total payroll taxes, typically some 70 to 80 percent
of all payroll taxes. With insufficient aggregate revenues, substantial
pension payment arrears accumulated.
The UI programs in many FSU countries have used this decentral-
ized system of payroll tax collections, essentially a carry-over from the
Soviet period. Because unemployment rates vary widely across re-
gions, UI financing problems have arisen, most acutely in regions with
the highest unemployment rates. Surplus regions, wanting to be assured
of adequate funding to make payments to claimants from their region,
have retained most or all of their collections. The central administration
then had insufficient monies to transfer back to deficit regions. In defi-
cit regions, payments simply were not made. This not only adversely
affected the income of the unemployed, it also limited their utilization
of PES offices for job-matching services and other help in securing
new jobs.11
In the area of UI financing, the CEE-FSU countries could learn
from the experiences of other countries. Most UI programs throughout
the world are financed nationally with payroll taxes levied at a uniform
rate. Cross-subsidization at a number of levels is an implied part of
these financing arrangements. There are net subsidies (benefit pay-
ments less revenues) across geographic areas, across industries, and
within industries as employers follow different policies regarding long-
term employer-employee relationships.
Studies in Canada and the United States have investigated the ex-
tent of cross-subsidies and shown that it depends crucially upon UI
financing arrangements. In the United States, for example, cross-
subsidies between the states are precluded in the regular UI programs
because the programs are fully financed at the state level. Furthermore,
net subsidies across industries are reduced due to experience rating.
Recent literature in this area includes papers by Anderson and Meyer
(1993), Vroman (1996), and Woodbury (2003). Large net subsidies
flow to agriculture, mining, and construction, and from the retail trade,
finance, and service industries. The patterns have been stable for more
than four decades since the earliest work by Becker (1972).
Canada has a typical financing arrangement with national collec-
tion of UI (EI) taxes levied at uniform tax rates.12 Research on various
aspects of cross-subsidies in Canada has been conducted by Karagian-
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nis (1986), Corak and Pyper (1995), and Corak and Chen (2003). The
patterns of net subsidies across industries and regions have been stable
in Canada since the early 1970s. The interindustry pattern is similar to
that found in the United States, with agriculture and construction as the
major recipients of net subsidies while the finance and services indus-
tries are consistently net donors.13
The size of the geographic cross-subsidies in the Canadian pro-
gram is not only large but also persistent. For the 11 years from 1986
to 1996, total benefit payments were $15.2 billion (in 1997 Canadian
dollars). The net subsidy to the five eastern provinces during these
years was $2.4 billion. The ratio of benefits to UI taxes ranged from
1.29 in Quebec, the largest of the five, to ratios above 3.00 in New-
foundland and Prince Edward Island. Net subsidies were provided by
the other provinces west of Quebec, with Ontario providing the largest
share. Corak and Chen (2003, Part II) vividly document these patterns
by industry and province.
The change in Russia’s method of UI financing will operate to
increase recipiency, particularly in the regions with high unemploy-
ment. This change will improve the targeting of benefit payments to
persons in the geographic areas where the need for UI benefits is great-
est. Since this is but one change within a UI program characterized by
low recipiency, albeit an important one, it remains to be seen how
much recipiency will increase in the areas of high unemployment.
SUMMARY
The problems of unemployment as well as questions of UC costs
and program administration were examined in the CEE-FSU geo-
graphic area. The labor markets in the countries of this region have
been characterized by high unemployment rates and unemployment
spells of very long average duration. Moreover, the unemployment sit-
uation deteriorated throughout the region during the 1998–2001 period
from the position during the 1994–1997 period. This deterioration was
attributed to three adverse developments: the Russian financial crisis of
1998, the effects of the conflict in Kosovo, and delayed implementation
of economic reforms. Yet, important contrasts between the CEE and
FSU countries were noted.
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While an important policy debate of the 1990s concerned the speed
of the transition to a market economy, there does not appear to be an
overall pattern that links the speed of the transformation to the time
path of the unemployment rate. For instance, Latvia and Lithuania pur-
sued policies to achieve a speedy transition and managed to reduce
average unemployment. Small reductions in average unemployment,
however, also occurred in Romania and Slovenia, countries that fol-
lowed a more gradual approach.
It was recognized that the transition to a market economy would
entail dislocations and unemployment, but the severe nature of these
problems has presented major challenges. Three were noted: the rapid
increase in unemployment, the unexpectedly high level of UC costs,
and the difficulties in administering benefits. Several legislative
changes were enacted, including changes in UC statutory provisions
and administrative rules with the aim of reducing access to benefits,
the duration of benefits, and the level of payments. Labor market policy
initiatives emphasized both active and passive measures, but within a
constrained budgetary environment.
From the outset, the UC programs in the CEE-FSU countries expe-
rienced funding problems because the volume of recipients persistently
exceeded initial expectations. The administration of benefit payments
in Bulgaria was used as a case study to illustrate the problems encoun-
tered in this area. Starting in 2002, the Bulgarian NSSI embarked upon
a major consolidation of its benefit payments administration. In terms
of UC, the objective was to target payments more effectively to unem-
ployed persons. This objective was achieved by trying to detect unwar-
ranted duplication in the receipt of benefit payments with concurrent
earnings. By cross-matching benefit payments with earnings records,
an agency can be more effective in serving the appropriate client base.
Of course, an effective IT structure is necessary to undertake such
cross-match activities. This structure is necessary, however, but not
sufficient. For instance, collusion between employers and workers can
impair the efficiency of an effective IT structure.
The financing of the UC program in Russia was used as another
case study to illustrate the problems encountered in funding. In 2002,
Russia instituted a major overhaul in the financing of its UI program by
shifting tax collection responsibilities away from the regional (oblast)
governments to the national government. The underlying premise was
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that aggregate receipts would be increased to cover benefit costs, and
any deficits would be reallocated to the oblasts needing additional
funds. More than likely, the change in the method of UI financing
will lead to increased recipiency, particularly in the regions with high
unemployment. Moreover, it will improve the targeting of benefit pay-
ments to persons in the oblasts where the need for UI benefits is great-
est. It was noted, however, that since this is but one change within a UI
program characterized by low recipiency, it remains to be seen how
much recipiency will increase in the oblasts with high unemployment.
Notes
1. The two CEE countries are Albania and Bosnia, while the eight FSU countries
are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenis-
tan, and Uzbekistan.
2. In May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia were formally accepted into the EU. Bulgaria, Croatia,
and Romania are candidate countries.
3. Details appear in issues of Social Security Programs Throughout the World that
predate the 1990s.
4. Large proportions of unemployment spells lasted for more than 12 months. The
average percentages in five CEE countries between 1995 and 2000 were Bulgaria,
61; the Czech Republic, 35; Hungary, 51; Poland, 38; and Slovakia, 52.
5. Boeri and Edwards (1998) also document the evolution of selected UC benefit
provisions through roughly middecade.
6. Eight countries were formally accepted into the EU in May 2004; three are candi-
date countries. See note 2 for the list of countries.
7. This discussion is based on Vroman’s work in Bulgaria in 2000–2003 and conver-
sations with Ms. Hristina Metreva of the National Social Security Institute
(NSSI).
8. Consolidation of Bulgarian tax collection administration is also under way.
9. Similar cross-matches were made between earnings records and short-term sick-
ness and maternity benefits. For these benefits, the NSSI found that the overlap
was nearly 15 percent of recipients.
10. In many countries this arrangement was intended to operate at two levels: from
local areas (raions) to regions and from regions (oblasts) to the national authority.
11. Note in Table 5.1 the low ratios of registered to LFS-based unemployment for
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.
12. The Unemployment Insurance Act was given Royal Assent in Canada on August
7, 1940. A major reform of the UI program, the Employment Insurance Act, was
passed in July 1996.
13. In the United States the net subsidies across industries are reduced by the experi-
ence rating of UI taxes. See Vroman (1996) for a comparison of the interindustry
subsidies in Canada and the United States.
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Unemployment Compensation in
East and South Asia
The countries of East and South Asia have the widest range of
relative income variation among the eight regions studied in this vol-
ume. On the other hand, most of the countries of this region generally
have low unemployment rates, with only the Philippines, Sri Lanka,
and Pakistan having relatively high rates of unemployment. Unemploy-
ment rates increased, however, following the Asian financial crisis of
1997, and they continued to be higher in 2000–2001 than they were at
the start of the 1990s. More than likely, unemployment rates in the
region are going to remain higher than the rates experienced in the
precrisis period.
To the extent that unemployment will be higher in the future, the
need for income protection for the unemployed will grow. Yet, UC
programs are not common in Asia. Indeed, there is not a strong tradi-
tion of utilizing PES to secure reemployment so that job matching by
public agencies is generally quite limited. The Asian financial crisis
highlighted the risks inherent in this situation, particularly with the
large increases in poverty rates that accompanied the higher unemploy-
ment.
Certain institutional features in Asian labor markets would inhibit
the applicability of a UC program. First, a sizeable share of employ-
ment is in agriculture, where UC traditionally does not apply. Second,
particular groups of workers usually excluded by UC programs, such
as the self-employed, form a high proportion of total employment in
many Asian countries. Hence, if a low-income country in the region
were to adopt UC with customary coverage provisions, it would likely
include less than half of the total labor force. These issues are explored
in the first section of the chapter.
The second section of the chapter describes UC recipiency in four
countries with functioning UC programs as of 2001: Hong Kong,
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Not only have unemployment rates risen in
recent years, but UC caseloads have also increased. The growth in
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UC recipiency was more dramatic than the growth in unemployment,
particularly in Korea and Taiwan. This alarmed policymakers in Hong
Kong, Korea, and Taiwan and led to the implementation of initiatives
to increase the likelihood of reemployment.
Given that Korea was one of the five Asian economies most af-
fected by the Asian financial crisis, the Korean experience with UC is
reviewed in the third section of this chapter. The fact that Korea had
established UC before the Asian financial crisis makes the case study
all the more interesting because the performance of the program during
the crisis can be assessed. In fact, serious shortcomings in the structure
of the UC program were revealed and several changes were imple-
mented to make the program more accessible to the unemployed.
OVERVIEW OF THE LABOR MARKET
As noted in Chapter 2, the Asian region (along with Sub-Saharan
Africa) has the widest range of relative income variation among the
eight regions studied in this volume. This point is reemphasized in
column (1) of Table 6.1, which displays the 22 Asian economies ar-
rayed by their level of real per-capita GDP in 1999. For the top 11 and
bottom 11 countries the simple (unweighted) averages of their income
levels were $11,600 and $1,618, respectively.
Several labor market factors are correlated with the level of income
in these countries. Fourteen of 22 countries conduct LFSs, all 11 with
the highest income levels plus Pakistan, Bangladesh, and (since 2000)
Cambodia.1 The generally low unemployment rates are illustrated in
columns (3) and (4). Only the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and (possibly)
Pakistan could be described as having high rates of unemployment.
Column (5), however, provides an explicit comparison of unem-
ployment rates before and after the Asian financial crisis. It is generally
agreed that the crisis affected unemployment mainly during 1998 and
1999 and that five Asian countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand) were most severely affected. Column (5)
shows a before-and-after comparison for these countries along with
other countries with ongoing LFSs. For all five countries, unemploy-
ment rates were higher in 2000–2001 than in 1995–1996, and the in-
crease was in the 1.9- to 2.1-percentage-point range for four. Only
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Table 6.1 Summary Characteristics of Asian Economies and Labor Markets
Per-capita
GDP
1999($)
(1)
LFS
(2)
Unemp.
rate
1995–96a
(%)
(3)
Unemp.
rate
2000–01b
(%)
(4)
Unemp.
rate
change
(5)
UC type
(6)
Reg. job
seekers/
unemp.
1990s
(7)
Nonag.
emp.
share
2000c
(8)
Wage-sal.
employee
share
2000c
(9)Country
Japan 25,170 Yes 3.3 4.9 1.6 UI 0.38 0.95 0.83
Hong Kong 22,570 Yes 3.0 5.1 2.1 UA 0.09 1.00 0.90
Singapore 22,310 Yes 2.9 3.9 1.1 0.04 1.00 0.90
Korea, South 15,530 Yes 2.0 3.9 1.9 UI 0.09e 0.90 0.62
Taiwan 15,000 Yes 2.2 3.8 1.6 UI 0.92 0.71
Malaysia 7,640 Yes 2.8 3.5 0.7 0.13 0.82
Thailand 5,950 Yes 1.6 3.5 1.9 UId 0.53 0.40
Philippines 3,990 Yes 7.9 10.0 2.1 0.60 0.48
China 3,550 Yes 2.7 3.1 0.5 UI 0.53
Sri Lanka 3,230 Yes 11.9 8.0 3.9 UId 0.65 0.60
Indonesia 2,660 Yes 4.1 6.1 2.0 0.30 0.57
Papua New Guinea 2,260
India 2,230
Myanmar (Burma) 2,000 0.37
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Table 6.1 (continued)
Per-capita
GDP
1999($)
(1)
LFS
(2)
Unemp.
rate
1995–96a
(%)
(3)
Unemp.
rate
2000–01b
(%)
(4)
Unemp.
rate
change
(5)
UC type
(6)
Reg. job
seekers/
unemp.
1990s
(7)
Nonag.
emp.
share
2000c
(8)
Wage-sal.
employee
share
2000c
(9)Country
Vietnam 1,860 UId
Pakistan 1,860 Yes 5.4 7.8 2.4 0.12 0.52 0.36
Bangladesh 1,530 Yes 2.5 3.3 0.8 0.38 0.15
Laos 1,430
Cambodia 1,350 Yes 2.2 0.15
Nepal 1,280
Bhutan 1,200
Afghanistan 800
NOTES: Unemployment rate change is percentage-point change.
a Indonesia data are for 1995 only. Bangladesh data are for 1996 only.
b Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka data are for 2000 only.
c Philippines data refer to 1999. Sri Lanka data refer to 1996.
d Country plans to establish a UI program.
e Average for 1998–2000.
SOURCE: World Development Report for per-capita GDP. Other data from the ILO Web site and country publications.
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Malaysia had a smaller increase between 1995–1996 and 2000–2001.
Note that four other high-income Asian countries (Japan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Taiwan) also had higher unemployment rates in 2000–
2001 than in 1995–1996. The 2000–2001 rate was at least one full
percentage point higher for all four, and the increase was between 1.6
and 2.1 percentage points for three of those. Higher unemployment
was widespread during 2000–2001. In fact, for the 13 countries where
comparisons are possible, only Sri Lanka had lower unemployment in
2000–2001 than in 1995–1996. While this comparison may be influ-
enced by lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis (affecting unem-
ployment rates during 2000), it could also suggest that unemployment
rates in Asia are not going to return to the very low levels observed
during the 10 to 15 years of the precrisis period.
To the extent that unemployment will be higher in the future, the
need for income protection for the unemployed will grow. In contrast
to the OECD-20 countries, Asian countries have operated small-scale
programs of active and passive labor market measures. The Asian fi-
nancial crisis highlighted the risks inherent in this situation, with large
increases in poverty rates that accompanied the higher unemployment
of 1998 and 1999.2
Unemployment compensation (UC) programs are not common in
Asia. Table 6.1 identifies the five countries with functioning UC pro-
grams in 2001. Of these, the program in Japan has been operating for
more than 50 years and is the largest. Korea and Taiwan established
programs in the 1990s. The generally small scale of the Asian UC
programs has already been noted in the discussion of UI costs in Chap-
ter 3. Three additional countries that are considering or have recently
adopted UC (Thailand, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka) are also identified.
Thailand had planned to start a program in the fall of 2003, but this
was delayed until mid-2004, while the start-up dates for Sri Lanka and
Vietnam are uncertain, perhaps 2006. Because of their recent start-ups,
the initial experiences of the UC programs in Korea and Taiwan are
of particular interest. The Korean experience is reviewed later in this
chapter.
To function most effectively, UC programs must be able to assist
claimants in learning about job vacancies, facilitate job search, provide
counseling and assessments, and refer people to training. One indicator
of the presence of these activities is data on job registrations with the
PAGE 131................. 11236$ $CH6 04-15-05 08:16:44 PS
132 Vroman and Brusentsev
public labor exchange. Recall from Table 4.1 that ratios of registered
job seekers to LFS unemployment averaged about 1.0 in the OECD-20
countries. The seven ratios shown for Asian countries are much lower,
ranging from 0.04 to 0.38 (Table 6.1). The ratios exceed 0.15 only for
Indonesia (0.30) and Japan (0.38). The PES operation in most Asian
economies is small scale. There is not a strong tradition of utilizing the
PES to secure new jobs. Thus, the ability to perform the job-matching
function is generally quite limited across these countries.
There are other facets of employment in Asia that would inhibit
the applicability of a UC system. In many countries, a sizeable share
of employment occurs in work situations where UC traditionally does
not apply. First, agriculture usually falls outside the scope of UC cover-
age. This is a highly seasonal industry and typically many, or most,
workers are the farm owners and other family members. The agricul-
tural employment share traditionally is much higher in countries with
low per-capita income. Column (8) shows the nonagricultural shares
for 14 of the 22 Asian countries. The nonagricultural shares are close
to (or round to) unity in the three highest income countries (Hong
Kong, Japan, and Singapore) whereas the shares fall into the 0.37 to
0.53 range in five (Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Thai-
land). The proportions in the high-income Asian countries resemble
those of the OECD-20 countries (outside of southern Europe), as
shown in Table 4.1.
Second, certain groups of workers are rarely covered by UC pro-
grams: employers, the self-employed, unpaid family workers, and
members of production cooperatives. Coverage most usually applies to
wage and salary employees (so-called dependent employees). Column
(9) shows the wage and salary shares of total employment in 2000.
These proportions also vary widely. For the three highest income Asian
countries, the proportions exceeded 0.80, as in the OECD-20 countries.
However, for the lower-income countries (where data are available),
the proportions are much lower: five fall below 0.50. If one of the
lower-income Asian countries were to adopt UC with customary cover-
age provisions, it would apply to much less than half of the total labor
force.
Data from Thailand are useful for illustrating this point. In the
fourth quarter of 2002, employment totaled 33.1 million but only 41
percent were wage and salary workers, just one percentage point higher
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than the 40 percent for 2000 shown in Table 6.1. Workers from agricul-
ture, employers, own-account workers (self-employed), and unpaid
family workers combined to represent 60 percent of total employment.
The example is interesting because Thailand is establishing a UI pro-
gram, with payments commencing in mid-2004. From the preceding
discussion, it would seem likely that less than half of unemployment
would be potentially covered in Thailand. The UC coverage question
is revisited in Chapter 8.
UC RECIPIENCY IN ASIA
Table 6.2 presents annual summary data on unemployment and UC
recipiency since 1990 for four of the five countries with functioning
UC programs as of 2001 (all but China). Panel A displays unemploy-
ment rates, again illustrating that unemployment rates in the most re-
cent years have been much higher than at the start of the 1990s. The
simple averages across the four countries were 1.9 percent in 1990 but
4.7 percent in 2001. The combined annual unemployment across the
four increased from 2.0 million in 1990 to 4.9 million in 2001 (Panel
B).
Panel C traces the time paths of UC recipiency in each country. In
Japan there were twice as many recipients at the end of the period as
in 1990. For the other three countries, the increases were much more
dramatic. In Hong Kong, the UA program average caseload from 1998
to 2001 averaged 27,000 compared to 2,500 from 1990 to 1993. Al-
though the data periods are much shorter for Korea and Taiwan, both
countries have witnessed very large caseload increases since the incep-
tion of their programs. Thus, some of their caseload growth reflects
factors associated with initiating a new UI program, also note that both
countries experienced higher unemployment rates shortly after their
programs commenced. Finally, as will be described below, Korea’s
increased recipiency has been influenced by policy changes designed
to make the program more accessible to the unemployed.
While much of the caseload growth in all four countries simply
reflects the increase in unemployment, Panel D shows there has been a
large increase in the recipiency rate for three. At the same time, note
the generally low levels of the recipiency rates even in the most recent
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Table 6.2 Unemployment Rates and UC Recipiency Rates for Four Asian
Countries, 1990–2001
Japan Hong Konga Korea Taiwan
A. Unemployment
rates (%)
1990 2.1 1.5 2.4 1.7
1991 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.5
1992 2.2 2.0 2.4 1.5
1993 2.5 1.8 2.8 1.4
1994 2.9 2.4 2.4 1.6
1995 3.2 3.3 2.0 1.8
1996 3.4 2.4 2.0 2.6
1997 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.7
1998 4.1 5.4 6.8 2.7
1999 4.7 6.1 6.3 2.9
2000 4.7 4.7 4.1 3.0
2001 5.0 5.7 3.8 4.5
B. Unemployment
(in thousands)
1990 1,340 43 454 140
1991 1,360 55 436 130
1992 1,420 55 465 132
1993 1,660 53 550 128
1994 1,920 72 490 142
1995 2,100 101 420 165
1996 2,250 78 426 242
1997 2,303 99 556 256
1998 2,787 179 1,461 257
1999 3,171 202 1,353 283
2000 3,198 159 913 293
2001 3,397 197 845 444
C. UC beneficiaries
(in thousands)
1990 482 1.7
1991 494 2.0
1992 571 2.6
1993 699 3.5
1994 780 4.6
1995 837 7.7
1996 844 13.0 2.1
1997 899 16.6 10.3
1998 1,053 26.7 113.6
1999 1,068 29.7 142.6 3.3
2000 1,029 23.9 76.5 8.8
2001 1,077 26.9 117.0 40.5
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Japan Hong Konga Korea Taiwan
D. UC recipiency
rates
1990 0.360 0.040
1991 0.363 0.037
1992 0.402 0.047
1993 0.421 0.066
1994 0.406 0.064
1995 0.398 0.076
1996 0.375 0.167 0.005
1997 0.390 0.168 0.018
1998 0.378 0.150 0.078
1999 0.337 0.147 0.105 0.012
2000 0.322 0.151 0.084 0.030
2001 0.317 0.137 0.138 0.091
a Data refer to fiscal years ending on March 31 of the following year, e.g., 2001 spans
the months from April 2001 to March 2002.
SOURCE: Data from ILO and labor market publications of individual countries.
years. While Japan has had recipiency proportions consistently in the
0.32 to 0.42 range, the ratios for the other three countries have been
less than 0.17 for every year covered in Panel D.
The dramatic growth in caseloads in Hong Kong has alarmed pub-
lic officials and program administrators. Concerns have emerged about
possible long-term welfare dependency and have motivated new policy
initiatives designed to speed reentry into employment.3 In 1998 the
government convened an interdepartmental steering group that was
chaired by the Director of Social Welfare and undertook a major review
of the system of income support. Several recommendations were made,
including the establishment of a ‘‘Support for Self-Reliance’’ scheme
(Hong Kong Social Welfare Department 1998). The scheme included
three elements: 1) more active assistance to help the unemployed to
find new work, 2) a requirement that the unemployed participate in
unpaid community work, and 3) an increase in the earnings disregard
to improve incentives for the UA recipients to seek work.
These recommendations have already been implemented, and eval-
uations of ‘‘Support for Self-Reliance’’ are being undertaken. At the
same time, however, unemployment has remained in the 4.5 to 6.0
percent range, and the labor market has not demonstrated the same
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strength as in the precrisis years. The recipiency rate has decreased
somewhat since 1997 but still has remained at levels far above those of
the early 1990s. The UA program in Hong Kong is now serving many
more persons than it did before the Asian financial crisis.
The one decrease in the recipiency rate is observed for Japan, de-
clining from 0.39 (1990–1993) to 0.34 (1998–2001). The decline
seems to reflect, in part, the effects of relatively fixed benefit duration
provisions in the UI program coupled with higher unemployment rates
(Panel A) and the associated increase in unemployment duration. Max-
imum potential UI duration is linked to both age and years of service.
The longest potential duration, for persons aged 45 to 60 years with 20
or more years of service, is 330 days, or 11 months. While this poten-
tial duration is higher than previously (300 days prior to 2001), the
increased duration applied only to job losers and dislocated workers in
the 45–60 age group. The maximum potential durations have not
changed for younger people.4 For someone aged 30 to 45 years with
20 years of experience, the maximum has remained at 240 days. Data
on actual benefit duration in Japan show that it has remained at about
6 months since unemployment started to increase in the mid-1990s. At
least some of the explanation for the decrease in recipiency observed
in Panel D is the higher rates of exhaustion experienced in the most
recent years covered by Table 6.2.
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE
Korea instituted its UC program shortly before the onset of the
Asian financial crisis.5 Unemployment increased sharply in late 1997
and early 1998 following the financial crisis; unemployment averaged
6.8 percent during 1998 and 6.3 percent during 1999. While these un-
employment rates were not the highest ever experienced in Korea, rates
in excess of 5.0 percent had not occurred since the late 1960s. Unem-
ployment decreased in the postcrisis period, with the annual unemploy-
ment rate reaching 3.7 percent in 2001.
The high unemployment of 1998–1999 revealed serious shortcom-
ings of Korean UC as originally structured, and several changes were
implemented to improve its effectiveness. Even today, however, UC in
Korea remains a modest program, as shown in Panel D of Table 6.2.
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As one of the countries most severely impacted by the Asian fi-
nancial crisis, Korea is interesting to study for several reasons. Its
strong economic performance during the preceding two decades was
broadly shared within the population. As indicated in Table 6.1, its per-
capita GDP of $15,530 in 1999 placed Korea fourth among all Asian
countries, with higher income present only in Japan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. Korea has been an OECD member since 1996, and the
availability of labor market data and other economic data make it possi-
ble to study its experiences in greater detail than is possible for many
other Asian countries. Since UC was recently adopted, Korea had the
opportunity to study UC programs in several other countries and incor-
porate foreign design features into its own program. Finally, because
UC was established before the Asian financial crisis, the program’s
performance during the crisis can be assessed.
Unemployment insurance had been considered for adoption in
Korea during the 1970s and 1980s but was rejected as premature.6
There were also concerns about disincentive effects of cash transfers
to the unemployed. In the late 1980s, Korea adopted a public pension
system, and experiences with this social insurance program were gen-
erally viewed as successful. During the early 1990s the Korean Labor
Institute was charged with designing an EI program. Their proposal
included both active and passive measures for the unemployed. The EI
bill was passed in late 1993, went into effect in July 1995, and benefit
payments commenced in July 1996.
Korea’s EI program has three elements: UI benefits, an employ-
ment stabilization program, and a job skills development program. The
program is funded with payroll taxes on covered employers and work-
ers. The stabilization component provides wage subsidies to employers
to retain current workers and to hire workers from protected classes
such as the elderly, disabled, and labor force reentrants. The job skills
component mainly provides training to experienced workers. The two
components have several individual measures to serve a diverse client
base. The design of the Korean EI program places strong emphasis
on both active and passive measures to support the unemployed and
encourage reemployment.
To be eligible for UI benefits under the original 1993 legislation,
the covered worker initially needed to have 12 months of covered em-
ployment during the 18 months preceding the separation. Coverage in
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the first years extended only to firms with 30 or more employees. The
statutory replacement rate was 50 percent, and the original maximum
benefit was 35,000 won per day, which implied maximum monthly
benefits roughly equal to average monthly wages. The waiting period
was two weeks, and payments were made biweekly so that the first
payment would be received four weeks after the onset of unemploy-
ment. Potential benefit duration ranged from one to seven months in
the original age-experience table, which conferred longer potential du-
rations for those who were older and those with more years of experi-
ence. Because the crediting of experience commenced only in 1995,
however, the initial maximum was just four months.7 This design fea-
ture recognizes the above-average duration of unemployment among
older workers and makes an explicit link between years of past service
and one’s potential entitlement. Durational disqualifications were ap-
plied in situations of voluntary quits and misconduct. The UI program
was supported by payroll taxes levied at a 0.3 percent rate on both
employers and employees.
As unemployment increased in late 1997 and early 1998, it became
apparent that UI was serving only a small fraction of the unemployed.
During the last half of 1997, monthly beneficiaries averaged 2.4 per-
cent of total unemployment (12,553 out of 515,000), and this only
increased to 5.6 percent during the first half of 1998 (73,818 out of
1,330,000). Thus, while UI caseloads grew rapidly, the program was
not reaching the vast majority of the unemployed.
Several changes were instituted to improve access to the UI pro-
gram:
• During 1998, the minimum size of covered firms was lowered
in stages from 30 to 10 (January), then to 5 (March), and finally
to all firms with 1 or more employee (October).
• The minimum qualification period was reduced to 6 of the past
12 months starting in March 1998 (initially extending through
June 2000 but later revised to 6 of the past 18 months in April
2000).
• In March 1998, a new age-experience table was instituted,
which increased the minimum potential duration to two months.8
• A temporary extension of the maximum duration for an addi-
tional two months was effective between July 1998 and Decem-
ber 1999.
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• The maximum benefit was reduced from 35,000 to 30,000 won
per day in July 1999. In effect, the Korean policy response was
to improve access to the UI program but to reduce benefit levels
to lessen the total increase in benefit payments.
• Finally, even though the trust fund that pays UI benefits was not
in deficit, contribution rates were raised in January 1999 to 0.5
percent of payroll for both employers and employees.
Note that all changes related to coverage and eligibility became
effective during 1998 and remained operative throughout all of 1999.
Despite these expansions, UI continues to serve a small share of the
unemployed. As indicated in Table 6.2, the average recipiency rate
during 1999 (monthly beneficiaries as a proportion of monthly unem-
ployment) was only 0.105. This proportion decreased to 0.084 in 2000
(as temporary measures, such as the emergency two-month extension
of benefits lapsed). With continuing decreases in unemployment during
2001, the recipiency rate increased to 0.138. The increase was partly a
reflection of increased potential duration due to the liberalization in
January 2000 of the age-experience table that determines potential du-
ration and the fact that more qualified workers had at least five years
of creditable experience which entitled them to up to seven months of
potential benefits. Increases in potential benefit duration will continue
to occur as more of the unemployed acquire the necessary five years of
creditable work experience, and then 10 years starting in 2005.
As presently structured, the UI program in Korea is narrow in
scope despite extensions of coverage to small firms, easier qualification
requirements (work in 6 of the last 12 months since 1998), and in-
creases in potential duration from the revised age-experience table.
Five elements operate to limit the scale of the program:
1) There are important limitations in coverage that arise from both
the exclusion of certain classes of workers and from the limited
penetration of the program in securing contributions from small
firms. More discussion of this issue is reserved for Chapter 8.
2) Many who work in covered firms are not eligible for benefits
due to blanket exclusions of temporary, daily, and part-time
workers. For example, in December 1999, temporary and daily
employees constituted 53 percent of employment but 82 percent
of unemployment (Table 2.5 in Hur 2001).
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3) The two-week waiting period and the 50 percent replacement
rate are both strict when viewed from a comparative perspective.
4) Durational disqualifications for both quits and misconduct re-
duce eligibility. The importance of quits in Korea can be illus-
trated with data from the last half of 1998, which was already
months in the midst of the financial crisis. Nearly 60 percent of
the covered unemployed for these six months had voluntarily
left their last job compared to about 30 percent who became
unemployed through (individual and mass) layoffs (Table 5.3 in
Yoo 1999).
5) To retain continuing eligibility, UI recipients are required to
visit local EI offices every two weeks. A failure to report leads
to a suspension of benefits payments.
In addition to these points, it should be noted that potential dura-
tion is short for many, especially for younger workers who traditionally
have high unemployment rates. For the five years between 1997 and
2001, UI duration averaged 2.4, 3.1, 5.3, 3.6, and 4.0 months, respec-
tively.9 This five-year series shows both a gradual increase in actual
duration as potential duration has increased and the effect of the two
months of emergency benefits operative throughout all of 1999. Short
potential duration results in a high rate of benefit exhaustion (i.e., about
70 percent in 2001 and 2002).10
As noted at the outset of this section, concerns about disincentive
effects of UI benefit payments have been longstanding in Korea. Not
surprisingly, this concern is reflected in program statutes and adminis-
trative requirements affecting eligibility. The Korean UI program can
be described as limited both in the generosity of monthly payments and
in access to benefits. Thus, even though UI was substantially expanded
during 1998 and again in 2000, UI recipients have remained a small
proportion of total unemployment.
Ongoing concerns about the effective coverage of EI have resulted
in further coverage extensions effective in January 2004. Coverage has
been extended to day workers and those employed under temporary
employment contracts. It is anticipated that some 1.5 to 2.0 million
workers will benefit from this extension. Like the minimum firm size
coverage extension of 1998, it is likely the effects of this extension will
occur over several years.
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Given the limited effective scale of UI in Korea, other labor market
measures are also important for alleviating the effects of unemploy-
ment. Two important strands in the social safety net are the other EI
program components noted earlier: the Employment Stabilization Pro-
gram and the Job Skills Development Program. Both expanded sharply
in 1998 and 1999. The number of jobs protected under the Employment
Stabilization Program increased from 93,000 in 1996 and 117,000 in
1997 to more than 750,000 in 1998 and more than 650,000 in 1999.
Training activities under the Job Skills Development Program also in-
creased during 1998 and 1999, with nearly 600,000 participants in
1998 and more than 1,000,000 in 1999. The number of participants
in training activities has continued to grow since 1999, reaching more
than 2,000,000 in 2001.11
Two other important programs serving the unemployed are the
livelihood protection program and emergency public works. The num-
ber of beneficiaries in both programs expanded sharply during 1998
and 1999. Livelihood protection has been a longstanding program pro-
viding income support to the indigent and families without a working
adult. It uses income and asset tests to target payments to low-income
recipients. A temporary livelihood protection program for families
with unemployment was added during the financial crisis. It served
310,000 persons in 1998 and 760,000 in 1999. Emergency public
works jobs were also created, and participation levels were 175,000 in
1998 and 390,000 in 1999. Workers in these jobs were paid on a daily
basis for periods up to three months, with a second period of eligibility
also possible following a successful reapplication.12
Thus, UI is but one element in the Korean social safety net. Ac-
cording to one set of estimates, UI benefits accounted for 15 to 17
percent of all spending on social protection for the unemployed during
1998 and 1999.13 The combined scale of all social protection programs,
however, was quite modest relative to the need for income support
during these two years. According to a household survey of Septem-
ber–October 1998, the most important sources of support for the unem-
ployed (utilization ranked in order of importance) were earnings of
others, 55 percent; savings, 34 percent; borrowing, 22 percent; and
social protection payments, 19 percent. The three leading categories of
social protection payments were public works employment (7.7 per-
cent), UI benefits (7.5 percent), and training (4.2 percent).14 Receipt of
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UI benefits was a small element in the support system used by Korean
families during the Asian financial crisis. For most families, the adjust-
ment to unemployment during the financial crisis was to rely mainly
on personal resources, family resources, and coping mechanisms.
SUMMARY
In the region of East and South Asia identified in Table 6.1, func-
tioning UC programs were present in just 5 of the 22 countries in 2001.
Although at least 3 other countries have an active interest in having
UC, it remains to be seen if and when their programs will be instituted.
As of 2004 only Thailand has been added to the other 5.
The low incidence of UC among Asian economies is explained in
large part by the low per-capita GDP of many countries. In 1999, the
worldwide average as shown in Table 2.1 was about $6,900 (PPP esti-
mates), but the Asian average was $4,060, the second lowest of the
eight regional averages in that table. Thirteen Asian countries had per-
capita income less than half of the worldwide average in 1999. Using
income as a guide to the likely presence of UC in a country, the sur-
prises in Asia would be Singapore and (perhaps) Malaysia, not Laos,
Nepal, or the other low-income countries appearing in Table 6.1.
Where UC is present in Asia, the programs are relatively small.
Even after expanding the scope of the program in Korea in 1998, less
than one in five unemployed receives benefits. The same is true of
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Only Japan routinely compensates as many as
one-third of the unemployed through its UI program.
The small scale of UC programs in Asia reflects deliberate policy
choices affecting both initial eligibility and continuing eligibility. Reci-
piency would be higher with different treatment of part-time workers,
shorter disqualification periods, and longer potential entitlements. Re-
strictive features, however, reflect deep concerns about the disincentive
effects of UC programs and potential long-term dependence on transfer
payments. These concerns were apparent in Hong Kong in 1998, when
UA caseloads increased sharply.
Similar concerns slowed the initial adoption of UI in Korea and
continue to dominate policy discussions even after the higher unem-
ployment rates arising from the Asian financial crisis revealed the seri-
PAGE 142................. 11236$ $CH6 04-15-05 08:16:46 PS
Unemployment Compensation in East and South Asia 143
ous shortcomings of the original Korean UI program. The program has
been modified to improve its effectiveness but remains relatively mod-
est in scale. Despite the extension of coverage to small firms, easier
qualification requirements, and increases in potential duration, the pro-
gram continues to serve a small share (less than 20 percent) of the
unemployed. Concerns about disincentive effects of UI benefit pay-
ments continue to be reflected in program statutes and administrative
requirements affecting eligibility.
It seems that UC programs are likely to remain small scale not
only in Korea but also in other Asian countries. The limited penetration
of the PES into the labor market will reinforce this tendency. Finally,
the comparatively small share of wage and salary employment within
the overall employment total in most Asian countries would also oper-
ate to restrict the scale of UC programs. More discussion of UC cover-
age is given in Chapter 8.
Based on LFS unemployment rates, UC would appear to be quite
affordable for most countries in the region. Labor force surveys typi-
cally show low to moderate unemployment rates, for example, 10 of 14
countries below 6.0 percent in 2000–2001. Also, recall from Chapter 2,
the generally small response of employment to changes in real GDP in
Asia. This would suggest that unemployment and UC benefit payments
would exhibit less cyclical volatility for a given change in real GDP
relative to a similar change in the OECD-20 countries. Interest in
adopting and expanding the scope of UC programs may grow, how-
ever, if Asian unemployment rates continue to increase as is suggested
by the data presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Notes
1. Vietnam also conducts an LFS, but the results are not generally available.
2. One analysis of the Asian financial crisis with individual chapters on each of the
five ‘‘crisis’’ countries is the volume edited by Betcherman and Islam (2001).
3. The Hong Kong income support system for those of working age includes UA
benefits for the unemployed, cash support for those with low earnings, and pay-
ments to low-income families with single parents.
4. Maximum potential duration is determined by a table with four age groups and
five experience categories. Only 2 of the 14 cells in this table were increased
when the table was revised in 2001.
5. The Korean Labor Institute was charged with designing an Employment Insurance
(EI) program in the early 1990s. The EI bill was passed into legislation in late
1993, and benefit payments commenced in July 1996.
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6. Yoo (1999) gives the background and a thorough description of all the elements
of the EI program in Korea.
7. The first age-experience table had three age categories (under 30, 30–49, and 50
and older) and five experience categories (from less than 1 year to 10 or more
years). The 5–10 year category became operative only in June 2000 and the top
category (for those with 10 or more years of experience) will not become opera-
tive until June 2005. As noted previously, Japan has a similar arrangement linking
potential duration to age and experience.
8. Since January 2000 a third age-experience table has been operative with potential
benefit duration ranging from three months to eight months.
9. Duration is measured as months compensated in the year divided by the number
of claimants receiving a first payment.
10. This was reported in a meeting with representatives of the Human Resources
Development Service of Korea in July 2002.
11. Counts of participants in these two programs are shown in various issues of
Monthly Statistics of Employment Insurance, a publication of Human Resources
Development Service of Korea (2002).
12. Details of both programs are given in Lødemel and Dahl (2001).
13. See Table 1.2 in Park et al. (2001).
14. The survey, conducted by the Korean Institute of Health and Social Affairs and
the Korean Labor Institute, interviewed 4,339 households during September–
October 1998. The results described in the text are reported in Park (2001).
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Unemployment Compensation
in Latin American
and Caribbean Countries
The countries of South America, Central America, and the Carib-
bean face serious economic challenges frequently manifested in high
unemployment and/or high inflation. While the economic crisis in Ar-
gentina that commenced in late 2001 has received widespread atten-
tion, large increases in unemployment also occurred in Chile in 1999
and in Uruguay in 2001–2002. Recent economic statistics also show
that the problem of high inflation has not disappeared from the region.
Although episodes of hyperinflation did not return during the 1990s,
inflation in Argentina during 2002 reached 40 percent while in Uru-
guay it was approximately 25 percent.1 Providing social protection for
the unemployed of this region presents unique challenges.
Of the 21 countries from this region, only 6—all of which are in
South America—have a formal UC program. The programs in South
America are, however, relatively modest in scale—potential benefit du-
ration is short and replacement rates are generally low. Recipiency
rates are also relatively low (see Panel D of Table 3.3). These aspects of
UC programs are explored in the first section of this chapter. Particular
attention is given to the association between inflation and UC replace-
ment rates because past inflation has been severe in many Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries. It is argued that without effective
indexation provisions, high inflation would quickly erode the real value
of monthly benefits.
The second section examines UC administration in four South
American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The dis-
cussion highlights the important ways in which the administrative ar-
rangements in these countries deviate from those in the OECD-20
countries, arrangements that are more familiar to most readers. As a
broad generalization, there is a more substantial disconnect between
the benefit payment function and the other reemployment functions
traditionally undertaken by a country’s PES.
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Low recipiency in formal UC programs has meant that the unem-
ployed have had to rely on various coping mechanisms and/or other
public programs. This is examined in the third section of the chapter,
with particular attention to social investment funds and severance pay.
The final section of this chapter describes and assesses the new UI
program in Chile, a program that places primary emphasis on access
to individual accounts as the basis for payments. The key provisions of
the new program are outlined and two questions are raised for discus-
sion. How will access to individual accounts be controlled? How well
will UI coverage match unemployment?
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAMS:
PREVALENCE, RECIPIENCY RATES, AND
REPLACEMENT RATES
Of the 21 countries from this area, only 6 have formal UC pro-
grams, and all are UI programs. All 6 are in South America: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.2 In Chile and Uru-
guay nationwide programs have been operating for more than 40 years;
their origins date from the 1930s.
Compared with UC programs in the OECD-20 countries, the pro-
grams in South America are modest in scale. Potential benefit duration
is short and replacement rates are generally low—in the 0.50 to 0.60
range. In 2003 three countries imposed a 30-day waiting period (Brazil,
Chile, and Venezuela) while the waiting period is 60 days in Ecuador.
Ecuador is also unusual in that benefits are paid as a single lump sum,
akin to severance pay.3
Because LFSs are present in most Latin American and Caribbean
countries (18 of 21 in 1999), one can assess recipiency rates in the
countries with UC programs. Across the four countries where perform-
ance data were assembled for this volume (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Uruguay), Brazil stands out as having by far the highest recipiency
rate. Over the 15 years from 1987 to 2001, the annual ratio of benefi-
ciaries to unemployment averaged 0.28, and ranged from 0.12 (1987)
to 0.47 (1995). Between 1990 and 2001 the recipiency rate ranged from
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0.24 to 0.38. The targeting of UC benefits in Brazil is examined later
in this section.
For the other three countries, recipiency rates have been consis-
tently much lower. The averages were 0.06 for Argentina between 1993
and 2000, 0.11 for Chile between 1980 and 2001, and 0.13 for Uruguay
between 1984 and 2001.4 Just one annual observation from the three
reached 0.24 (Chile in 1983), the minimum for Brazil between 1990
and 2001. Low recipiency in these countries has meant that persons
have had to rely on various coping mechanisms (savings, resources of
family members, reduced consumption) and/or other public programs
while unemployed.
One factor in low recipiency in these countries has been the short
duration of UI benefits. In Brazil UI duration was 4.0 months between
1987 and 2001, while it was 4.1 months in Uruguay between 1990 and
2000 and 7.1 months in Chile between 1995 and 2001. Among recipi-
ents, UI benefit payments represent a temporary income source. Limi-
tations on potential benefit duration have been effective in these
countries in preventing long-term dependency on UI benefits.5
A second limiting factor has been the restricted coverage of UI
programs. A substantial share of the labor force works without a formal
labor contract, often as self-employed or as unpaid family workers. As
shown by de Ferranti et al. (2000, Table 5.3), workers in the informal
sector in Argentina and Mexico have at least as high a likelihood of
experiencing unemployment as those in the formal sector. These work-
ers, however, fall beyond the scope of UI coverage.6
Because past inflation has been severe in many Latin American
and Caribbean countries, it is appropriate to examine the association
between inflation and UI replacement rates. Without effective index-
ation provisions, high inflation would quickly erode the real value of
monthly benefits provided by these programs.
This question is examined using regressions that relate the inflation
rate to the UI replacement rate in the three countries where replacement
rates were measured for reasonably long periods. The estimation spans
1987 to 1999 in Brazil, 1975 to 1976 and 1981 to 2000 in Chile, and
1982 to 2000 in Uruguay. Two indicators of inflation are tested—
annual percent changes in the GDP deflator and annual percent changes
in average monthly wages. Over these sample periods, the replacement
rates averaged 0.478 in Brazil, 0.105 in Chile, and 0.116 in Uruguay.
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Figure 7.1 displays the three replacement rate series. Brazil stands out
for having by far the highest replacement rate and the widest range of
variation between 1986 and 1999.
Each of the three countries experienced substantial inflation during
these years. In Brazil 8 of 13 years had inflation rates (GDP deflator)
above 100 percent, including five years with inflation in excess of
1,000 percent. Chile experienced 9 of 22 years with GDP inflation
above 20 percent, including 2 with inflation above 250 percent. In Uru-
guay the highest inflation over the sample period was just above 100
percent in 2 years, but the inflation rate exceeded 50 percent in 9 of 19
years. The highest single-year inflation rates (GDP deflator) during the
estimation periods were 2,582 percent in Brazil (1990), 344 percent in
Chile (1975), and 107 percent in Uruguay (1990). Within each country,
the price and wage inflation series were highly correlated during the
estimation periods, with correlations of 0.99 in Brazil, 0.96 in Chile,
and 0.88 in Uruguay. Thus, each country experienced several years
with high inflation in both prices and wages.
The regressions are fitted with two specifications. The first empha-
sizes changes in replacement rates in response to inflation. Across the
three countries, no significant effects of inflation are found, based on
either price inflation or wage inflation. The second specification uses
the inflation rate to explain the level of the replacement rate. Here the
coefficients for current inflation (both price inflation and wage infla-
tion) are (unexpectedly) positive and significant in Brazil and Chile but
negative and significant for Uruguay. Because the latter results are not
consistent in explaining the levels of the replacement rates across the
three countries, no strong conclusions can be drawn.
A few added comments, however, may be appropriate. Of the three
countries, Brazil had the highest inflation rates over its estimation pe-
riod, rates in excess of 1,000 percent in five different years between
1987 and 1999. Yet, its replacement rates did not decline during the
years of hyperinflation due to effective indexation arrangements. Chile
operated with a freeze on maximum benefits in the late 1980s (1986 to
1989) and again during the late 1990s (from 1996 through 2002). Al-
though inflation rates were moderate during both periods (consistently
below 20 percent), replacement rates declined due to these freezes.
Uruguay had the most stable replacement rates of the three countries.
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Figure 7.1 UI Replacement Rates in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
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Replacement rates rose somewhat during the late 1990s (See Figure
7.1), a period when inflation decreased.
In sum, analyses of replacement rate developments in the individ-
ual countries need to recognize other determinants besides simply vari-
ation over time in the rates of wage and price inflation. Particularly
important is the determination of changes in the maximum and mini-
mum UI benefit. A freeze on the maximum and minimum can lead to
a reduced replacement rate even if inflation is moderate, as in Chile
from 1986 to 1989 and again after 1996.
ISSUES IN UI ADMINISTRATION
Unemployment insurance program administration in the four
South American countries studied here deviates in important ways
from administrative arrangements in the OECD-20 countries. In gen-
eral, there is a more substantial disconnect between the benefit payment
function and claimant registration, job search assistance, and other re-
employment functions traditionally undertaken by a country’s employ-
ment service. A short review of these countries’ arrangements helps to
highlight some salient characteristics.
Of the four countries, Uruguay’s program most closely follows
traditional UI administrative arrangements. The primary administrative
entity, the Banco de Prevision Social, has responsibility for registration
of claimants, deciding initial eligibility, monitoring continuing eligibil-
ity, making referrals for training, and paying benefits. Its role as gate-
keeper is illustrated by the annual numbers of claimant sanctions.
During 2000, when monthly beneficiaries averaged 26,200, there were
about 5,900 sanctions (denials and suspensions) per month (see Banco
de Prevision Social 2001, pp. 243–244).
Between 1974 and 2002 Chile’s program functioned with benefit
payments administered by the public social security system. Claimants
registered at municipal offices where there was some screening for
eligibility. Workers needed to provide evidence of being separated by
employers, for reasons other than a quit or misconduct. In the past,
claimants were often required to participate in some form of temporary
employment scheme. Ongoing eligibility past the point of initial enroll-
ment was rarely monitored. Low initial benefit levels coupled with
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time-related benefit reductions (benefits after six months were only half
of initial benefits) helped to ensure that workers self-limited their time
in benefit status. As noted previously, duration averaged 7.1 months
between 1995 and 2001.
While payment levels and replacement rates were low, there were
concerns among policymakers that many recipients were needlessly
prolonging their spells in benefit status. These concerns were an impor-
tant factor in a major reform (revision) of the UI program enacted
during 2001. Starting in October 2002, workers with expiring labor
contracts were enrolled in a new program with quite different adminis-
tration, eligibility, benefit levels, and potential duration. This new pro-
gram is discussed in more detail in the fourth section of this chapter.
Argentina’s program, enacted in 1991, is administered through the
local offices of the social security system, which also pays family assis-
tance benefits (asignaciones familiares). Workers both register and re-
ceive payments from these offices. The offices do not offer the job
mediation functions traditionally offered by local employment service
offices, and there is no requirement to register as a job seeker else-
where. Thus, the UI system is not structured with support services and
requirements designed to speed claimant reemployment.
Two aspects of the benefit structure in Argentina are also notewor-
thy. The level of payments decreases with benefit duration. For those
entitled to 12 months, the initial replacement rate of 60 percent de-
creases to 51 percent after 4 months and to 42 percent after 9 months.
As in Chile, this time-dependent payment level is intended to encour-
age reemployment. Also, when benefit claims have threatened to ex-
ceed annual revenues derived from a total (employer plus employee)
2.5 percent tax on payrolls, payment levels have been reduced. This
was done in 1995, and it occurred again during the financial crisis of
late 2001. Annual severance payments in Argentina are much larger
than total UI payments.
While UI recipiency is low in Argentina, it is suspected that many
beneficiaries work at the same time as receiving benefits. This applies
both to formal and informal employment. Because the informal sector
is large, much of this claimant fraud would persist even if an effective
cross-match were instituted that identified the simultaneous presence
of formal sector earnings and the receipt of UI benefits.7
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Brazilian UI also operates with a limited connection between bene-
fit payments and job intermediation services for the claimants. Claim-
ants may register as unemployed and collect benefits from one of three
institutions: the local state banks, local offices of the Ministry of Labor,
or local employment service offices.8 The three institutions are of dif-
fering importance across the regions of Brazil. During the 1990s, pay-
ments from employment offices grew in importance from about 20
percent of total benefits in 1991 to 45 percent in 1999. Even for those
paid through the employment offices, there is no effective coordination
with labor market intermediation services or linkages to training. Eligi-
bility is to be conditioned on income, but enforcement is not vigorous.
Because job availability and work search are not monitored, the
program poorly targets the unemployed. Data from a 1996 household
survey indicated that, among UI recipients, 44 percent were employed,
42 percent were not actively seeking work, and only 14 percent were
unemployed. The percentage employed was divided between 16 per-
cent employed in the formal sector and 28 percent in the informal
sector.9
In light of this administrative situation, Brazil’s comparatively high
recipiency rate is not surprising. The UI program has easy entry re-
quirements (e.g., 6 months of employment over the past 36 months) for
the minimum entitlement period of 3 months. Three features operate to
restrain the recipiency rate. First, there is a 1-month waiting period.
Second, potential duration is short, from 3 to 5 months. Third, repeat
use is controlled by allowing a maximum of 5 months of benefits dur-
ing any consecutive 16 months. As noted earlier, average duration per
recipient has averaged four months in recent years.
To summarize, among the South American UI programs, Uruguay
can be described as having administrative arrangements that most
closely resemble those in the OECD-20 countries. For the other pro-
grams, there is a common weakness in ensuring that UI beneficiaries
are indeed unemployed. It appears that benefits often go to persons
who are employed and persons who are not actively seeking work.
Control over recipiency is exercised not through active monitoring of
continuing eligibility but through restrictive statutory provisions. Thus,
there are long waiting periods (in four of six countries), short potential
benefit durations (3 to 5 months in Brazil, 5 months in the new program
in Chile, and 6 months in Uruguay), replacement rates that decrease
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with benefit duration (Argentina and both the old and the new Chilean
programs), restrictions on repeat use (Brazil and the new Chilean pro-
gram), and procedures to reduce benefits when funding is inadequate
(Argentina and the new Chilean program). Targeting of benefits on the
unemployed would undoubtedly improve by investing in procedures to
improve monitoring of eligibility, for example, requiring claimants to
develop individual reemployment plans, verifying work search activi-
ties, using electronic cross-matches between benefits and formal sector
earnings, and developing employment office job matching capabilities.
OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
Latin American and Caribbean countries provide support for the
unemployed through several programs, but their size is generally mod-
est. Four are widely prevalent throughout this broad region: family
allowances, temporary jobs programs, social investment funds (SIFs),
and severance pay. Family allowances and temporary jobs programs,
while varied in size, financing arrangements, and levels of financial
support, are similar to programs in middle-income countries of other
regions of the world. The unemployed, particularly the long-term un-
employed, may also participate in temporary jobs programs (notably in
Argentina). Social investment funds and severance pay merit a broader
discussion and are discussed in detail below because they are ubiqui-
tous to this region.
Social Investment Funds
Social investment funds have been widely used in South and Cen-
tral America to address poverty problems in specified geographic
areas. Local communities propose specific projects to improve infra-
structure whose construction and renovation provide temporary em-
ployment. Projects cover a wide range of activities, such as social
infrastructure (schools, health clinics), economic infrastructure (irriga-
tion systems, access roads), social assistance (nutrition programs), sup-
port of production and distribution (local marketplaces, community
banks), technical assistance and training, and environmental improve-
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ment (reforestation, terracing). Two kinds of output are produced by
SIF projects: enhanced services that improve the quality of life in local
communities and temporary job creation associated with activities that
build and upgrade local infrastructure.
An SIF typically has the following five elements:
1) Geographic targeting is used to decide which areas within a
country will be selected for SIF activities. The identification
utilizes a geographic map of poverty areas and areas of below-
average income.
2) Local groups and communities in eligible areas write proposals
describing a project, including expected output measures and
the targeting of persons to work on the project.
3) Project financing involves some local resources. This matching
requirement helps to ensure that the community really desires
the project.
4) There is open competition in submitting bids, and submissions
are evaluated by a neutral committee that selects the winning
bids.
5) Projects are of finite duration.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been the biggest
single donor organization providing support to SIFs. In 1997, it pub-
lished an evaluation report (Goodman et al. 1997) which covered all
aspects of SIF activities. The IDB report drew upon other reports and
evaluations of more than 800 SIFs. The majority (726) were SIF proj-
ects in three countries: Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Assessments were
based on process analysis, examination of various budget documents
(project and national), and surveys of clients. Direct impact evaluation
and cost-benefit analysis were not undertaken.
The IDB evaluation reached several major findings.10 In project
areas the quality of life did improve. The scale of job creation, how-
ever, was small even though levels of pay were generally modest (i.e.,
minimum wage). This is largely explained by the importance of spend-
ing on materials and on pay of contract employees not from the local
communities. While projects served low-income areas, the very poor-
est areas were underrepresented. Women were also underrepresented
among those served. The SIF projects were generally more successful
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in serving the poor in higher income countries from the region (Chile
and Uruguay).
In considering SIFs as an alternative to more traditional programs
that help the unemployed, such as temporary job creation and UC, two
problems are especially important. First, most funding for SIFs has
been external, not only to the local project area but also external to the
host country. The IDB report indicated that roughly 90 percent of SIF
financing was from foreign sources, meaning that projects were unsus-
tainable when external support ceased if national support did not step
in to fill the gap. Second, the scale of SIF activities was small relative
to poverty and unemployment in the countries. The largest effect on
employment took place in Bolivia during a year of economic crisis.
However, SIF-related employment was only about 1 percent of total
national employment that year. For five noncrisis years, the employ-
ment level was closer to 0.1 percent of Bolivian employment. Thus,
while SIFs have helped many local communities and individual fami-
lies, they have not provided sustained or large-scale support relative to
the scale of unemployment and/or poverty in these countries.
Severance Pay
Workers accrue eligibility for severance pay through long-term em-
ployment. As noted in Chapter 3, it is a form of deferred compensation
due when the employer terminates the employment relationship for
unprejudicial reasons. While payment formulas vary widely, the value
of the severance pay award often specifies a set number of months
related to past tenure with the employer, paid at the level of the
monthly wage just prior to separation. The payment is typically made
as a single lump sum amount to workers who meet the minimum years
of service requirement and have a ‘‘clean’’ separation, that is, not a
voluntary quit or a discharge for misconduct.
Severance pay is ubiquitous in the countries of the region. A recent
analysis by Heckman and Pages (2000, Table 1.A) describes the sever-
ance pay provisions in both 1990 and 1999 for 20 of the 21 countries
from the South American and Central American-Caribbean regions (all
but Haiti) as identified in Table A.1. Their summary highlights the
variability of severance pay formulas across these countries.
PAGE 155................. 11236$ $CH7 04-15-05 08:16:51 PS
156 Vroman and Brusentsev
Does severance pay function as a substitute for UI payments? Like
UI, severance pay is available to workers in the formal sector. Neither
UI nor severance pay extend to workers in the informal sector. Four
considerations suggest that severance pay is not a substitute for UI.
First, the minimum years of service requirement effectively targets eli-
gibility to more experienced workers and workers with a stable past
history of employment.11 Yet, unemployment and frequent job chang-
ing are more common among younger workers, who typically have
the highest unemployment rates. Severance pay also does not restrict
eligibility to the unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is deferred
compensation, an accrued property right whose value is linked to past
service, the worker’s wage, and the nature of the job separation. Eligi-
bility is not conditioned upon the worker’s current labor force status.
Payments go to those who are employed and those who have stopped
seeking work as well as the unemployed. Additionally, payments are
often not timely. Disputes over the reason for the job separation fre-
quently need to be resolved in a labor court prior to awarding severance
pay. Lengthy delays often accompany court proceedings, and net
awards to claimants may be reduced through associated legal fees.
Finally, the macroeconomic circumstances that cause increases in
aggregate unemployment may make payment of severance pay less
likely during recessions. Bankruptcies and downsizing during reces-
sions reflect financial weaknesses of companies. This weakness may
preclude the payment of severance pay even when it is an acknowl-
edged liability. In short, severance pay may not be delivered during the
phase of the business cycle when it is most needed by the unemployed.
A recent study by MacIsaac and Rama (2001) provides useful de-
tails on severance pay coverage and recipiency in Peru. While their
analysis was concerned mainly with the effects of severance pay on
worker earnings (the economic incidence or burden of contributions)
and consumption, MacIsaac and Rama also provide information on the
workers who participate in severance pay arrangements. Relying upon
surveys conducted in 1994 and 1997, they inferred that about one-fifth
of all private sector workers and one-third of wage and salary workers
were covered. Ranking families by consumption quintile,12 they found
that coverage among all workers increased from 15 percent in the low-
est quintile to 29 percent in the highest quintile. Among wage and
salary workers there also was a positive, but weaker, association with
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eligibility across consumption quintiles. Eligible workers were most
likely to have other eligibility-enhancing characteristics, such as a for-
mal labor contract, social security contributions, union membership,
and employment in a large firm. There was a similar strong gradient
across consumption quintiles in the receipt of severance pay. At the
same time, the likelihood of unemployment in 1997 (conditioned on
labor force status in 1994) was lower among those more likely to be
eligible. In sum, severance pay eligibility extended to only about one
in five and was higher among those less likely to experience unemploy-
ment.13
To summarize, while SIFs and severance pay provide a degree of
income security to certain recipients, neither functions as an effective
program serving a large proportion of the unemployed in Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries. Across this region, severance pay and
temporary jobs programs often serve the largest number of the unem-
ployed of all five social protection arrangements identified and dis-
cussed here (UI, temporary jobs programs, family allowances, social
investment funds, and severance pay). This conclusion holds even for
Argentina, one of the six countries with a UI program.
CHILE’S NEW UI PROGRAM
Starting in October 2002 Chile began replacing its existing UI pro-
gram with a new one that places primary emphasis on access to indi-
vidual accounts as the basis for payments.14 Covered workers with
unemployment will make withdrawals from individual accounts man-
aged by a freestanding administrative entity that records and monitors
contributions and benefit payments. At the time when workers renew
their formal labor contracts, they will automatically be transferred into
the new UI system. Full conversion is expected to take about seven
years.
Key Provisions
The new program presents several major contrasts with the existing
UI program. Six are examined in the subsequent discussion. First, there
is a 1-month waiting period as compared with no wait in the existing
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program. Second, maximum potential duration is limited to 5 months,
compared to 12 months in the current program.
Third, benefits are linked to past earnings, in contrast with the
present system, which pays flat benefits (but the level decreases with
duration in benefit status). For each recipient, the level of payments
decreases with each successive month of recipiency. The first month
provides 50 percent wage replacement (subject to a maximum), but
replacement decreases by five percentage points in each succeeding
month, reaching 30 percent in the fifth month.
Monthly benefits vary between a statutory minimum and a maxi-
mum. Those persons with above-average earnings in the 12 months
prior to the job separation (the basis for benefit calculations) receive
above-average monthly benefits. The initial maximum for the first
month of 125,000 pesos represents about 50 percent of the average
monthly wage in 2002, a payment level seven times higher than the
maximum of 17,338 pesos of the old UI system. The new minimum
benefit (65,000 pesos in the first month) is also substantially higher
than the previous maximum. Benefit levels will change automatically
each year through indexation.
These new features encourage a fast return to employment. Pay-
ment levels of the new system, however, will be much higher than the
existing system. For a worker eligible for the maximum benefit, the
potential entitlement for five months of benefits in the new program is
more than four times the potential entitlement for 12 months under the
old system (625,000 pesos versus 143,000 pesos).15 An increased rate
of applications can be anticipated for those covered by the new system
because payment levels are so much higher than previously.
Because the increase in average monthly benefits is much larger
than the decrease in average potential duration, total payments of the
system will increase. The overall order-of-magnitude changes are
likely to be the following: monthly benefits, six times higher than at
present (66,000 versus 11,000 pesos); average benefit duration, half of
present duration (3.5 versus 7.0 months); and total payments, three
times higher than at present (231,000 versus 77,000 pesos per recipi-
ent). The changes to the program imply that, in any given month, fewer
individuals will receive benefits, but average benefits will be much
higher. Since the recipiency rate in the existing program averaged 0.11
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between 1990 and 2001, the implied recipiency rate under the new
program seems likely to be close to 0.05–0.07.16
Fourth, the new UI program is financed by payroll taxes levied
on employers and employees at rates of 2.4 percent and 0.6 percent,
respectively, for a combined rate of 3.0 percent.17 This marks a radical
departure from the current financing arrangement, which operates
through the general budget with monies transferred by the Superinten-
dencia of Social Security to the UI fund.
Fifth, contributions are deposited into two accounts: individual ac-
counts (cuentas individuales) and a common fund (fondo solidario).
Employee contributions and 1.6 percentage points of the employer
contribution go to the individual accounts while the remaining 0.8 per-
centage point of the employer contribution go to the common fund.
The common fund finances payments to those who are eligible but
whose individual account balances are insufficient to cover benefit pay-
ments. This pooling aspect of the new UI system is a unique feature
that imparts a social element to its structure. Assets that remain in the
individual accounts are reserved for workers at retirement or their heirs
in cases of death prior to retirement.
Finally, the new program is effectively a funded system in contrast
to the present system, which operates with annual appropriations, a
pay-as-you-go system. It will need several new elements of financial
administration: making deposits and withdrawals from individual ac-
counts, updating information when workers change employers, invest-
ing individual account balances, and tracking transactions involving
the common fund. These activities are akin to the administration of
individual accounts in the present pension system. In fact, regulatory
supervision of the new UI administrative entity will be undertaken by
the regulatory body that now oversees the pension system (Superinten-
dencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones).
Statutory safeguards will help to ensure that the new UI system
will avoid financing difficulties. Since withdrawals from the individual
accounts are automatically limited by the size of each person’s balance,
threats to solvency would arise from developments affecting the com-
mon fund. Here, there are two safeguards. First, withdrawals by any
person from the common fund will be limited. During any five-year
period, a person can have only two periods of benefit withdrawals.
Effectively this means a limit of eight or nine months of benefits per
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person financed by the common fund during a given five-year period.
Second, aggregate withdrawals in any given month cannot exceed one-
fifth of the existing balance in the common fund. If total claims against
the common fund are larger, all claims will be reduced proportionately
to make their sum add up to one-fifth of the balance.
While the new UI program represents a sharp departure from the
existing one, some elements of continuity should also be noted. Un-
changed will be the requirements to register as a job seeker at local
municipal offices, to be able and available for work, and to not refuse
offers of suitable work (still defined as work in the same occupation
with wages at least half the wages of the previous job). Access to other
parts of the Chilean safety net also will remain unchanged.
Two Questions
Two questions about the new program and attendant uncertainties
seem especially important. How will access to individual accounts be
controlled, and how well will UI coverage match unemployment?
Creation of individual accounts will undoubtedly be followed by
pressures to gain access to the assets in the accounts. In most employ-
ment situations, workers will have more interest in this access question
than their employers. A worker with a high rate of time preference
might prefer immediate access to UI benefits rather than carrying
assets over into retirement years. Collusion with employers to gain
access to account balances could occur even when employers are re-
quired to make severance payments.
Brazil may provide one example of how this situation could de-
velop. A worker who is terminated can receive both UI benefits and
severance pay. In situations of unjust dismissal, severance pay has two
elements: access to assets in individual accounts supported by em-
ployer contributions and direct payment by employers to workers of a
40 percent fine levied for unjust dismissals. Chahad (2000) asserts that
situations of worker-employer collusion have developed whereby the
worker gains access to the principal in the severance pay account and
the 40 percent fine is kicked back (returned) by the worker to the em-
ployer. The resulting arrangement increases labor turnover and pro-
vides early access to severance pay intended for retirement at no added
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cost to the employer. This risk, related to the asymmetry of worker and
employer motivations, will be present in Chile.
Australia provides a second example of problems of coordination
and moral hazard in accessing individual account assets. The pension
system in Australia has two elements: mandatory savings in individual
accounts that provide for superannuation benefits at retirement and
pension payments from the original public scheme where eligibility is
conditioned upon income. In the past, the coordination of the two sys-
tems was imperfect with the retirement (withdrawal) age for superan-
nuation payments being younger than the retirement age in the public
scheme. Australia has also had to restrict the range of permissible
‘‘emergency’’ early withdrawals of superannuation assets.18 The net ef-
fect of these withdrawals was to reduce individual account assets, leav-
ing less available when the eligible age for superannuation was reached
and then later when the retirement age for the public scheme was
reached. The key point is that the actions of some workers to gain early
access to individual account assets went counter to the intended pur-
pose of the superannuation scheme.
These experiences should be kept in mind as Chile implements its
new UI program. Some covered workers will undoubtedly try to secure
UI benefits by making it appear to fund managers that they are unem-
ployed. While the scale of the informal sector is smaller in Chile than
in Brazil, and Chile has a reputation for high overall administrative
efficiency, the Australian experience may also be instructive. It will
require careful administrative oversight to ensure that applicants are,
indeed, unemployed before they are granted access to their individual
account balances.
Accrual of assets in individual accounts will be fastest among those
with high wages and those with stable employment patterns. Unem-
ployment occurrences, on the other hand, are most likely among young
workers and those with low skills. In many individual situations, the
pattern of asset accrual will not match the pattern of unemployment
and the associated need for UI benefits. Access to payments from the
common fund will address these situations to a degree. However, there
will undoubtedly be many situations in which unemployed workers
have insufficient assets in their individual accounts and no (or little)
entitlement to assets from the common fund because of recent usage.
It will require some years of operation of the new system before the
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seriousness of this potential mismatch problem can be accurately
judged.
Assessment
Three features of the new system in Chile are particularly attrac-
tive. First, it provides much more adequate levels of compensation than
the present system. Average benefits will likely increase from about
11,000 pesos per month to about 66,000 pesos, and the associated wage
loss replacement rates are likely to increase from 0.05 to 0.25, or per-
haps higher. Chilean UI has not had such high replacement rates in the
past 25 years (recall Figure 7.1).
Second, the new system has automatic benefit indexation that will
stabilize replacement rates at their starting levels. In the past, replace-
ment rates declined, but (interestingly) not during the periods of high-
est inflation. The current system will avoid this erosion as long as it
maintains adjustments tied to changes in the Consumer Price Index as
presently stipulated.
Third, the new system has a rock sound financial basis. Several
design features ensure adequate financing: limiting potential duration
to 5 months, limiting each individual’s access to resources of the com-
mon fund (at most two withdrawal periods every five years), and limit-
ing the overall payout rate from the common fund (a maximum of one-
fifth of its current balance for any given month).
Three negative features of the new system can also be identified.
First, potential benefit duration of 5 months is short. The existing UI
program has not compensated more than 10 percent of the unemployed
in any year since 1989. Reducing maximum potential duration from
one year to 5 months will further reduce average recipiency rates
among the unemployed. Many workers who actively seek work during
their 5 months of entitlement will not be successful despite explicit
design features intended to encourage rapid reemployment. This prob-
lem will be especially apparent during recessionary periods when the
private labor market will generate fewer new job openings than new
onsets of unemployment.
The administrators of the new UI program should monitor average
benefit duration and benefit exhaustion rates. If both are ‘‘high,’’ cor-
rective action needs to be considered. The most obvious measure would
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be to increase potential duration from the current 5 months to a higher
level, for instance, 8 months or even 12 months as in the existing UI
program that is being replaced.
Second, the new system does nothing to enhance UI coverage
within the labor force. The system is explicitly targeted on dependent
workers where roughly three in four are now covered.19 Others are
likely to remain outside the UI program as they presently remain out-
side of the pension system. The potential access to UI benefits through
individual accounts will probably not provide a sufficient attraction to
have an important positive effect on coverage. In fact, adding a new 3.0
percent payroll tax will increase the financial pressures on employers
to provide noncontract jobs. The lack of coverage, in turn, may have
manifestations elsewhere in Chile’s system of social protection, for
instance, family allowance caseloads and/or attempts to enroll in tem-
porary jobs programs.
A final observation pertains to the balance of revenues and expen-
ditures in Chile’s new UI system. It seems that the new system will
generate annual revenues that are at least two to three times annual
expenditures (payouts). This inference is based on three considerations:
1) the rate of payouts of the current system, 2) the likely increase in
the rate of payouts (higher benefits but shorter duration compared to
the present system), 3) and the likely revenues of the new system. Table
3.3 of Chapter 3 shows that the payout rate averaged about 0.03 percent
of payrolls during the 1990s in Chile. Suppose this payout rate in-
creases to 1.0 percent under the new system. The rate of inflow based
on 3.0 percent of taxable payroll is likely be lower than 3.0 percent due
to noncompliance, but much of noncompliance at the same time means
there will be no associated liabilities for the new system. If revenues
equal 2.5 percent of covered payroll, there will be a substantial excess
of revenues over expenditures on a year-to-year basis, with exceptions
occurring only during recessions.
The initial contribution rates for the participants are not fixed for
all future years. Should the system be over financed, there will be
ample opportunity to adjust benefit levels, potential benefit duration,
and/or contribution rates in the future. For the initial years in a new
system, it is certainly safer to err on the side of over financing. Benefits
and/or taxes can be adjusted later should accumulations in the individ-
ual accounts and the common fund prove excessively large. Otherwise,
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the new UI system would in effect become a new mandatory retirement
savings plan but one entitled Seguro de Cesantia (unemployment in-
surance).
The new UI program in Chile presents a strong contrast not only
with UI programs in its own immediate past but also with other pro-
grams from the region and elsewhere in the world.20 Because of its
strong emphasis on individual accounts, its evolution will be watched
with interest by many countries. It has received strong support from
some economists and some staff at both the World Bank and the IDB.
Since it is presently in its initial period of implementation, evaluations
of its effectiveness have not been undertaken. However, in a country
where recipiency has consistently averaged less than 10 percent of un-
employment, it seems highly unlikely that the new program with
shorter potential duration than the current program will lead to in-
creased recipiency.
SUMMARY
Unemployment compensation programs in South America are gen-
erally characterized by low recipiency rates and low benefit replace-
ment rates. At the same time, there is a question of targeting benefits
on the unemployed. It appears that many who collect UC benefits are
not unemployed. There is a disconnect between the benefit payment
functions and the limited administrative activities that monitor work
search and more generally verify continuing eligibility for benefits.
Control of benefit payments is achieved less by proactive administra-
tion than through restrictive statutory provisions such as long waiting
periods, short potential benefit durations, and low benefit replacement
rates.
Increased administrative oversight of continuing claims appears to
be needed. This can be achieved through increased face-to-face contact
with claimants and other forms of oversight such as matching earnings
information with benefit claims information to ensure that recipients
are unemployed and not employed or inactive. To achieve increased
oversight, more resources should be devoted to UC program adminis-
tration than at present.
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For three countries, an analysis of replacement rates suggested that
high past inflation did not cause replacement rates to decrease. Effec-
tive protection against the effects of inflation was achieved during the
periods of highest inflation. However, there was also evidence that re-
placement rates decreased in Chile during two periods of moderate
inflation, the late 1980s and the late 1990s. More evidence needs to be
adduced before concluding that South American UC programs have
implemented effective ongoing safeguards against inflation.
Chile’s new UI program will rely on mainly payments from indi-
vidual account balances to provide protection against unemployment.
The new program will pay much higher benefits than the program
being replaced, but potential duration will be much shorter, 5 months
versus 12 months. It appears the low recipiency rate of the past decade,
roughly 10 percent, will decrease even further under this new program.
Further, coverage of the labor force will most likely not change sig-
nificantly. Thus, the new program will pay higher benefits but to fewer
monthly beneficiaries. To provide income support to the unemployed,
other programs and measures besides UC will continue to be needed in
Chile as they are needed throughout the Latin American and Caribbean
region.
Notes
1. This refers to changes in consumer prices between December 2001 and December
2002.
2. Venezuela has enacted a UI law, but it has not been implemented. While Barbados
also has a UI program, it is not included in the discussion because its population
is less than one million.
3. Classification of Ecuador’s system as UC is somewhat arbitrary. It is financed by
payroll taxes levied at a 2 percent rate on employers and 1 percent on workers.
The benefit formula recognizes the worker’s duration of past service and level of
monthly earnings. This is separate from a new severance pay system established
in 2001.
4. These averages closely mirror averages for the 1990s (Table 3.3).
5. The limits are 3 to 5 months in Brazil, 12 months in Chile, and 6 months in
Uruguay. In Chile the limit under the new program now being phased in is 5
months.
6. Coverage is examined in more detail in Chapter 8, with some attention to Chile
and Uruguay.
7. See Mazza (1999, pp. 14–21). Argentina has recently introduced a cross-match,
but its effectiveness is uncertain.
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8. This description draws heavily upon Mazza (1999) and Chahad (2000).
9. See Chart 3 of Chahad (2000) and Thomas (1999).
10. See Goodman et al. (1997). A summary of the findings is given in Vroman (1999,
pp. 41–42).
11. Severance pay typically is not portable. Accrual of eligibility starts anew each
time a worker commences a new job.
12. Families were ranked from top to bottom and then divided into five equal groups.
The bottom quintile was the 20 percent with the lowest level of consumption.
13. The details of these associations appear in Tables 3, 5, and 6 in MacIsaac and
Rama (2001).
14. This description draws heavily upon Vroman (2002c, pp. 19–27).
15. This calculation incorporates the time-dependent decreases in monthly benefits in
both systems.
16. The implied recipiency rate for the new system is an illustrative calculation by
the authors.
17. These contribution rates apply to workers with indefinite duration contracts and
those with fixed duration contracts. For others working by task (obra o faena),
employers contribute the full 3.0 percent.
18. Details of the Australian experience with accessing individual accounts are given
in Section 6.2 of Ingles (1998) and in Ross (1997).
19. An analysis of UI coverage that includes data from Chile is undertaken in
Chapter 8.
20. The UI program for wage earners prior to 1974, however, did feature individual
accounts.
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Three Problem Areas
for Unemployment
Compensation Programs
This chapter turns discussion to some general issues and problems
facing UC programs throughout the world. If one were to present a
comprehensive assessment of UC programs, it would more than likely
cover nine key areas:
1) Financing of UC programs. Selected issues in UC program fi-
nancing are discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Examples include
the recent change in UC financing in Russia, the reduction of
benefit levels in Argentina, and a procedure for reducing bene-
fits from the common fund in Chile in response to inadequate
UC revenues
2) Improved IT capabilities to assist in UC program administra-
tion. This topic is crucial if UC is to serve a large client base
efficiently. A discussion of improved IT capabilities, however,
covers a very broad area, and we covered only the use of IT in
the administration of benefits in Bulgaria in Chapter 5.
3) Disincentive effects of UC benefit payments. While this is
certainly a key topic, there is no attempt here to survey the ex-
tensive literature—a literature that has grown especially in refer-
ence to CEE and FSU countries during the past decade.
4) An analysis of other programs that serve the unemployed. This
topic is briefly discussed both in Chapters 3 and 6 for Korea and
in Chapter 7 for the Latin American region. A recent, more
broad-based discussion is given in Chapter 3 of Vodopivec
(2004).
5) Coordination of UC benefits with other income support pay-
ments. In many CEE-FSU countries, social assistance as well as
UC is received by large numbers of unemployed. The OECD
Jobs Study (1994) identifies many of the relevant alternative
sources of income support.
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6) The coordination of active and passive measures for the unem-
ployed. While this topic receives some attention in Chapter 4 for
the OECD-20 countries, the focus was mainly on trends and not
directly on measures to ensure effective coordination.
7) Coverage of UC programs. Coverage issues are present for
countries at all levels of economic development, although the
types of coverage problems differ for high-income versus low-
income countries.
8) Issues of continuing UC benefit eligibility. This topic entails a
discussion of the evolving practices that have the intent of en-
couraging claimants to secure reemployment and/or to find suit-
able work.
9) Policies to shorten the duration of unemployment and UC bene-
fit duration. This is an ongoing area of UC policy initiatives and
Chapter 4 identifies some recent examples from Germany and
four small-to-medium OECD-20 countries. An analysis here
would include approaches used to identify the long-term unem-
ployed and a survey of the evolving strategies to assist claimants
in reemployment.
This chapter focuses on the last three areas, in part because they
are relevant across all countries with UC programs, regardless of region
or level of economic development. They were also selected because,
when considered together, they illustrate a central ongoing tension
within UC programs as they try to serve large numbers of unemployed
workers while at the same time operating to encourage and assist bene-
ficiaries to secure rapid reemployment in meaningful jobs.
The issues relating to UC coverage are important not only for
countries adopting programs but also for long-standing programs with
low benefit recipiency rates. In practice, the challenges in providing
effective UC coverage are quite different for countries at different
stages of development. As the content of work and the terms of the
employment contract change, UC coverage issues will also evolve.
Once a worker applies for benefits, administrative decisions must
be made in every country regarding both initial eligibility and then
continuing eligibility for claimants who receive an initial payment. Un-
employment compensation is intended to provide temporary income
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support. Program administrators are increasingly aware of the need to
ensure that UC support is indeed just temporary. Two aspects of this
administrative challenge are to ensure that ongoing eligibility is effec-
tively monitored and that potential long-term recipients are identified
early in their unemployment spells so that timely interventions may be
provided.
While the problem of long duration of unemployment spells is
common to all geographic areas, our discussion focuses on countries
in the OECD-20 and CEE-FSU regions. This decision is strongly in-
fluenced by the availability of both data and an extant research litera-
ture on these countries. Hence, the discussions of continuing eligibility
and unemployment duration both use material from the higher-income
countries of the developed world.
All three issues selected are of critical importance if UC is to serve
large numbers of unemployed and do it in an efficient manner. The
treatment of the topics, however, is selective and reflects the availabil-
ity of data and research literature.
COVERAGE
To be effective in providing income support to the unemployed, a
country’s UC program must extend to a sizeable segment of the labor
force. While high coverage does not necessarily guarantee a high UC
recipiency rate (e.g., the United States), low recipiency is more likely
if only a small fraction of workers are covered by a country’s UC
program.
Two aspects of the coverage question are important to distinguish:
the prevalence of jobs appropriate for coverage and the proportion of
wage and salary workers excluded. In terms of the first aspect of UC
coverage, the type of employment relationship is of great significance.
Employment with a standard or traditional employer–employee rela-
tionship is (or can be) appropriate for coverage whereas other jobs
usually are not. Traditional employment has a well-defined relationship
between the employer and the employee, with a (formal or informal)
contract that specifies hours of work, the rate of pay, fringe benefits,
and other details of the employment relationship, such as procedures
for resolving conflicts. There is distance between the employer and the
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worker, and there are distinct roles for both in the performance of work.
Explicit or implicit rules govern the employment relationship, and the
employer can terminate the relationship if work performance is sub-
standard or if product demand decreases. The employees in such rela-
tionships are often described as wage and salary workers or as
dependent employees.
Other types of work and employment are also common.
• Some people work as owners of businesses organized as sole
proprietorships or partnerships. These people control the overall
direction of the enterprise; make the decisions regarding
staffing, organization of production, and the choice of capital
equipment; and receive the economic rewards (profits) from the
enterprise.
• Large numbers work as self-employed or own-account workers
where the one individual is both the employer and the employee.
Such individuals may work at a fixed location or with no fixed
address.
• Family workers are common in some industries such as agricul-
ture and retail trade. Spouses, children, and other relatives com-
monly hold such jobs. They do not receive an explicit salary but
are supported by the net income (profits) of the enterprise.
• People may work cooperatively, owning and working in a busi-
ness where the financial rewards are shared under an explicit
formula arrangement.
A characteristic of all four of these employment relationships is the
absence of distance between the ownership of the enterprise and deci-
sions about the work done within the enterprise. Ownership and work
are closely connected, and compensation for these individuals is ex-
plicitly tied to the success (profits) of the enterprise.
As a general rule, wage and salary employment is appropriate for
UC coverage whereas employers, the self-employed, family workers,
and members of cooperatives are usually excluded from UC coverage.
The exclusion of the latter groups is typical but not universal. However,
coverage of, say, employers or the self-employed, would present prob-
lems of moral hazard because the affected individuals would, to a sub-
stantial extent, control the decisions regarding their separation from
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employment. Further, if coverage of such individuals were voluntary,
there could also be problems of self-selection, for example, electing
coverage in anticipation of becoming unemployed. The problems of
self-selection and moral hazard in UC are reduced by the exclusion of
employers, the self-employed, family workers, and members of coop-
eratives from coverage.
The second aspect of UC coverage is the proportion of wage and
salary workers excluded from the program. Here there are two issues.
All UC programs have explicit statutory provisions and administrative
rules that exclude some workers from coverage. Exclusions may extend
to employees of small firms, to economic sectors such as agriculture or
nonprofit entities, to firms in seasonal industries, or to classes of work-
ers such as part-time employees or government employees. There also
can be substantial numbers, however, who are not covered because of
the limited administrative capacity of the UC agency to enforce the
program’s intended coverage. This is most common for workers in
small firms. These firms are characterized by high turnover, employee
mobility, and poor record keeping, all of which make it difficult for the
agency to secure contributions on a continuing basis. In practice, many
small firms avoid coverage even though they fall within the ambit of
the UC statute and associated administrative rules.
To summarize, low coverage can have more than a single cause. In
countries where payroll taxes support the UC program, a useful sum-
mary index of coverage is the ratio of contributing workers to total
employment.1 Countries with low UC recipiency rates typically have
low coverage ratios.
COVERAGE BY CLASS OF WORKER
Table 8.1 displays summary data on the first aspect of UC cover-
age: the prevalence of jobs appropriate for coverage. The country data,
mainly from the ILO, have been arranged according to the eight geo-
graphic regions introduced in Chapter 2. Four kinds of employment are
highlighted: 1) agricultural employment, 2) wage and salary employ-
ment, 3) employers plus the self-employed, 4) and family workers plus
members of cooperatives. Each of the four was measured as a propor-
tion of total employment in 2000 using LFS data. It should be noted
that reporting of employment data to the ILO is more complete among
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Table 8.1 Average Employment Shares, by Region, in 2000
Region
Agricultural employment
share in 2000
Number
of
countries
Countries
reporting
Average
proportion
Employment shares by
class of worker
Countries
reporting
Wage and
salary
workers
Employers
and self-
employed
Family
workers
and co-ops
OECD-20 countries 20 20 0.055 19 0.838 0.145 0.017
Central-Eastern Europe 12 8 0.141 8 0.793 0.158 0.049
Former Soviet Union 16 13 0.305 7 0.779 0.149 0.072
East-South Asia 22 14 0.307 10 0.595 0.268 0.137
North Africa-Middle East 17 7 0.213 5 0.599 0.263 0.138
Sub-Saharan Africa 42 3 0.208 1 n/a n/a n/a
South America 10 10 0.043 7 0.617 0.344 0.040
Cent. America-Caribbean 11 9 0.202 8 0.621 0.322 0.057
Total 150 84 0.184 65 0.717 0.218 0.064
NOTE: Averages are simple averages that weight countries equally. n/a  information not available, just one country reported data to
the ILO.
SOURCE: Data taken mainly from the ILO Web site. For a few countries the data refer to a year besides 2000. Data for Bulgaria, Chile,
the Philippines, and Taiwan from country publications.
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higher-income countries. For example, 39 of 45 countries with the
highest per-capita GDP in 1999 reported information on agricultural
employment compared to 3 of the 45 countries with the lowest per-
capita GDP. Thus, the data in Table 8.1 should be viewed as illustrative
of the prevalence of coverage because lower-income countries are less
fully represented than other countries.
Data on agricultural employment are displayed for two reasons.
Country data on agricultural employment are more fully reported than
data by class of worker; for example, 84 countries versus 65 countries
out of the 150 in Table 8.1. Also, agriculture is typically excluded from
UC coverage. As this sector is relatively larger, UC would be expected
to cover a smaller share of the unemployed. For six regions (all but
North Africa-Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa), more than 60 per-
cent of the countries reported data on agricultural employment. Labor
force surveys in South America and the Central America-Caribbean
regions often cover just urban areas. The low proportion in agriculture
in South America is strongly influenced by the fact that 6 of the 10
countries conduct urban surveys. Elsewhere, note that the lowest pro-
portions in agriculture are found in the OECD-20 and in the CEE coun-
tries. For five regions in the world, the agricultural share fell into the
0.20 to 0.31 range. Across all reporting 84 countries, the agricultural
share of employment averaged 0.184 in 2000.
The employment proportions by class of worker also show obvious
regional contrasts. Average proportions in wage and salary employ-
ment exceeded 0.75 in three regions (OECD-20, CEE, and FSU) but
fell below 0.65 in four regions. For the 65 reporting countries, the
average proportion was 0.717. Conversely, note the higher proportions
of employers and self-employed and family workers and members of
cooperatives for these latter regions. On the basis of wage and salary
employment shares, one might expect to observe UC programs more
commonly in the former three regions and less commonly in the latter
four regions. This pattern is present in Table 3.1, except for South
America, where 6 of 10 countries have UC programs.
A review of the country data for the employment share proportions
summarized in Table 8.1 reveals a clear association between the em-
ployment shares and per-capita GDP in 1999. This relationship is ex-
plored in a regression analysis and the results are reported in Table 8.2.
The regression equations generally use the same specifications, with
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Table 8.2 Regression Analysis of Employment Shares, by Region, in 2000
Constant
Inverse
income
1999
Dummy
Southern
Europe
Adjusted
R2
Standard
error Mean
Sample
size
Agricultural employment
proportion
Full sample 0.060 0.636 0.540 0.115 0.184 84
(3.4) (9.9)
OECD-20, CEE, FSU 0.002 1.037 0.042 0.838 0.063 0.151 41
(0.1) (14.4) (1.3)
Asia, South Am., 0.019 0.845 0.510 0.130 0.217 33
Cent. Am., Carib. (0.5) (5.9)
Wage and salary employment
proportion
Full sample 0.816 0.565 0.432 0.131 0.717 65
(38.1) (7.0)
OECD-20, CEE, FSU 0.904 0.68 0.15 0.441 0.086 0.815 34
(39.9) (4.6) (3.3)
Asia, South Am., 0.799 0.875 0.684 0.095 0.609 25
Cent. Am., Carib. (24.7) (7.3)
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Employer and self-employed
proportion
Full sample 0.165 0.303 0.291 0.095 0.218 65
(10.7) (5.2)
OECD-20, CEE, FSU 0.102 0.317 0.120 0.443 0.050 0.149 34
(7.7) (3.7) (4.4)
Asia, South Am., 0.205 0.470 0.527 0.071 0.307 25
Cent. Am., Carib. (8.5) (5.3)
Family worker and cooperative
employment proportion
Full sample 0.019 0.262 0.395 0.065 0.064 65
(1.8) (6.5)
OECD-20, CEE, FSU 0.006 0.368 0.034 0.325 0.051 0.036 34
(0.5) (4.2) (1.2)
Asia, South Am., 0.003 0.405 0.455 0.070 0.084 25
Cent. Am., Carib. (0.1) (4.6)
NOTE: Inverse of income is measured as 1,000 divided by per-capita real GDP. The dummy for Southern Europe equals 1 for Greece,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain and zero for other countries. Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio. Ratios of 2.0 or
larger are significant at the 0.05 level.
SOURCE: Data on employment proportions taken mainly from the ILO Web site and refer to 2000 for most countries.
PAG
E
177
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.11236$
$CH8
04-15-05
08:16:54
PS
178 Vroman and Brusentsev
income measured in inverse form (1,000 divided by per-capita GDP)
to allow for nonlinearity. The idea is that employment shares respond
more strongly to income change at lower income levels than at higher
income levels. After fitting several regression equations for the individ-
ual regions, two groupings of regions are assembled. The first com-
bines OECD-20 with CEE-FSU countries while the second combines
Asia with South America and the Central America-Caribbean coun-
tries. The one additional variable is a dummy variable for the four
OECD-20 countries from southern Europe. Recall from Chapter 4 that
wage and salary shares of total employment are lower in these coun-
tries than in the rest of the OECD-20 countries.
In Table 8.2, three regression equations are fitted for each of the
four employment shares shown in Table 8.1. The first of each trio uses
all available data while the second and third are based on the two re-
gional groupings identified above. For each of the 12 regressions, the
income variable is statistically significant, with t-ratios ranging from
3.7 to 14.4 but with most (9 of 12) between 4.0 and 7.3. As income
increases, the share of employment in agriculture decreases as does
the share represented by employers plus the self-employed and the
share who are family workers plus members of cooperatives. In con-
trast, the wage and salary employment proportion increases with in-
come. Note also that the coefficient of the dummy variable for southern
European countries has the expected sign in all four regression results
and is significant in two. Compared to the rest of the OECD-20 and
CEE-FSU sample, these four have less wage and salary employment
and more of the other three forms of employment identified in Table 8.1.
The regression findings suggest an analogy from consumer behav-
ior theory: wage and salary employment behaves like a superior good
in a cross section of countries while the other three forms of employ-
ment respond like inferior goods; that is, they become a smaller share
of total employment at higher levels of income.2 Since it was pre-
viously asserted that UC coverage is most appropriate for wage and
salary workers, this finding helps explain why countries with higher
incomes are more likely to have UC programs. Also, for a country
experiencing a rapid growth in per-capita income, establishing a UC
program would appear to become more appropriate as income in-
creases and the mix of employment changes towards an increased wage
and salary share.
PAGE 178................. 11236$ $CH8 04-15-05 08:16:55 PS
Three Problem Areas for Unemployment Compensation Programs 179
The constant terms in the regression equations are also of interest
because they show the limit towards which each of the proportions is
tending to converge as income continues to grow. In particular, note
that the intercepts for the wage and salary proportions in the two re-
gional configurations differ by about 10 percentage points. For in-
stance, it is 0.904 for the OECD-20/CEE-FSU grouping but 0.799 for
the Asia/Latin America/Caribbean grouping. One implication of these
regression results is that the wage and salary proportion in the CEE
and FSU countries will approach that of the OECD-20 countries as (or,
more appropriately, if) their average income converges to that of the
OECD-20 countries. For the other subsample, the limit is much lower.
Thus, the low mean wage and salary proportion in the Asia/Latin
America/Caribbean grouping shown in Table 8.2 (0.609, second col-
umn from the right) reflects not only lower average income but also
structural economic differences that would probably persist even with
income at the level of the average for the OECD-20 countries.
To illustrate the contrast between the two regional groupings, re-
gression equations are used to project wage and salary employment
proportions at differing income levels. At an income level of $5,000
the two proportions are 0.77 and 0.62, respectively. The proportions
increased to 0.84 and 0.71 at an income of $10,000 and then to 0.88
and 0.76 at an income of $25,000. At each income level, the proportion
in the OECD-20/CEE-FSU countries is more than 0.10 higher than in
the Asia/Latin America/Caribbean countries. Note also that the differ-
ential is larger at lower income levels.
To the extent that wage and salary (dependent) employees are most
appropriate for UC coverage, then at a given income level, there is a
lower share of such workers in the regions of Asia and Latin America
and the Caribbean. This contrast could affect the willingness of govern-
ments in these regions to institute UC programs. Where UC programs
are present, this low coverage of dependent workers would operate to
reduce recipiency even if other aspects of eligibility were the same as
for programs in other regions where the dependent worker share of
employment is larger.
Coverage Trends in Seven Countries
To help illustrate the two distinct aspects of the UC coverage, Table
8.3 displays data for seven countries that span part or all of the period
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Table 8.3 Aspects of UI Coverage in Selected Countries, 1960–2000
United States Japan Singapore Korea Thailand Chile Uruguay
A. Wage and salary employment, share of total employment
1960 0.85 0.57
1970 0.90 0.65
1980 0.91 0.72 0.86 0.47
1985 0.91 0.74 0.87 0.54 0.74b
1990 0.91 0.78 0.89 0.61 0.31a 0.73 0.73c
1995 0.92 0.82 0.89 0.63 0.36 0.72 0.73c
2000 0.93 0.83 0.90 0.63 0.40 0.72 0.73
B. Ratio of contributors to wage and salary employment
1960 0.73 0.52
1970 0.73 0.64
1980 0.96 0.63 0.94
1985 0.96 0.64 0.83 0.63b
1990 0.97 0.65 0.75 0.31a 0.67 0.56d
1995 0.99 0.65 0.78 0.32 0.45 0.71 0.62d
2000 1.00 0.63 0.68 0.50 0.44 0.74 0.72
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C. Ratio of contributors to total employment
1960 0.61 0.30
1970 0.66 0.41
1980 0.87 0.45 0.81
1985 0.87 0.47 0.72 0.47b
1990 0.89 0.51 0.67 0.09a 0.49 0.41
1995 0.90 0.53 0.69 0.20 0.16 0.52 0.45
2000 0.93 0.53 0.61 0.32 0.18 0.53 0.53
NOTE: Data for Chile are from Arenas de Mesa and Sanchez (2001); for Uruguay, Banco de Prevision Social (2001). Data for Singapore,
Thailand, Chile, and Uruguay refer to contributions to the pension system by wage and salary workers.
a 1991.
b 1986.
c Assumed to be 0.729 as in 2000.
d Derived.
SOURCE: Proportions based on data from the ILO Web site and country sources.
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between 1960 and 2000. Panel A shows wage and salary employment
shares while Panel B shows the ratio of contributors (covered workers)
to wage and salary employment.3 Four of the seven countries are from
Asia while two are from South America. The wage and salary share
for the six countries where time series are displayed has generally been
increasing, with the largest changes occurring in Japan and Korea.
Chile presents the only exception to this general pattern.
Note how the ratio of contributors to wage and salary employment
has also been increasing in most countries. In the United States, the
change during the 1970s was very large as many workers from state
and local governments and employees of nonprofit organizations en-
tered coverage through statutory changes.4 Singapore and Thailand did
not have UC programs in these years.5 The data in Table 8.3 refer to
the provident fund in Singapore and to the pension scheme in Thailand.
For both countries, the data exclude the self-employed. Singapore pro-
vides the only example of a decrease in the ratio of contributors to
wage and salary employment. Increases of more than 10 percentage
points are registered by the other six countries. The changes in Korea
are especially large, considering that contributions only commenced in
1995 (from 0.32 in 1995 to 0.50 in 2000).
The ratio of contributors to total employment (Panel C) combines
the two aspects of coverage displayed separately in Panels A and B.
Given the preceding discussion, the increases present in six countries
(all but Singapore) are the result of differing combinations of increases
in the wage and salary share and increases in the ratio of contributors
to wage and salary employment. Except for the United States, however,
the proportions in 2000 are all 0.61 or lower. For four countries, the
ratio of contributors to employment range from 0.53 to 0.61, or some-
what more than half of total employment.
To the extent that workers outside the scope of UC coverage expe-
rience unemployment at rates similar to that of covered workers, these
ratios provide an important insight into low recipiency rates. Many of
the unemployed are simply beyond the effective reach of UC programs.
Many of these workers are not wage and salary workers, but the con-
tributor proportions fall far short of unity in six countries. As noted
above, part of the explanation for these low proportions is the low
scope of coverage due to the UC statutes and administrative rules, but
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part is also due to the failure to secure contributions from covered
employers.
Korea and Thailand have especially low proportions (0.32 and 0.18
in 2000). Both countries recently passed laws to increase coverage by
lowering the minimum size of subject employers. Details of the
changes are given below. Korea and Thailand also have the lowest
shares of wage and salary workers in Table 8.3 (Panel A). Even if
coverage were effectively extended to all wage and salary workers,
there would still be low coverage of the total employment in both coun-
tries because so many jobs are not wage and salary jobs.
Chapter 6 noted that UI recipiency was low in Korea when it expe-
rienced high unemployment during the Asian financial crisis. In re-
sponse to this, several measures were enacted to improve access to UI
benefits. Table 8.4 provides details on the effects of one change, the
reduction in the minimum size of firms subject to coverage. Data are
displayed for Korea and Thailand since both have had recent experi-
ences in expanding coverage.
In Korea, the original lower limit for coverage was firms with 30
or more employees. As noted in Chapter 6, this was reduced three
times during 1998: to 10 in March, to 5 in June, and then to 1 or
more employees in October. Changing the minimum firm size sharply
increased the numbers of workers and firms making contributions to
the program. There was a proportionately much larger change in the
increase in the number of firms. By December 2002 more than 825,000
firms were making contributions, more than 17 times the number at the
end of 1997. Contributing workers employed in small firms numbered
more than 3 million in December 2002 compared to somewhat more
than 4 million in firms with 30 and more employees on the same date.
The Korean data also suggest that enforcement of the coverage
extension has been an ongoing process since 1998. The number of
firms and employees with contributions approximately doubled be-
tween December 1998 and December 2002, with an unchanged mini-
mum firm size. By the latter date there were over 775,000 such firms
making UI contributions. Within the 1–29 size group, very small firms
dominate. Of the 776,000 total for this group, nearly 90 percent were
firms with 1–9 employees and their employment totaled about 1.9 mil-
lion. In December 2002 the mean number of employees for firms of
this size was less than 3.
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Table 8.4 Effects of Changes in Minimum Firm Size on Coverage, Korea and Thailand
Total
employ-
ment
(1)
Wage
and
salary
em-
ployees
(2)
Wage
and
salary
share
(2)/(1)
(3)
Mini-
mum
firm
size
(4)
Number
of
contribut-
ing
employers
(5)
Em-
ployees
with
contri-
butions
(6)
Con-
tributors
wage and
sal. emp.
(6)/(2)
(7)
Con-
tributors/
total
employ.
(6)/(1)
(8)
Smallera
Number
of
contribut-
ing
employers
(9)
Em-
ployees
with
contri-
butions
(10)
Largerb
Number
of
contribut-
ing
employers
(11)
Em-
ployees
with
contri-
butions
(12)
Korea
1985 14,970 8,104 0.54
1990 18,085 10,950 0.61
Dec. 1995 20,667 12,960 0.63 30 4,204 0.32 0.20 0 0 4,204
Dec. 1996 21,114 13,230 0.63 30 44 4,331 0.33 0.21 0 0 44 4,331
Dec. 1997 21,269 13,273 0.62 30 47 4,280 0.32 0.20 0 0 47 4,280
Dec. 1998 19,905 12,296 0.62 1 400 5,268 0.43 0.26 356 1,555 44 3,712
Dec. 1999 20,991 13,185 0.63 1 601 6,054 0.46 0.29 560 2,246 41 3,809
Dec. 2000 21,420 13,578 0.63 1 693 6,747 0.50 0.31 647 2,699 46 4,049
Dec. 2001 21,923 13,936 0.64 1 807 6,909 0.50 0.32 758 2,908 49 4,001
Dec. 2002 22,326 14,382 0.64 1 826 7,171 0.50 0.32 776 3,065 50 4,106
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Thailand
Aug. 1987 27,639 7,679 0.28
Dec. 1991 31,138 9,562 0.31 20 2,926 0.31 0.09
Dec. 1992 32,385 10,114 0.31 20 3,868 0.38 0.12
Dec. 1993 32,153 11,038 0.34 10 4,624 0.42 0.14 4,624
Dec. 1994 32,095 11,157 0.35 10 65 4,971 0.45 0.15 65 4,971
Dec. 1995 32,575 11,613 0.36 10 74 5,184 0.45 0.16 74 5,184
Dec. 1996 32,232 12,151 0.38 10 83 5,590 0.46 0.17 83 5,590
Dec. 1997 33,162 12,489 0.38 10 91 6,085 0.49 0.18 91 6,085
Dec. 1998 32,138 11,729 0.36 10 93 5,418 0.46 0.17 93 5,418
Dec. 1999 31,398 12,329 0.39 10 100 5,680 0.46 0.18 100 5,680
Dec. 2000 33,001 13,070 0.40 10 107 5,810 0.44 0.18 107 5,810
Dec. 2001 33,100 13,636 0.41 10 111 5,865 0.43 0.18 111 5,865
June 2002 32,352 13,881 0.43 1 276 6,697 0.48 0.21 159 712 116 5,985
Dec. 2002 33,861 13,790 0.41 1 302 6,900 0.50 0.20
NOTE: Data in thousands except for columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Data in columns (1) and (2) generally refer to the calendar quarter where
the indicated month falls. Since the Thai LFS for the fourth quarter only commended in 1998, earlier data refer to round 3, i.e., the
August survey.
a From 1 to 29 employees in Korea and 1 to 9 in Thailand.
b Thirty or more employees in Korea and 10 or more in Thailand.
SOURCE: ILO Web site and Korean and Thai publications.
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Despite the increases in the number of firms and workers making
contributions to the program, many who are supposed to be covered by
UI legislation in Korea remain without effective coverage. Data shown
by Hur (2001, Table 2.2), for example, suggest that about 3.5 million
permanent and temporary employees work firms with 1–9 employees.
Thus, only about half of these workers were having contributions re-
corded in December 2002. Still, contributors as a proportion of wage
and salary employment grew from 0.32 at the end of 1995 to 0.50 in
December 2002.
The Thai and Korean data in Table 8.4 reveal an important contrast
in the scope of wage and salary employment within total employment.
During 2002 both countries had about 14 million wage and salary
workers, but since Thailand’s labor force was about 50 percent larger
than Korea’s, the wage and salary share was much lower.
Thai data on the minimum size of firms subject to pension contri-
butions show important effects of reducing the minimum firm. The first
change occurred in 1993, when the minimum size was reduced from
20 to 10. During the early months of 2002 the minimum was further
reduced to firms with one or more employees. As of June 2002 the
increase in the number of contributing firms was 165,000; by Decem-
ber 2002, it was 191,000.
The Thai coverage expansion added 712,000 contributors in June
2002. If the Korean experience is at all relevant, further increases in
firms and contributing workers can be anticipated in data from 2003
and 2004. As of June 2002, Thai authorities estimated they had ex-
tended coverage to about 22 percent of firms and 27 percent of wage
and salary employees in firms with 1–9 employees. The coverage
expansion increased the contributor ratio from 0.43 at the end of 2001
to 0.48 in June 2002. Even with this expansion, contributions were
being secured from only half of wage and salary workers and 20 to 21
percent of all employment in June and December 2002.
The effects of the Asian financial crisis in both countries are also
illustrated in Table 8.4. In Korea, the number of employers in the 30
and above size category actually decreased in December of 1998 and
1999 compared to December 1997. In Thailand, growth in the number
of large employers (that is, with 10 or more employees) slowed after
1997. For both countries, the associated numbers of contributing work-
ers actually declined during 1998, by about 13 percent in Korea and 11
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percent in Thailand. While total employment in these ‘‘large’’ firms
has rebounded since 1998, it had not reached 1997 levels by the end of
2002 in either country.
Sectoral Programs and Sectoral Exclusions
Many countries first established sectoral programs before institut-
ing their national UC programs. A short list would include construction
workers in Austria, Argentina, and Italy; seamen in Greece and Japan;
and meat-packing workers in Uruguay. Usually the special programs
served groups with high unemployment, and these programs have per-
sisted after the establishment of a national UC program in some in-
stances. Sectoral programs have provided valuable administrative
experience as well as actuarial (cost) experience. In effect, these sec-
toral programs served as pilot projects, yielding useful information that
could be incorporated into the national UC programs.
Sectoral exclusions from national UC programs also exist. Govern-
ment workers are excluded from coverage in several countries. Other
exclusions seem more idiosyncratic; for example, bank employees are
excluded in Uruguay. Since these excluded groups typically experience
low unemployment, their exclusion has had only a small effect on UC
recipiency.
On the other hand, seasonal workers, domestic workers, and em-
ployees of small enterprises are also frequently excluded. Part-time
workers and those employed through temporary contracts may also be
excluded. These exclusions have more serious consequences for UC
recipiency since the excluded groups typically have high unemploy-
ment.
Coverage of Nonstandard Dependent Workers
Labor markets in many countries are evolving and generating more
nonstandard jobs among wage and salary (dependent) workers. Non-
standard employment can be defined in different ways, but three as-
pects of a standard employment relationship should first be noted. One
definition of a standard job would include the following: a full-time
schedule of hours worked per week, a long-term commitment to the
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worker by the employer and vice versa, and a clear situation of depen-
dence as evidenced by an employment contract.
In several countries, a stable long-term relationship can exist with-
out an explicit labor contract. This contractual arrangement is some-
times characterized as the invisible handshake. The parties are
committed even though no legally binding employment contract exists.
An increasing share of employment lacks one or more of the three
characteristics of a standard job as defined here.6 When at least one of
the above characteristics is absent, the job is deemed to be nonstandard.
The importance of nonstandard employment varies widely across
countries. One aspect of this variance for the OECD-20 countries is
illustrated in column (6) of Table 4.1. During the 1990s, part-time em-
ployment averaged 0.16 of total employment in these countries, but the
range extended from 0.07 in Spain to 0.29 in the Netherlands. The part-
time employment share in the 1990s exceeded 0.20 in six of these
countries, and it ranged from 0.15 to 0.199 in three countries. Low
shares were most obvious for the four countries from the Southern
Europe sub-region: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. For most
OECD-20 countries, the part-time employment share has been in-
creasing.7
While individual countries follow different practices, it is common
to exclude at least some part-time workers from UC eligibility.8 The
most common treatment among OECD countries is to compensate
part-time workers with the same replacement rate of previous earnings
as full-time workers. Weekly hours must exceed some minimum
threshold, however, in order to be eligible when unemployed. Gener-
ally, the minimum thresholds vary between 15 and 22 hours per week.
Most states within the United States exclude part-time workers. The
basis for these exclusions in the United States (and the United King-
dom) is a requirement that UI claimants be available for full-time work.
Being available for a job with the same weekly hours as the pre-
unemployment job is disqualifying in some other countries as well.
Given differences in work patterns by gender, limiting access to UC
among part-time workers has a disproportionate effect on women.
Although data are generally less available on temporary employ-
ment than for part-time work, temporary work has also grown in many
countries. Unlike part-time workers who do not consistently experi-
ence above-average unemployment rates, temporary workers exhibit
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high unemployment, much of it associated with the frequent ending of
temporary work assignments. When temporary assignments end and
new assignments do not follow immediately, the resulting unemploy-
ment may be compensable. Practices in the United States vary across
the individual states, and they vary internationally in compensating
temporary workers.
Generally, the line of demarcation between independent (the self-
employed) and dependent (wage and salary) workers is clear, but there
can be ambiguous situations. The distinction is important since, typi-
cally, independent workers are not covered by UC programs. Adminis-
trative agencies that collect UC taxes use both statutory language and
administrative rules to draw the line between the two employment situ-
ations. A self-employed individual who works for only one client for a
lengthy period (six months or a year) may be classified as an employee
despite the wishes of the person and the employer. When such persons
then experience unemployment, they could potentially be eligible for
UC benefits.
Growth of nonstandard employment is leading to statutory changes
in UI legislation in a number of countries. In 1998, Germany increased
the scope of coverage of part-time workers through two changes: re-
ducing the minimum weekly hours needed for eligibility from 18 to 15
hours; and, when hours are less than 15, having a minimum earnings
threshold. In the United States, one-third of the state UI programs have
instituted an alternative base period (a procedure to recognize recent
earnings not captured in the standard base period) since 1987, which
has had the effect of extending coverage to some low-wage workers
with irregular work patterns who would otherwise be ineligible.
Coverage: Summary
To summarize, UC coverage issues are important for countries
adopting programs and for long-standing programs with low benefit
recipiency rates. Extending coverage to smaller firms requires consid-
erable administrative resources. Given the high turnover of such firms,
this administrative enforcement problem is not a one-time issue but
rather a matter requiring continuing attention and resources. Efficient
and effective firm registration procedures are needed to facilitate
tracking, to assess administrative performance, and to minimize the
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burdens on covered employers. Establishing procedures for one-stop
registration (for paying contributions to all social insurance programs,
as opposed to program by program, and granting licenses to sell certain
products such as alcoholic beverages and pharmaceuticals) can be
helpful.
As the labor market continues to evolve in countries with well-
established UC programs, other coverage issues will emerge. For part-
time workers and employees of temporary help agencies, involuntary
unemployment reduces earnings just as it does for full-time, long-
tenure workers. Adapting eligibility criteria to these situations will be
an ongoing challenge.
Even if administrative activities are fully effective in securing cov-
erage among wage and salary (dependent) workers, however, there re-
mains a coverage question for other workers such as the self-employed.
It seems that some other type of income support during periods of
unemployment is needed. One option is to provide temporary jobs at
low pay for persons who fall outside the logical scope of UC coverage,
that is, employment situations other than wage and salary (dependent)
employment. Other options may be appropriate in light of differing
local circumstances. As the scope of wage and salary employment is
smaller and as the effective reach of UC coverage among wage and
salary workers is smaller, the need for an alternative program (or pro-
grams) to complement UC is greater.
CONTINUING ELIGIBILITY
Unemployment compensation administrative activities focus on a
client population that has a high rate of turnover. Following an applica-
tion for benefits, administrative decisions must be made regarding both
initial eligibility and then continuing eligibility for claimants who re-
ceive an initial payment. Effective administrative oversight includes
not only applying the statutory requirements for eligibility but also
making judgments about the motivation and activities of claimants in
satisfying eligibility requirements.
In framing a discussion of UC program administration, it is useful
to recall the three possible labor market states of working-age individu-
als: employed, unemployed, and not in labor force (inactive). Eligible
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recipients must be unemployed and their situation must be involuntary.
Thus, procedures should be followed to verify that claimants (benefi-
ciaries) are not either employed or inactive or unemployed through
decisions to avoid available suitable work.
To ensure that these various conditions are satisfied, UC adminis-
tration undertakes some or all of the following activities: overseeing
efforts to secure reemployment by imposing work search requirements,
judging the ‘‘suitability’’ of job offers made to recipients, requiring
claimants to formulate explicit reemployment strategies (usually in
consultation with a job counselor), and imposing reporting require-
ments to assess the sincerity of reemployment efforts. These various
administrative activities lead to sanctions (either suspension or outright
denial of further benefits) when the claimant is judged to be making an
insincere effort to secure reemployment. The administrative structures
used to oversee claimant eligibility and make benefit payments are
quite varied throughout the world. Moreover, they are evolving in re-
sponse to improved IT capabilities, greater importance of ‘‘activation’’
of claimants, and increased emphasis on decentralized decision mak-
ing. A key requirement of effective administration is close coordination
between the oversight of claimant reemployment activities and benefit
payments administration.
This section highlights some of the changes that have been taking
place. It draws upon earlier discussions from Chapters 4 and 7 and
presents additional information. The discussion describes existing prac-
tices, with emphasis on emerging practices that are effective in secur-
ing reemployment and directing payments to appropriate persons, that
is, those who are unemployed through no fault of their own and who
are actively seeking work. The objective is to highlight selected aspects
of continuing eligibility rather than offer a comprehensive treatment of
the issue.9
Three elements of searching for a new job are the ability to work,
the availability for work, and an active work search. In all three areas,
UC administrative agencies have developed operational definitions to
be applied to ambiguous situations. In the past, being able and available
for work were sufficient to confer continuing eligibility. More and
more countries, however, are requiring UC recipients to engage in ac-
tive work search and to be able to provide documentation of search
activities. It is no longer sufficient for a UC recipient to be able and
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available to take a job if one is offered, but rather proactive actions to
secure a job are increasingly required. This reflects the increased em-
phasis on ‘‘activation’’ of claimants in many countries throughout the
world.
Work Search
Unemployment compensation administrative agencies are increas-
ingly requiring claimants to undertake active work search and to docu-
ment their efforts to find employment. Practices are highly variable,
however, from one country to the next. For example, Grubb (2001, p.
191) identifies specific practices in reference to 13 OECD countries.
Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Spain do not have a general require-
ment for search while five countries (Australia, the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) require reporting
on search activity and specify a minimum number of contacts with
potential employers.
A common requirement is to contact some minimum number of
employers each week. Agencies can then verify assertions about con-
tacts by following up with the employers. If the claimant fails to supply
sufficient information regarding the employer (e.g., a telephone num-
ber or street address), the agency may rule there was no contact. The
typical penalty for first-time failure to make adequate contacts is to be
ruled ineligible for the period (week) in question. Repeated violations
typically result in a durational disqualification, for example, for the
remainder of the current unemployment spell and for some number
of weeks (months) of subsequent employment until a requalification
requirement is met.
What constitutes a bona fide job contact is subject to administrative
interpretation. It is not sufficient for a person to read a help-wanted
advertisement in a newspaper without making an explicit contact with
the employer. Neither will inquiries about employment made of friends
and relatives be sufficient. Random contacts with employers with no
announced vacancies will not be sufficient, nor will making contact
for a job whose qualifications differ substantially from those of the
claimant.
One evaluation of work search in the United States found that ben-
efit duration was reduced by requiring more frequent contacts with
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employers and by increased agency verification of reported contacts
(Klepinger et al. 1998). However, the same study found that wages at
reemployment were higher when work search requirements were re-
laxed. Thus, increased administrative requirements and/or oversight
may not lead to improved job matches.
Monitoring claimant work search activities is prohibitively expen-
sive if applied to all cases. To reduce administrative costs, UC agencies
often require that claimants keep records that can be produced upon
request, in effect shifting the cost to the claimant. Agencies then sam-
ple some individuals for details of their employer contacts and apply
sanctions where appropriate. Another form of sampling is to require
periodic visits to an administrative office to meet with and update the
case officer on progress in job search and other reemployment activi-
ties during the interval since the last visit. Sanctions may be applied
for an unexplained failure to appear or lack of evidence of work search
activity.
Suitable Work
When a claimant is informed of a job opening by the UC agency
(or the agency becomes aware that a job offer has been made to the
claimant) it may be refused if the claimant feels the job is not ‘‘suit-
able.’’ Since there can be disagreements over what constitutes suitabil-
ity, UC agencies need to have an operational definition of suitable
work. Refusal of a suitable job offer can lead to sanctioning.
Countries follow a variety of practices in defining suitable work.
Chapters 4 and 7 noted the definitions used in Germany and Chile,
respectively. The following approaches are used by different states
within the United States (see Table VI-5 in Vroman 2002a):
• Suitability is determined on a case-by-case basis (Virginia).
• A suitable job is reasonably fitted to the claimant in light of
training and experience (Massachusetts).
• Several factors are considered, most importantly, wages, dis-
tance from residence, the shift offered, and the occupation of-
fered (California, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin).
• More than four explicit factors may be considered (Rhode Island
and New Hampshire).
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• The level of the wage offered relative to the wage on the last
job, for example, at least 80 percent (Indiana) or 60 percent
(Louisiana).
When multiple factors are deemed relevant, UC agencies often decide
on the balance of job characteristics rather than using each factor as a
minimum threshold where all factors must be satisfied. Considerations
of safety, noise, and/or stress may also make an offer unsuitable.
The concept of suitable work is evolving away from emphasis on
multiple factors toward increased emphasis on the wage of the job offer
relative to the wage of the previous job. While this has been followed
in Chile for decades, its adoption in Germany occurred only in 1998.
Increased reliance on before-after wage comparisons simplifies UC ad-
ministration while at the same time encouraging increased mobility
across occupational lines and towards employment in expanding sec-
tors.
Suitable work is a dynamic phenomenon. As the duration of unem-
ployment increases, many UC agencies set lower and lower wage
thresholds in defining a suitable job. The recent changes in Germany
aptly illustrate this, with the threshold being at least 80 percent of the
previous wage during the first three months descending in two steps to
wages above the level of the weekly UI benefit after six months.
Practices vary regarding the number of refusals allowed before
penalties are imposed. Often just one refusal is permitted. Also, the
penalties imposed vary widely. Penalty periods may extend for a fixed
number of weeks for the first sanction, but eventually durational penal-
ties are imposed in most countries.10
Administrative activities related to work search and suitable work
are intended to ensure that claimants are unemployed (not inactive) and
that the unemployment is involuntary. Departures from these hypothe-
sized conditions can occur in any week when benefits are claimed.
Thus, administrative oversight can be exercised only for a sample of
the universe of weeks claimed.
Because the potential for abuses is always present, some form of
continuing oversight administered to small samples of claimants is
needed to identify patterns of abuses and to modify administrative pro-
cedures with the objective of reducing occurrences. Where the payment
functions and oversight functions are separate (or there is no effective
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oversight as in Argentina and Brazil), the administrative problem of
identifying and sanctioning violators is much larger.
Problems of Continuing Eligibility
Programs usually permit claimants to earn small amounts and still
receive periodic benefit payments. Through partial benefit schedules
small amounts can be earned while receiving full benefits, but higher
earnings cause benefit reductions. Typically, partial benefit schedules
permit only modest earnings before benefits are fully withheld.
In many situations, however, claimants may have substantial earn-
ings while claiming benefits at the same time. Examples from Bulgaria
and Brazil were noted in Chapters 5 and 7, respectively. When the
NSSI in Bulgaria matched earnings records for UI beneficiaries in
2002, it found that 10 percent of recipients had full monthly earnings.
In Brazil studies of recipients in 1996 found that 44 percent were em-
ployed, with a breakdown of 16 percent in formal sector jobs and 28
percent in informal jobs.11 In the United States, state UI programs can
match earnings and benefit records and find measurable numbers of
overlaps (2 to 4 percent) among recipients. A common situation is for
recipients to continue claiming UI during the first weeks of a new job
even though eligibility ends when employment begins.
The preceding examples show that contemporaneous work and
benefit receipt can be identified through record matching when the
earnings are reported by the employer. Undeclared earnings (gray
economy), however, call for another administrative strategy. One tech-
nique is to schedule eligibility reviews or otherwise require an appear-
ance at the local administrative office at a time of day when work is
likely. Alternatively, recipients can be required to work a certain num-
ber of hours at a temporary public service job as a condition of receiv-
ing UC benefits. Enforcement can be reasonably expensive, however,
in terms of personnel time required for monitoring. Many countries do
not have the resources to devote to such activities.
Given that administrative agencies and their contractual service
providers operate with limited budgets, it is crucial to allocate adminis-
trative resources efficiently. The first priority should be to provide ser-
vices related to job search assistance since this is widely found to be
cost effective. In contrast, resources for monitoring continuing eligibil-
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ity should be more carefully allocated. Resources for expensive inter-
ventions such as training should take into consideration the potential
economic returns of these interventions.
Problems of ascertaining continuing eligibility are greater in situa-
tions where the benefit payment function and the monitoring functions
are undertaken by separate entities. Brazil seems to reside at an ex-
treme position on the continuum with practically no oversight of con-
tinuing eligibility. The advent of electronic reporting systems will
increasingly make it feasible to monitor the simultaneous receipt of UI
benefits with earnings and the simultaneous receipt of UI benefits with
some other types of social benefits.
Chapter 7 indirectly identified a different approach where oversight
of reemployment activities is zero or minimal, but potential payments
to those initially eligible are kept low. If UC benefits are characterized
by low replacement rates and/or short potential benefit duration, those
who receive an initial payment often collect a full entitlement. Admin-
istrative oversight is very limited and focused just on determining ini-
tial eligibility for benefits. In effect, those receiving a first payment
treat payments as an entitlement (similar to a pension benefit), not
something requiring reciprocal actions to maintain continuing eligibil-
ity for payments.
In the past, this approach was followed within certain OECD-20
countries, but many analysts and policymakers eventually concluded
that unconditional access was contributing to long unemployment dura-
tion. The emphasis on activation, which developed during the 1980s
and 1990s, was intended to provide a more balanced perception among
beneficiaries regarding UC eligibility; that is, they have obligations as
well as rights. Since unemployment is high in many non-OECD coun-
tries, widening the geographic application of this conception of eligi-
bility, that is, with obligations as well as rights, can be anticipated.
Otherwise, the payment of UC benefits will remain poorly targeted on
those who are involuntarily unemployed.
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND UC BENEFIT
DURATION
In many countries, policymakers are trying to devise strategies that
limit the duration of benefit payments in their UC programs. Countries
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follow a variety of approaches and new initiatives are common occur-
rences. Concerns about long spells in benefit status and repeat use of
UC benefits (carousel effects) have become widespread over the past
two decades. Many feel that reform of UC administrative practices is
central to addressing the problem of long-term unemployment. The
following section provides an overview of important developments.
Given the limited availability of duration data, the overview focuses on
OECD-20 and CEE-FSU countries.
Long-Term Unemployment
Unemployment spells of long duration are ubiquitous in OECD-20
and CEE-FSU countries. While the problem is not unique to these
geographic areas, the availability of duration data makes is easier to
trace developments here than in other regions. Figure 8.1 and 8.2 depict
recent patterns using the common designation of long duration—spells
lasting 12 months or longer. For CEE-FSU countries, the data are avail-
able only from the early 1990s.
Figure 8.1 displays time series on the percentages of long-term
unemployment spells for six countries selected on decidedly nonran-
dom criteria. For all six, data on long-duration spells extend back to
the mid-1970s, and the data extend back to the late 1960s for three
(Australia, France, and the United States). While all six are OECD-20
countries, the second selection criteria was that they have ‘‘unusual’’
duration characteristics, either very long or very short average duration
or duration that underwent large changes during the past 30 years. Note
that Canada and the United States consistently display low percentages
of long-term spells. For 25 of the 34 years, the percentage in the United
States was the lowest among these six countries and was below 10
percent in 29 years.
At the opposite extreme, France and Spain display very high per-
centages of long-duration spells, with Spain consistently having one of
the highest across all the OECD-20 countries. For both countries, high
long-term percentages span the 1980s and later years, typically above
50 percent in Spain and above 40 percent in France.
The increases in duration that occurred in the mid-1970s, early
1980s, and early 1990s reflect cyclical developments discussed in
Chapter 4. Also, the duration patterns across the four OECD-20 subre-
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Figure 8.2 Countries with High Long-Term Unemployment, 1983–2001
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gions discussed in Table 4.1 are reflected in Figure 8.1; for instance,
rates are lowest in English-speaking countries (Australia, Canada, and
the United States) and highest in southern Europe (Spain).
Two other noteworthy patterns in country-specific developments
were the successively higher peaks reached in Australia in 1981, 1984,
and 1993 and the large increase in long-duration spells in Sweden dur-
ing the mid-1990s. In both cases, the increases reflect underlying
changes in the unemployment rates in these countries. In the early
years of Figure 8.1, Australia and Sweden had long-term percentages
similar to those in Canada and the United States but then increased,
and their percentages have not returned to Canadian–U.S. levels. Since
1995, the Australian and Swedish percentages have averaged about
twice the percentage in Canada and about three times the percentage
in the United States.
Finally, while the long duration percentages decrease noticeably in
the most recent years for most countries (all but France), the levels as
of 2001 are much higher than for the earliest years for all six countries.
This holds equally for the three countries where data extend from the
late 1960s and for the three countries where data extend from 1976 to
1977. Not only does long-duration unemployment reflect business
cycle developments, but there has also been a pervasive tendency for
unemployment duration to lengthen in OECD-20 countries since the
mid-1970s.
Figure 8.2 summarizes information on six countries with consis-
tently high long-term unemployment percentages. The long-term per-
centages extend from 1983 to 2001 for France, Germany, and Italy,
whereas the data extend only from the early to mid-1990s for the three
CEE countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). The long-
term percentages in France and Italy display little change between 1995
and 2001 despite reductions in their unemployment rates. For Germany
the large reduction in the long-term percentage of 1991 was followed
by a secular uptrend, with percentages reaching 50 percent from 1998
to 2000.
Of the three CEE countries, the pattern in Bulgaria is the most
stable, percentages between 56 and 66 percent in all eight years. The
long-term percentage increased noticeably from 1992 to 1995 for the
Czech Republic and by a larger amount in Hungary. The increase for
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the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2001 mirrors increases in the Czech
unemployment rate. For Hungary, the 1995–1996 unemployment rate
averaged about 10 percent, but it had declined to about 6 percent by
2000–2001, roughly a 40 percent reduction. Over the same period,
however, the long-term unemployment percentage decreased from 52.5
percent to 47.8, a reduction of only 9 percent. Reducing the overall
unemployment rate was not matched by a similar reduction in long-
term unemployment. The average Czech percentages in 2000–2001
were only slightly higher than the Hungarian percentages even though
their unemployment rates averaged 8.20 percent and 6.05 percent, re-
spectively. For these two countries, the gradualist approach (the Czech
Republic) and the shock therapy approach (Hungary) to the economic
transition have yielded similar results in terms of the percentages of
long-term unemployment spells.
We examined the patterns of high and increasing long-term unem-
ployment percentages depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 quantitatively
using multiple regression equations, and the results are reported in Ap-
pendix E. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the most
important single determinant of the long-term unemployment percent-
age is the unemployment rate lagged one year. Under different specifi-
cations, lagged unemployment consistently entered with a positive
coefficient that was nearly always significant for 18 of the OECD-20
countries for which there were enough time-series data to conduct
meaningful tests.
Tests are also conducted for secular trends in the long-term unem-
ployment percentage. While the regression results suggest significant
trends for several individual countries in data measured as levels (Table
E.1), the trend coefficients are not robust when the data were measured
in first differences (Table E.2). The principal finding of the regression
analysis is that the lagged unemployment rate is by far the largest sin-
gle determinant of the percentage unemployed for periods of 12
months or longer.
Even if the evidence regarding trends in long-term unemployment
percentages is not clear cut, the high levels of these percentages in
several OECD-20 and CEE-FSU countries is of concern to those who
study labor markets, policymakers, and UC program administrators.
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Unemployment Compensation Policies and Long-Term
Unemployment
Long-term dependence on UC benefits has grown as the duration
of unemployment has increased. While the most obvious situations
involve lengthy continuous stays in benefit status, other aspects of
long-term dependency also exist. From a multiyear perspective, repeat
use of UC associated with seasonal or other recurring patterns of
unemployment can be important. Long-term joblessness arising from
alternating spells of unemployment–employment and unemployment–
inactivity (termed carousel effects) should also be noted. In all these
situations, the availability of UC and other income support payments
contributes to long-term dependence and a lack of self-support. Poli-
cies that stress activation and mutual obligation are intended to inter-
rupt situations of long-term dependency.
During the past 10 years, more and more countries have adopted
policies to activate the unemployed. Central to the evolution of UC
administrative practices within OECD and other countries are efforts
to identify the long-term unemployed early in their spells of unemploy-
ment and then to apply effective interventions that reduce their unem-
ployment duration. A shorthand descriptive term for this approach is
profiling.
A recent analysis by the OECD (2002) surveyed practices across
member countries and identified Australia, the Netherlands, and the
United States for their strong emphasis on early identification and in-
tervention. A brief summary of their profiling procedures is appro-
priate.
Australia
The delivery of labor market services was modified in Australia in
May 1998 with the introduction of Job Network services.12 Through
Centrelink, the responsible labor market administrative entity, the Aus-
tralian government provides a uniform national service for registering
jobseekers, administering unemployment benefits, assessing the eligi-
bility of jobseekers for Job Network services, and referring jobseekers
to appropriate interventions. As part of the mutual obligation arrange-
ment, Centrelink is responsible for paying unemployment benefits to
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jobseekers who must meet an activity test, that is, demonstrate that
they are actively seeking and willing to undertake suitable work or
undertake the activities specified in their Preparing for Work Agree-
ment.13
Centrelink staff determine eligibility for most Job Network ser-
vices using guidelines developed by the Department of Employment,
Workplace Relations and Small Business. Eligibility for different Job
Network services is based on scores that reflect a hierarchy of pre-
sumed jobseeker needs. Most unemployed individuals, irrespective of
whether they are receiving income support, are eligible for Job Match-
ing. Eligibility for Job Search Training is more restricted, and it is even
more tightly restricted for Intensive Assistance. The restrictions are
intended to ensure that assistance is directed to those most in need of
interventions and that assistance is appropriate for individual job-
seekers.
Centrelink staff identify the likelihood of unemployed individuals
becoming or remaining long-term unemployed and refer them to Job
Network providers (service providers selected competitively). The as-
sessment utilizes the Jobseeker Classification Instrument, a profiling
tool designed to identify the relative risk of becoming or remaining
long-term unemployed. Each client scoring above a specific threshold
is considered for case management.14 Scores above certain thresholds
are used to direct clients into Job Search Training and Intensive Assist-
anc.15 In addition, responses to certain structured questions can signal
the need for further assessment by Centrelink.
Registered unemployed with a moderate degree of labor market
disadvantage receive services from Job Service Training through train-
ing in job-search techniques—interview techniques, confidence-build-
ing, self-presentation, and other strategies. The most disadvantaged
unemployed with a high risk of long-term unemployment receive indi-
vidually tailored assistance from Intensive Assistance in such areas as
training, work experience, employer incentives, or subsidies for cloth-
ing, equipment, or transportation to secure employment.16 Through dif-
ferent interventions, Centrelink attempts to match the client’s needs
with the appropriate intervention.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands uses the ‘‘chance meter’’ to identify those who
are likely to become long-term unemployed. This meter provides a
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score based on a questionnaire administered and scored by a job coun-
selor. Four factors are of primary importance in developing the score
for individual clients: age, years of education, occupation, and years of
work experience. The score is used to classify individuals into one of
four groups which signal likelihood of reemployment and the timing
and type of intervention. Group 1 is considered most reemployable and
does not receive any intervention until several months after the onset
of unemployment (e.g., six months). Groups 2 and 3 are considered to
be at risk of long-term unemployment and, in addition, have a capacity
to benefit from a proactive intervention. Group 4 is also deemed at risk
of long-term unemployment but unlikely to benefit from standard labor
market interventions. The counselor assesses the client and takes the
lead in suggesting the appropriate labor market intervention (or other
measures to increase the likelihood of reemployment) and the timing
of follow-up.
Individual clients and counselors work jointly to develop a reem-
ployment plan. The approach to reemployment for those who are im-
mediately job ready (Group 1) is more hands off than for those judged
to be at higher risk of long-term unemployment. Individual plans may
be revised as unemployment duration lengthens.
The United States
In the United States, worker profiling was established in 1993 and
made mandatory for state UI agencies. The Worker Profiling and Re-
employment Services system is designed to identify likely long-term
claimants and those who are expected to use their full entitlements
(that is, exhaust their UI benefits) and need to be referred to services
for additional job search assistance.
The system is a statistical profiling technique that uses personal
characteristics (education, occupation) and labor market information
(local unemployment, sectoral employment growth) at intake to assign
a profiling score where higher numbers indicate an increased likelihood
of benefit exhaustion.17 Most typically, the profiling score is based on
parameters estimated from historic data where the association between
characteristics and labor market variables and actual benefit duration is
known. The algorithms that assign profiling scores are highly varied,
and some states utilize just selected client characteristics with no asso-
ciated statistical equation.
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Those with high profiling scores are required to utilize services
(where available) intended to increase the likelihood of reemployment.
There is a requirement to attend an initial profiling orientation session
to be followed by participation in some form of services. Most services
are small-scale interventions such as information on job openings, test-
ing, and counseling. Nonparticipation in profiling can lead to sanctions
if it seems the person is deliberately not cooperating.
A common element present in all three countries is the assignment
of a score intended to be predictive of the likelihood of long-term
unemployment. The score influences decisions about the provision of
services.
Three Questions
While profiling is comparatively new and has generated wide-
spread interest, three questions seem appropriate in assessing its use-
fulness. None of the questions has simple answers. For all three
questions, aspects of statistical decision making are involved, that is,
intervening when it is appropriate but not intervening when action is
not needed.
Can long-term unemployment be predicted?
Evidence on this question is available from studies conducted in
both Canada and the United States. Wong, Henson, and Roy (2002),
using two distinct statistical models, report success rates of roughly 50
percent in identifying persons unemployed 12 months or longer based
on 1996 data from Canada. Among the set of explanatory factors were
gender, broad age group (youth, prime age), education, occupation,
industry, province, weeks employed in past year, part-time status, and
recall status.
Olsen et al. (2002) report a limited success rate in predicting UI
exhaustions in data from Washington, D.C., and Florida during 1995
and 1996. While identification of exhaustees with the profiling models
was relatively higher than would be expected from random data, there
were numerous misclassifications (erroneous predictions of both ex-
haustees and nonexhaustees). The authors state, ‘‘The targeting effect
of the profiling model is limited. The models do not separate claimants
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into one group in which nearly everybody exhausts and another group
in which practically nobody exhausts’’ (Olsen et al. 2002, p. 45).
In both states, a higher percentage exhausted benefits in the group
that was predicted to exhaust benefits than in the group predicted not
to exhaust. The differentials in the two percentages averaged 6 to 7
percent in the Florida data (see Table 2.4 in Olsen et al. 2002).
Based on these analyses it would seem that, to date, only modest
success has been obtained in predicting long-term unemployment. The
success rate reported in the Canadian study would probably be measur-
ably lower if those still job-attached (with a definite recall date) were
excluded from the data set. Given the interest in profiling, it is likely
that improved predictive accuracy can be anticipated.18
It also seems likely, however, that substantial error rates will per-
sist even as the models developed for profiling improve. At least three
considerations are relevant. As the structure of the labor market contin-
ues to evolve, use of parameters derived from earlier data will contrib-
ute to inaccuracy when applied to current UC applicants. Key variables
important in determining long-term status will not be available; for
example, claimant motivation. In the United States, there is an added
problem in that age, gender, and ethnicity are not used as predictor
variables due to concerns of possible discriminatory implications. In
Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, age has proved to be an impor-
tant determinant of long-term unemployment.
Thus, two types of errors will continue to be present when profiling
predictions are compared to actual outcomes. Some predicted to ex-
haust will not do so while some will exhaust who are predicted not to
exhaust.
When we step back from primary reliance on equation-based pre-
dictions, however, it is clear that use of scoring and classification pro-
cedures to identify potential long-term unemployment will become
more widespread. Korea and New Zealand have experimented with
scoring algorithms in the past few years. The Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland all follow systems where
local office staff classifies claimants according to their perceived pros-
pects for employment (OECD 2002, p. 217).
When should interventions take place?
The answers to this question also present dilemmas. For many
(most?) of the newly unemployed who are most employable, the situa-
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tion is temporary and self-correcting without the need for any interven-
tion. On the other hand, waiting to prescribe services can lead to delays
in reality testing by claimants, inefficient search, and loss of self-
esteem, all of which contribute to longer unemployment duration.
Since the full range of variables and motivations related to successful
reemployment may not be known (or measurable) by the provider of
reemployment services, this adds to the possibility of incorrect timing
of the intervention.
Practices vary across Australia, the Netherlands, and the United
States. For those identified through profiling as likely exhaustees in the
United States, an orientation session is scheduled immediately after the
first payment, and failure to participate (absence without a reason) can
lead to sanctions. For both Australia and the Netherlands, follow up
after the initial application for benefits can occur almost immediately,
or from 3 to 12 months later. The timing is set by the job counselor
and varies by individual. The client’s perceived prospects for reem-
ployment enters into this determination. Those deemed most reemploy-
able may search for up to 6 months with little or no contact with the
reemployment staff.
The timing of interventions for the three countries is more rapid
than the general guidelines suggested in 1997 for member countries in
the EU Luxembourg process. This guideline suggests that assistance
be offered to all youth reaching 6 months of unemployment and all
adults reaching 12 months. The updating of the EU guidelines in 2000,
however, stressed early intervention to prevent skill obsolescence and
loss of motivation (OECD 2002, p.211). A survey by Klemmer and
Wink (2001) provides more details about the approaches followed in
individual EU countries.
Who should receive treatments?
This question has several facets, and only a limited discussion will
be attempted here. Administrative agencies and their contractual ser-
vice providers operate with limited budgets, making it crucial to allo-
cate limited resources efficiently. Services such as access to automated
job listings and related job search assistance should be widely avail-
able. Resources for training and retraining, in contrast, should be more
carefully allocated with potential economic returns a paramount con-
sideration.
PAGE 207................. 11236$ $CH8 04-15-05 08:17:05 PS
208 Vroman and Brusentsev
Two situations are important to avoid when considering an inter-
vention. First, interventions should not be initiated while clients are
actively searching and the client and the job counselor agree that job
prospects are good. Reemployment implies failure to complete a treat-
ment with an attendant waste of resources. Second, some of the long-
term unemployed present poor prospects for interventions such as
training. The analogy with triage in medical situations is appropriate.
Resources for expensive interventions should be allocated with atten-
tion to the prospective economic return. For example, some who clearly
will become long-term unemployed will not benefit from training and
should be slotted to other measures, perhaps temporary employment or
subsidized employment.
Other questions for assessing the usefulness of interventions are
also relevant. First, how should clients participate in the decisions
about the selection of services? For example, in the United States par-
ticipation in self-employment assistance (use of UI to support micro-
enterprise startups) is typically allowed only for persons with high
profiling scores. A few states have instituted procedures to bypass this
requirement, allowing more persons to participate besides just likely
exhaustees.19 The effect is to allow self-selection into the program by
individuals who would otherwise be ineligible.
Second, how should reemployment resources be allocated for
youth and those nearing retirement? To even ask the question highlights
another aspect of administrative decision making and setting guidelines
for support of those with variable prospective earnings streams.
More generally, in making resources available to increase the like-
lihood of reemployment, there will always be tension between the ob-
jectives supporting choice among clients and allocating services based
on likely economic returns. For all three preceding questions, errors
will be made at the micro level even when decisions are firmly
grounded on past experience and accurate knowledge of good prac-
tices. The expectation is that reliance on profiling will improve the
quality of decisions because the information used will be based on a
broad body of claimant experiences.
A final comment about profiling is to relate it to overall unemploy-
ment duration, the starting point for the present discussion. Analyses
of its effect note that profiling will shorten average unemployment du-
ration. A rule of thumb based on evaluations in the United States is
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that UI benefit duration among those identified as likely exhaustees
and referred to services averages some 0.4–1.0 weeks less than for
others (Vroman 2004, Table 2C). Since this group generally averages
less than one-quarter of all claimants and since claimants represent
less than half of the unemployed in the United States, there is little
macroeconomic significance in profiling. One should not expect to dis-
cern impacts in macro-level data on average unemployment duration
or the long-term unemployment percentages as displayed in Figures
8.1 and 8.2.
SUMMARY
This chapter examines three problem areas for UC programs: cov-
erage, continuing eligibility, and long-term recipiency associated with
long-term unemployment. The problems of coverage vary with the
level of economic development as proxied by per-capita GDP. In low-
income countries a large share of employment is made up of the self-
employed, business owners, unpaid family workers, and members of
cooperatives. Because the traditional employer–employee relationship
is not present for these persons, they generally are not appropriate for
coverage by UC programs. At the same time, the continuing evolution
of labor markets in high-income countries also brings to the fore other
coverage questions for wage and salary workers with nonstandard em-
ployment arrangements. Thus, coverage issues are present for UC pro-
grams in countries at all income levels although the specifics of
coverage issues differ between high-income and low-income countries.
Our analysis of continuing eligibility and of long-duration unem-
ployment and UC recipiency was centered much more on the OECD-
20 countries and to some extent on CEE-FSU countries. The selection
of these countries was strongly influenced by availability of both data
and an extant research literature on these aspects of UC administration.
The general background theme of the discussion was the increased
emphasis on claimant activation in recent years.
Claimant profiling received strong emphasis. Based on the research
in Canada and the United States, only modest success has been ob-
tained in predicting long-term unemployment. Improved predictive ac-
curacy can be anticipated in the future. But substantial error rates will
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continue to persist even as improved models for profiling are devel-
oped. Two types of errors will continue to be present: some predicted to
exhaust will not do so and some predicted not to exhaust will exhaust.
Although profiling is comparatively new, it can be useful for iden-
tifying the potential long-term unemployed and for deciding how to
allocate resources in order to increase the likelihood of reemployment.
Statistical scoring procedures in Australia, the Netherlands, and the
United States were described, and questions were posed regarding as-
pects of profiling. Given the increased interest in profiling, it is clear
that utilization of profiling will increase. This is appropriate since long-
term unemployment and long-term UC recipiency are a pervasive phe-
nomena throughout the OECD-20 and CEE-FSU countries.
Notes
1. Making contributions may be the sole responsibility of the employer or a shared
responsibility of employers and employees. In employer-financed programs con-
tributions are made for a well-defined set of covered workers.
2. Economists will recognize the similarity of these results with Engle curve analysis
of consumption behavior. Some items become a larger share of the budget at
higher income levels (superior goods) while others become a smaller share (infe-
rior goods).
3. Because agriculture is usually excluded from UC coverage, it would be preferable
to use nonagricultural wage and salary employment in Table 8.3. While this is
easily done for OECD countries (Japan, Korea, and the United States in Table
8.3), the data are less readily available for other countries.
4. The increased coverage in the United States did not bring about a measurable
increase in UI recipiency because those newly covered have generally low unem-
ployment rates. In recent years, workers from the government and nonprofit sec-
tors have accounted for about 18 percent of total covered employment but only
about 4 percent of beneficiaries.
5. Thailand has established a UC program that commenced benefit payments in mid-
2004.
6. A more complete discussion of nonstandard employment is given in Chapter II of
Vroman (1998). That discussion also identifies a fourth dimension, on-site work
done by someone employed by an off-site employer. Estimates of the size of
various groups of nonstandard workers in the United States in 1995–1996 are
given in Table 1 of that report.
7. The part-time proportion in 2000 was higher than in 1990 in 15 of the 20 coun-
tries.
8. Practices at the end of the 1980s are summarized in ILO (1989).
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9. A more comprehensive treatment is given by Grubb (2001). Annex 4.A of OECD
(1999) surveys important differences across 13 OECD member countries in refer-
ence to both initial eligibility and continuing eligibility.
10. See Table 1 in Grubb (2001) for a display of penalties for the first, second, and
subsequent refusals of suitable work in 13 OECD countries.
11. See Chahad (2000) and Thomas (1999).
12. Job Network provides five main services tailored to the needs and background of
the individual jobseeker: 1) job matching, 2) job search training, 3) intensive
assistance, 4) new enterprise incentive scheme, and 5) project contracting. The
latter two services, respectively, support the establishment of new micro enter-
prises and the marketing of agricultural products.
13. The Preparing for Work Agreement is a mutual obligation arrangement based on
the premise that unemployed individuals, supported financially by the commu-
nity, should actively seek employment in the labor market and improve their
competitive position while searching for work.
14. The Jobseeker Classification Instrument was developed in 1995 and 1996 using
statistical analysis to identify the factors that increase the likelihood of remaining
unemployed for more than 12 months. The score is a weighted sum of 18 factors
that include age, country of birth, disability/medical condition, the duration of
unemployment, educational attainment, geographic location, language and liter-
acy, and recency of work experience. Centrelink staff pose a series of structured
questions to obtain the required information, and the score is constructed from
these responses.
15. Unemployed individuals are referred by Centrelink for Job Search Training after
they have been unemployed between 3 and 12 months. The program requires
attendance for a minimum of 15 consecutive days of training in job-search tech-
niques. Intensive Assistance is a program of individualized case management in
which participation can continue for up to 21 months: services are provided for up
to 12 months under Intensive Assistance level A and 15 months under Intensive
Assistance level B, with negotiated extensions of up to 6 months being possible.
Centrelink refers individuals to Individual Assistance if their score on the Job
Search Classification Instrument is above a certain threshold and, in addition, if
the individuals have a capacity to benefit from this intervention. This results in
some clients being referred at the start of their unemployment spell, while others
are referred only after a review a year or more later.
16. See OECD (2001a, pp. 116–119) for more details.
17. Exceptions to profiling are allowed for persons with good short-term reemploy-
ment prospects, for example, persons with definite recall dates or union members
listed at union hiring halls.
18. Annex 4.C in OECD (2002) gives a summary of profiling techniques used in
OECD member countries.
19. In one state the bypass allows a person to have his or her profiling score revised
(increased). Another state allows participation by all claimants by setting the
threshold score to zero.
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Conclusion
Unemployment compensation programs provide an important
source of income support to many unemployed persons and families
throughout the world. We have argued that the 70 countries with UC
programs vary in terms of macroeconomic performance, particularly
unemployment rates, and in access to UC benefits and payment levels.
While some problems are common to countries in all regions, other
problems are much more pronounced in particular regions: unusually
long benefit duration in OECD-20, CEE, and FSU countries; ensuring
protection against inflation in South American countries; and effective
implementation of new UC programs in Asian and CEE-FSU econo-
mies.
The challenge has been to identify the common developments and
to draw attention to the differences in UC programs throughout the
world. During the course of our investigation, we have identified sev-
eral problem areas. While we do not have all (or even most of) the
answers, we do believe we have been asking the right questions and
suggesting useful solutions.
This volume provides a broad perspective of the evolution of un-
employment since 1970 and the establishment of labor market surveys
across a global spectrum of 150 countries. We described the contrasts
in unemployment between the geographic regions of the world. Unem-
ployment rates increased in the OECD-20 countries in the mid-1970s
and again in the early 1980s; they remain persistently high. Unemploy-
ment rates in the transition economies of CEE and FSU countries have
been persistently high since the collapse of the Soviet regime. In con-
trast, average unemployment rates have historically been low for most
of the Asian countries.
Over time, there has been an increase in the prevalence of LFSs.
In 1999, 55 percent of the 150 countries conducted these surveys.
While all OECD-20 and South American countries have an LFS, there
are relatively few surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa. As well as providing
information on labor market outcomes, these surveys can also be help-
ful in assessing access to benefits paid by UC programs.
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The presence of UC is closely linked to the level of economic
development. Countries with high income were more likely than others
to already have UC programs or to adopt UC programs during the 50
years covered in this book. Furthermore, the countries with an LFS but
with no UC program are disproportionately located in two regions:
East and South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The coun-
tries with UC programs differ in terms of macroeconomic performance
(particularly their unemployment rates), access to UC benefits, and the
generosity of benefit payments. This volume documents important de-
tails of UC programs across many countries throughout the world.
From a historical perspective, the 1990s were unusual for the rapid
growth in the number of UC programs. Such programs were adopted
in 28 countries during the 1990s (mainly from 1990 to 1994), nearly
double the total of 16 adoptions that took place worldwide during the
preceding four decades.
Perhaps the most important point to note regarding UC programs
is their limited scope. As stated above, UC programs are found mainly
in countries with high per-capita real GDP. Of the 150 countries exam-
ined here, only 66 (44 percent) had a UC program in 1999. A second
aspect of the small scope of UC is the low recipiency rates in most
countries outside the OECD-20 and CEE-FSU groupings. Of the Asian
and South American countries examined in this volume, only Brazil
and Japan have exhibited recipiency rates consistently above 25 percent
of total unemployment. Recipiency rates close to or below 10 percent
have characterized the other in countries with UC programs from these
two regions. Most of worldwide unemployment is located either in
countries with no UC program or in countries where UC recipiency
rates are very low.
This volume introduces an actuarial framework for examining UC
costs and examines cost data from selected countries. The UC cost rate
(UC benefits as a percent of payroll) is determined by the recipiency
rate (beneficiaries as a proportion of unemployment), the replacement
rate (average weekly benefits as a proportion of average weekly wages),
and the unemployment rate. The product of these three is the UC cost
rate. In the sample of 24 countries, high recipiency and high costs are
evident in the OECD-20 countries. The analysis of UC costs indicated
that there was much more cross-country variation in recipiency rates
than in benefit replacement rates. Also, the costs of mixed UI-UA sys-
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tems were much higher than for stand-alone UI or UA programs. At a
given level of unemployment, the mixed UI-UA systems are systemati-
cally more expensive than other UC systems. Moreover, there has been
a trend toward an increased share of UA beneficiaries in the mixed UI-
UA systems.
Programs operate within a particular regulatory and institutional
environment. Such an environment defines the constraints under which
these programs will function. Historically, access to UC benefits has
been comparatively easy within many OECD-20 countries. Recipiency
rates have been high—ratios of beneficiaries to unemployment exceed
0.75 for 10 of 12 OECD-20 countries examined in Chapter 3 (Table
3.3). Macroeconomic performance and the institutional environment,
in combination, tended to inhibit economic adjustment in the mid-
1970s and again in the early 1980s, with adverse effects on employ-
ment. As unemployment rates increased, easy access to benefits and
other factors meant that average unemployment duration increased sub-
stantially throughout nearly all of these countries during the 1980s and
1990s. Most countries in the OECD-20 group recognized the impor-
tance of avoiding hysteresis (persistence) effects on unemployment. If
hysteresis comes from the erosion of human skills, the case for preserv-
ing these skills through more active labor market intervention is corre-
spondingly stronger.
Based on the region’s moderate unemployment rates, UC would
appear to be quite affordable for most countries in East and South Asia.
Moreover, the generally small response of employment to changes in
real output in Asia would suggest that UC benefit payments would
exhibit less cyclical volatility for a given change in real output relative
to a similar change in the OECD-20 countries. The small scale of exist-
ing UC programs in Asia reflects deliberate policy choices affecting
both initial eligibility and continuing eligibility. Recipiency would be
higher with different treatment of part-time workers, shorter disquali-
fication periods, and longer potential entitlements. Restrictive features,
however, reflect deep concerns about the disincentive effects of UC
programs and potential long-term dependence on transfer payments.
Not only do UC programs serve a small share of the unemployed, but
it also seems likely that they will remain small-scale in Asian countries.
Additionally, the limited penetration of the PES into the labor market
reinforces this tendency.
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Similar to UC programs in Asia, the programs in South America
are characterized by low recipiency rates and low benefit replacement
rates. There is also a question of targeting benefits on the unemployed.
Many who collect UC benefits in South America are not unemployed
because there is a disconnect between the benefit payment function and
the administrative activities that monitor recipiency. Increased admin-
istrative oversight of continuing claims is needed. Here, policymakers
can learn from the initiatives undertaken in OECD-20 and CEE-FSU
countries. For instance, increased face-to-face contact with claimants
and matching earnings information with benefit claims information im-
prove the targeting of benefits. This implies that more resources should
be devoted to UC program administration than is done presently.
The absence or limited presence of UC in most countries of these
geographic regions means that other programs serving the unemployed
are very important. It is undoubtedly the case that, even recognizing
other programs of social protection payments and temporary jobs pro-
grams, many unemployed individuals simply cope with their situation
without any form of assistance from public programs for the unem-
ployed.
The transition to a market economy led to severe dislocations and
high unemployment in the CEE-FSU geographic area. From the outset,
the UC programs in the CEE-FSU countries experienced funding prob-
lems because the volume of recipients persistently exceeded initial ex-
pectations. The rapid increases in unemployment, the unexpectedly
high level of UC costs, and the difficulties in administering benefits led
to several legislative changes in UC statutory provisions and adminis-
trative rules. The overall result was reduced access to benefits, shorter
benefit duration, and lower payment levels relative to average earnings.
Many countries in the OECD-20 group have undertaken policies
to ‘‘activate’’ the unemployed. It is no longer sufficient to be able and
available to take new jobs if offered. Increasingly, reciprocal actions
such as undertaking an active job search, participating in retraining,
and demonstrating willingness to accept job offers outside one’s past
occupation or at wage rates below previous wages are being required
as a condition for UC eligibility.
Increased reliance on activation also implies changes in statutes
and administrative procedures at UC agencies. Active work search re-
quirements have been increased, as have required documentation of
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claimant contacts with prospective employers. The scope of what is
deemed suitable work has been broadened. Increasingly, agency staff
develops reemployment plans with clients so as to speed the movement
from UC benefit recipient to employment. Absent such efforts, benefit
payments will be only imperfectly targeted on persons who meet the
criteria of unemployed as measured by LFSs. An important develop-
ment in program administration is matching earnings records with ben-
efit records to ensure that claimants do not have unreported earnings.
The preceding developments all imply an enlarged role for administra-
tive activities in UC programs with the twin objectives of improving
the verification of eligibility and encouraging a faster transition from
benefit status to employment. Continuing evolution of policies and
practices in the area of proactive administration of UC programs can
be anticipated.
Given that the most troubling aspect of the higher unemployment
was a significant increase in the duration of unemployment spells, the
social dialogue within the OECD-20 countries has increasingly empha-
sized active labor market measures. In this volume, we tested whether
policies to foster activation were reflected in a change in the composi-
tion of labor market spending between active and passive labor market
measures. The regression results obtained using data from the OECD
social expenditure database suggested that the share of spending on
active measures varied with the unemployment rate. In addition, the
results suggested that the share of spending on active measures in-
creased in about two-thirds of the OECD-20 countries but decreased in
the other third. Overall, the emphasis on active labor market measures
in OECD policy discussions was not consistently reflected in actual
spending.
Faced with chronic long-term unemployment, several countries are
initiating policies to identify potential long-term unemployed early in
their unemployment spells. For such persons, various interventions are
being recommended that are intended to shorten their duration in UC
benefit status. The initial identification is being accomplished through
profiling. Typically, profiling utilizes selected characteristics of indi-
viduals, their work histories, and labor market information to generate
a score where a higher value is presumptive of a higher risk of long-
term unemployment. Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States
are leaders in the use of profiling. However, several other countries are
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also utilizing the concept of profiling to identify and prescribe interven-
tions for the likely long-term unemployed.
Profiling is comparatively new, with most experience accumulated
during the past 10 years, but it has the potential for reducing unemploy-
ment duration for many workers. To date, however, the effects of pro-
filing on unemployment duration at the macroeconomic level have yet
to be demonstrated.
Profiling is but one emerging activity of UC program administra-
tion. Another aspect of evolving UC administrative practices is an in-
creased reliance on individual reemployment plans developed jointly
by claimants and employment counselors. As the IT capabilities of UC
administrative agencies continue to improve, cross-matching benefit
information with earnings records will become more widespread. In
short, as labor markets evolve and experiences accumulate, the tech-
niques of UC program administration will also evolve. The twin objec-
tives of effectively targeting benefits on those involuntarily
unemployed and shortening average benefit duration are destined to be
of high and increasing importance for UC programs throughout the
world.
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Labor Market Data for
150 Countries
The analysis of Chapter 2 utilizes data from 150 countries, each
with a population of one million or more in 1999. Table A.1 displays
selected data with the countries arranged into eight major regions and
alphabetically within each region.
The table shows four kinds of information: 1) the countries with
an LFS in 1999 are identified, along with the first year the LFS was
conducted; 2) important details of the LFS are displayed, including the
number of surveys per year, the age range for pesons covered by the
LFS questions and the length of the job search period; 3) average un-
employment rates from the 1980s and 1990s are shown along with the
number of years in the 1990s for which unemployment rate informa-
tion was submitted to the ILO; and 4) the countries with UI and UA
programs are identified.
Table A.1 emphasizes just a few salient details of the LFSs as of
1999, with the 150 countries arrayed by geographic area. No attempt is
made to address issues of sample size and design or the statistical prop-
erties of the survey estimates. Besides showing the start date for the
survey, the table shows frequency (annual number), the age limits of
persons treated as potentially economically active, and the job search
reference period for those classified as unemployed. The table also
displays average unemployment rates for the 1980s and 1990s.
The information about the LFS in each country came from ILO
surveys (ILO 1990, 2001) while the unemployment rate data came
from the ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org). The information about unem-
ployment protections came mainly from the U.S. Social Security Ad-
ministration (1999).
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220Table A.1 Measurement of Unemployment, Unemployment Rates, Registered Unemployment, and Unemployment
Compensaton
Region and
country
Unemployment rate measurement
LFS
start
date
Annual
number
Survey
age
limits
Job
search
ref.
period
Average unemployment rate
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Years
of data
1990–99
RU/LFSUa
1990–99
UI
1999
UA
1999
OECD-20
Australia 1960 12 15 4 wks. 7.6 9.6 8.2 10 0.98 X
Austria 1968 4 15 4 wks. 3.2 3.6 4.0 10 1.46 X X
Belgium 1973 1 14 4 wks. 10.8 8.0 9.1 10 1.48 X
Canada 1945 12 15 4 wks. 9.4 10.3 8.9 10 0.59 X
Denmark 1967 1 15–66 4 wks. 8.4 9.0 6.2 10 1.26 X
Finland 1959 12 15–74 4 wks. 4.8 10.8 12.7 10 1.17 X X
France 1950 1 15 1 mo. 9.3 10.3 11.9 10 1.01 X X
Germany 1957 1 15 4 wks. 6.9 8.1 9.4 10 0.99 X X
Greece 1974 1 15 4 wks. 6.6 8.5 10.6 10 0.50 X
Ireland 1975 4 15 4 wks. 14.2 14.6 9.6 10 1.51 X X
Italy 1959 4 15 4 wks. 10.2 10.9 11.6 10 X
Netherlands 1973 12 15e 4 wks. 9.9 6.6 5.4 10 0.85 X X
New Zealand 1985 4 15 4 wks. 4.6 9.3 6.7 10 1.37 X
Norway 1972 12 16–74 4 wks. 2.8 5.6 4.0 10 0.86 X
Portugal 1972 4 15 1 mo. 7.6 5.0 6.1 10 X X
Spain 1964 4 16 4 wks. 18.5 19.6 20.1 10 0.73 X X
Sweden 1959 12 16–64 4 wks. 2.5 5.2 7.2 10 1.14 X X
Switzerland 1991 1 15 4 wks. 2.5 3.6 9 of 9 1.00 X
United Kingdom 1973 1 16 4 wks. 9.8 9.0 7.2 10 0.89 X X
United States 1940 12 16 4 wks. 7.3 6.6 4.9 10 0.34 X
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Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE)
Albania X
Bosnia-Herzegovina X
Bulgaria 1993 4 15 4 wks. 14.8 7 of 7 0.89 X
Croatia 1996 2 15 4 wks. 11.2 4 of 4 1.49 X
Czech Republic 1993 4 15 1 wk. 5.9 7 of 7 0.90 X
Hungary 1992 4 15–74 1 wk. 8.7 8 of 8 1.29 X
Macedonia 1996 1 15 1 wk. 0 of 4 X
Poland 1992 4 15 1 wk. 12.3 7 of 8 1.08 X
Romania 1994 2 14–74 1 wk. 6.8 6 of 6 1.20 X X
Serbia 1996 1 15 1 wk. 0 of 4 X
Slovakia 1993 4 15 1 wk. 13.1 7 of 7 1.12 X
Slovenia 1993 4 15 1 wk. 7.4 7 of 7 1.64 X
Former Soviet
Union (FSU)
Armenia 1996 1 16 1 wk. 2 of 4 X
Azerbaijan X
Belarus X
Estonia 1990 1 15–74 1 wk. 10.3 10 of 10 0.30 X
Georgia 1998 4 15 1 wk. 14.1 2 of 2 X
Kazakhstan
Kyrgistan X
Latvia 1995 2 15 4 wks. 16.0 5 of 5 0.53 X
Lithuania 1994 2 14 1 wk. 15.1 6 of 6 0.43 X
Moldova 1999 4 15 4 wks. 11.1 1 of 1 X
Mongolia X
Russia 1992 1 15–72 1 wk. 11.5 8 of 8 0.24 X
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan X
Ukraine 1995 4 15–70 1 wk. 9.1 5 of 5 0.26 X
Uzbekistan X
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222Table A.1 (continued)
Region and
country
Unemployment rate measurement
LFS
start
date
Annual
number
Survey
age
limits
Job
search
ref.
period
Average unemployment rate
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Years
of data
1990–99
RU/LFSUa
1990–99
UI
1999
UA
1999
East and South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh 10 2 of 10 X
Bhutan
Cambodia
China 1978b 3 16 3 mos. 2.6 2.2 2.9 10 X
Hong Kong 1975 12 15 1 mo. 3.0 1.8 3.8 10 X
India 1955 0.2c 5 1 wk. 0 of 10
Indonesia 1975 4 10 1 wk. 2.5 3.0 5.1 9 of 10 0.34
Japan 1947 12 15 1 wk. 2.5 2.3 3.7 10 X
Korea, South 1963 12 15 1 wk. 3.8 2.5 3.9 10 X
Laos
Malaysia 1972 4 15–64 3 mos. 6.6 4.0 2.9 10 0.13
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Pakistan 1963 4 10 1 wk. 3.5 5.0 5.7 9 of 10 0.12
Papua New Guinea
Philippines 1976 4 15 1 wk. 9.0 8.6 8.6 10
Singapore 1974 4 15 4 wks. 3.5 2.3 3.2 0 0.04
Sri Lanka 1980 1 10 12 mos. 14.2 10.8 10PAG
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Taiwan 1961 12 15 1 wk. 2.1 1.5 2.5 10 X
Thailand 1963 4 13 1 mo. 3.2 1.8 1.9 10
Vietnam
North Africa—
Middle East
Algeria 1982 4 15 4 wks. 0 X
Egypt 1957 4 15–64 1 wk. 6.0 9.8 9.0 9 of 10 X
Iran, Islamic Rep. X
Iraq X
Israel 1954 4 15 1 wk. 6.1 9.8 7.7 10 X
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco 1976a 4 15 1 day 16.3 19.8 9 of 10
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Syria 1961 0.5d 10 1 wk. 0
Tunisia 1976 1d 15 1 wk. 2 of 10 X
Turkey 1966 2 12 6 mos. 7.8 8.0 6.6 10 0.379
United Arab Emirates
Yemen, Rep.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Benin (Dahomey)
Botswana 1984 1d 12 1 wk. 0
Burkina Faso
(Upper Volta)
Burundi
Cameroon
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Region and
country
Unemployment rate measurement
LFS
start
date
Annual
number
Survey
age
limits
Job
search
ref.
period
Average unemployment rate
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Years
of data
1990–99
RU/LFSUa
1990–99
UI
1999
UA
1999
Cent. African Rep.
Chad
Congo, Dem.Rep
(Kinshasa) (Zaire)
Congo, Peop. Rep.,
Brazziville
Cote d’Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
(Malagasy Rep)
Malawi 1983 1d 10 4 wks. 0
Mali
Mauritania
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Mauritius 1986 1d 12 8 wks. 1 X
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria 1983 4d 15–59 1 wk. 0
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa 1977 2 15 4 wks. 0 X
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
South America
Argentina 1969 2b 15 1 wk. 4.8 8.4 15.6 10 X
Bolivia 1989 1b 10 1 wk. 5.6 4.6 9 of 10
Brazil 1967 1 10 1 wk. 3.7 5.5 7.9 8 of 10 X X
Chile 1973 12 15 2 mos. 11.0 5.2 6.3 10 X
Colombia 1970 4b 12 1 wk. 10.8 8.9 13.6 10
Ecuador 1987 1b 10 5 wks. 7.2 9.5 9 of 10 X
Paraguay 1976 1b 10 1 wk. 5.9 5.3 6 of 10
Peru 1967 1b,d 14 1 wk. 7.6 4 of 10
Uruguay 1968 2a 14 1 wk. 9.1 8.8 10.5 8 of 10 X
Venezuela 1967 2 15 1 wk. 9.3 8.6 11.9 10 XPAG
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Table A.1 (continued)
Region and
country
Unemployment rate measurement
LFS
start
date
Annual
number
Survey
age
limits
Job
search
ref.
period
Average unemployment rate
1980–89 1990–94 1995–99
Years
of data
1990–99
RU/LFSUa
1990–99
UI
1999
UA
1999
Cent. America—
Caribbean
Costa Rica 1976 1 12 5 wks. 6.6 4.5 5.7 10
Dominican Rep. 14
El Salvador 1988 1 10 5 wks. 11.1 8.6 7.5 10
Guatemala 1986 0.2c 10 5 wks. 0
Haiti
Honduras 1986 2b 14 5 wks. 10.2 4.2 3.7 8 of 10
Jamaica 1977 1 14 1 wk. 23.8 15.7 16.0 9 of 10
Mexico 1973 12b 12 1 wk. 4.5 3.1 3.0 7 of 10
Nicaragua
Panama 1963 1 15 3 mos. 11.9 14.6 13.4 9
Trinidad and Tobago 1963 2 15 3 mos. 15.4 19.3 15.1 10
a RU/LFSU is the number of registerd unemployed divided by the number who are unemployed according to the LFS.
b Urban areas.
c LFS every 5 years.
d Survey on specific dates.
e Unemployment of persons 15–64.
SOURCE: Data mainly from ILO (1990, 2001) and ILO Web site.
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Appendix B
Output Changes and
Employment Changes
To illustrate the close connection between changes in employment
and changes in real output, we fitted a series of multiple regressions.
In annual data extending from 1971 to 2002, the percent change in
aggregate LFS employment was regressed on the current and lagged
percent change in real GDP. Positive coefficients were expected on
both output change variables while the intercept was expected to be
negative, reflecting the effects of productivity growth. Relationships
were fitted for all countries in the OECD-20 group and for nine East
and South Asian countries.
For most countries (25 of 29) the estimation was based on at least
29 observations. Only New Zealand, Indonesia, and Malaysia had
fewer than 25 observations (16, 18, and 21, respectively). Table B.1
shows the estimation period for each country. Several countries had
one major break in the employment series, explaining why the estima-
tion periods skip one year.
The principal data source for the OECD-20 countries was the
OECD publication Labor Force Statistics (OECD 2001b). Earlier edi-
tions were used to extend the data series back to 1970. In several in-
stances the OECD has adjusted these data for breaks. For the Asian
countries, the data came principally from information developed at the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Division of Foreign Labor Sta-
tistics. A file was developed at BLS that extended from 1970 to 1995
for several countries. These data were updated with information taken
directly from country LFS publications extending through 2002.
Alternative data were also explored. For both the OECD-20 and
Asian countries the ILO Web site had LFS employment data that can
extend back to 1969. The member countries report these data in differ-
ent ways, and there are more breaks in these data than in the OECD
data. The BLS Division of Foreign Labor Statistics supports files of
annual LFS data for 10 OECD countries. These data are available from
1959 using the country’s own LFS concepts and using U.S. concepts.
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Table B.1 Regressions Explaining Employment Growth on OECD-20 and East and South Asian Countries,
1971–2000
Country Constant
GDP
change
GDP
change
lagged
Adj.
R2
Std.
error
Durbin-
Watson Years
Avg.
emp.
change (%)
Avg.
GDP
change (%)
OECD-20
Canada 0.387 0.584 0.165 0.74 0.89 1.57 1971–2002 2.12 3.35
(1.0) (8.0) (2.2)
United States 0.547 0.504 0.242 0.79 0.66 1.40 1971–2002 1.75 3.10
(2.2) (9.1) (4.5)
Australia 1.512 0.598 0.362 0.54 1.21 2.10 1971–2002 1.74 3.34
(2.2) (5.0) (3.2)
New Zealand 0.109 0.478 0.003 0.15 2.20 0.70 1987–2002 1.25 2.87
(0.1) (2.1) (0.0)
Ireland 2.594 0.414 0.395 0.68 1.45 2.04 1971–2002 1.64 5.28
(4.5) (3.9) (3.7)
United Kingdom 1.363 0.288 0.506 0.67 0.96 1.78 1971–2002 0.48 2.31
(4.7) (3.3) (5.9)
France 0.490 0.342 0.087 0.36 0.74 0.83 1971–2002 0.58 2.45
(1.7) (3.4) (1.0)
Germany 1.258 0.444 0.296 0.50 1.02 0.87 1971–1990, 0.30 2.09
(3.7) (4.1) (2.6) 1993–2002
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Italy 0.127 0.020 0.130 0.00 0.98 1.16 1971–1992, 0.52 2.50
(0.3) (0.2) (1.4) 1994–2002
Netherlands 0.541 0.176 0.132 0.07 1.30 0.67 1972–1986, 1.38 2.66
(1.2) (1.4) (1.1) 1988–2002
Sweden 1.520 0.465 0.429 0.62 1.09 0.91 1971–2002 0.32 1.98
(4.8) (4.1) (4.2)
Austria 0.079 0.342 0.099 0.07 1.79 1.76 1971–2002 0.71 2.66
(0.1) (2.0) (0.6)
Belgium 0.590 0.206 0.144 0.20 0.89 0.95 1971–2002 0.26 2.35
(1.8) (2.5) (1.8)
Denmark 1.102 0.400 0.415 0.37 1.43 1.89 1971–2002 0.48 1.89
(2.5) (3.0) (3.2)
Finland 2.041 0.343 0.488 0.71 1.37 1.63 1971–2002 0.38 2.81
(5.6) (3.5) (5.1)
Greece 0.518 0.032 0.054 0.04 0.99 2.66 1971–1980, 0.59 3.05
(1.7) (0.5) (0.8) 1982–2002
Norway 1.532 0.293 0.465 0.52 1.07 1.40 1971, 1.09 3.42
(3.2) (2.3) (3.6) 1973–2002
Portugal 0.469 0.120 0.343 0.07 2.88 2.13 1971–2002 1.35 3.55
(0.5) (0.7) (2.0)
Spain 1.538 0.700 0.114 0.36 2.12 0.54 1971–2002 0.91 3.00
(2.2) (3.0) (0.5)
Switzerland 0.408 0.512 0.260 0.77 0.82 0.70 1971–1990, 0.74 1.47
(2.2) (6.8) (3.5) 1992–2002
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230Table B.1 (continued)
Country Constant
GDP
change
GDP
change
lagged
Adj.
R2
Std.
error
Durbin-
Watson Years
Avg.
emp.
change (%)
Avg.
GDP
change (%)
East and South Asia
Hong Kong 0.976 0.363 0.190 0.431 2.06 1.29 1978–2002 2.30 5.87
(1.1) (3.5) (1.9)
Indonesia 1.305 0.075 0.053 0.040 1.87 2.22 1978–1980, 1.97 5.16
(1.8) (0.8) (0.2) 1987–2001
Japan 0.409 0.190 0.140 0.529 0.63 0.97 1971–2002 0.69 3.20
(1.9) (3.5) (2.9)
Korea 0.661 0.363 0.087 0.426 1.60 1.93 1972–2002 2.63 7.30
(0.8) (4.8) (1.2)
Malaysia 1.800 0.196 0.009 0.240 1.39 1.45 1981–1995, 2.88 5.76
(3.0) (2.8) (0.1) 1997–2002
Philippines 2.912 0.229 0.128 0.039 4.10 2.09 1971–2001 3.27 3.53
(2.6) (0.9) (0.5)
Singapore 1.460 0.525 0.141 0.438 2.54 2.13 1971–2002 3.62 7.54
(1.3) (4.1) (1.1)
Taiwan 1.377 0.296 0.176 0.619 1.08 1.34 1971–2001 2.36 7.75
(2.3) (5.3) (2.8)
Thailand 0.876 0.328 0.059 0.119 2.95 2.07 1973–2002 2.59 6.37
(0.8) (2.2) (0.4)
a Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio.
SOURCE: OECD (2001b), IMF (2001), and BLS and country LFS publications. See text of Appendix B for further explanation of the
use of sources to create the table.PAG
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Appendix B 231
Regressions were fitted to both BLS employment series.1 Thus, for 10
OECD countries, up to four different employment regressions were
fitted. The results in Table B.1 are very similar to the results based on
these other measures of employment change, but they are not reported
here.
The regression results are summarized in Table B.1. Before exam-
ining individual equations, note the contrast in average employment
changes between the two sets of countries. Only one country in the
OECD-20 group (Canada) had an average employment change that
exceeded 2.0 percent per year, whereas only two of the Asian countries
(Indonesia and Japan) had an average of less than 2.0 percent. Similarly
the real output growth averages are much higher for most Asian econo-
mies, where only two means are below 4.0 percent (Japan and the
Philippines). While among the OECD-20 countries, only one (Ireland)
exceeds 4.0 percent.
The regression results in Table B.1 generally conform to a priori
expectations. Most intercepts are negative (20 of 29), most slopes are
positive (51 of 58), and 37 of the positive slopes have t-ratios of 2.0 or
larger. The results in individual countries vary widely in quality. For
both groups, about one-third have an adjusted R2 that falls below 0.20.
Generally the R2s and the standard errors convey the same information
about overall goodness-of-fit for individual countries. For the OECD-
20, the fits are generally worse for countries in southern Europe. For
both groups, the fits are generally worse for countries with lower levels
of per-capita GDP.2
Although the specifications are relatively simple, the results show
that lagged output change belongs in most equations. While its coeffi-
cient is generally smaller and less significant than for current output
change, most lagged coefficients are positive and about half have a
t-ratio of 2.0 or larger. There is support for the hypothesis that employ-
ment responds with a lag to increases in real GDP. Note that for three
of four Scandinavian countries, the lagged coefficient is actually larger
and more significant than for current output change.
One other finding is worth noting. For several countries in the
OECD-20 group, the residuals for the last five years, 1998–2002, were
positive and quite large. In a country such as the Netherlands, this
might be expected as part-time employment has grown rapidly in re-
cent years. There were, however, several other countries where the
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same pattern was observed. While an increased prevalence of nonstan-
dard work arrangements and part-time work could contribute to this
finding, it probably reflects other developments as well and, hence,
merits additional study.
The main purpose of this analysis was to compare employment
responsiveness in the OECD-20 countries with Asian countries. The
results on this point are clear. On average, employment responds more
to output changes in OECD-20 countries. As shown in Table 2.8 of
Chapter 2, the responsiveness is about twice as large in the OECD-
20 countries. The same qualitative result was obtained when the other
measures of employment change were used in the analysis.
Notes
1. The countries are the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Australia, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den. See Sorrentino (2000) for a display of unemployment rates for these coun-
tries and for a discussion of data comparability issues.
2. Within the OECD-20, group, the four with the lowest per-capita GDP in 1999
were Spain, New Zealand, Portugal, and Greece. Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia had the lowest per-capita GDP among the nine Asian countries.
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Appendix C
Regression Estimates of UC Benefit
Generosity
Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 displays two sets of estimates of the index
of UC benefit generosity, G. The estimates in column (5) are simply
means based on data from the 1990s (or for as many years as available).
The estimates in column (6) were derived from regression equations.
Table C.1 provides details of these regressions. It displays estimated
slopes, t-ratios, goodness-of-fit measures (adjusted R2s and standard
errors), average cost rates, average unemployment rates, and the years
of the estimation periods and the number of observations.
In developing regression-based estimates of G, it was decided to fit
homogeneous regressions where the unemployment rate (TUR) ex-
plained the average cost rate (B) with no other explanatory variables
and no intercept. Thus, the estimated coefficients show overall esti-
mates of G with no controls for possible changes in statutory UC provi-
sions or other factors that may have occurred during the estimation
periods. Use of this specification means that the adjusted R2 can be
substantially negative, indicating that the regression performs worse
than estimating simply the mean of the dependent variable (B). In fact,
four fits are so poor that the adjusted R2 falls below 0.25.
Note also that several regressions are based on very few data
points. Eight regressions had fewer than 10 observations, 4 from CEE-
FSU countries.
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Table C.1 Regression Estimates of Benefit Generosity (G)
Country
Estimate of
G t-ratio Adj. R2 Std. error B (%) TUR (%) Years
Number
obs.
OECD-20
Australia 0.24 38.2 0.93 0.27 1.38 5.80 1963–99 37
Austria 0.43 42.0 0.81 0.09 1.80 4.02 1995–99 5
Canada 0.28 32.5 0.66 0.48 2.31 7.61 1959–00 42
Denmark 0.51 28.0 0.72 0.58 3.98 7.17 1985–00 16
France 0.41 26.0 0.88 0.80 2.61 6.29 1960–97 38
Germany 0.32 57.6 0.97 0.27 1.91 5.54 1959–00 42
Ireland 0.28 44.5 0.91 0.49 3.02 9.38 1959–00 42
Netherlands 0.58 27.0 0.83 0.93 3.42 5.11 1959–98 40
New Zealand 0.32 22.9 0.95 0.27 1.49 4.29 1970–00 31
Portugal 0.18 5.0 0.32 1.08 1.38 6.60 1981–98 18
United Kingdom 0.18 30.9 0.85 0.25 1.04 5.23 1959–00 42
United States 0.12 28.6 0.68 0.18 0.75 5.95 1959–00 42
CEE-FSU
Bulgaria 0.11 11.8 0.48 0.35 1.83 15.04 1996–00 5
Slovakia 0.19 19.3 0.74 0.41 3.14 13.92 1995–00 6
Estonia 0.02 8.5 0.26 0.06 0.21 9.86 1994–99 6
Ukraine 0.03 5.2 0.58 0.17 0.32 9.50 1995–00 6
Eastern and
Southern Asia
Hong Kong 0.06 8.8 0.75 0.07 0.19 3.56 1994–01 8
Japan 0.17 18.1 0.95 0.15 0.44 2.19 1959–00 42
Korea, South 0.03 13.8 0.80 0.03 0.17 5.22 1998–01 4
Taiwan
South America
Argentina 0.02 6.5 0.25 0.11 0.29 12.50 1992–97 6
Brazil 0.11 6.3 0.15 0.42 0.74 5.86 1987–99 13
Chile 0.02 10.2 0.61 0.14 0.22 10.98 1975–00 26
Uruguay 0.01 12.3 0.83 0.04 0.12 9.93 1984–00a 14
a The years 1985, 1996, and 1997 were not included due to data unavailability.
PAG
E
234
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.11236$
APPC
04-15-05
08:15:37
PS
Appendix D
UC Provisions and UC Costs in
CEE-FSU Countries
Chapter 5 and this appendix examine UC statutes and UC costs in
CEE and FSU countries. The division between the text of Chapter 5
text and this appendix allows the text to focus on general developments
while supporting details are provided here. This appendix examines
three aspects of unemployment protection in CEE-FSU countries: 1)
the evolution of selected UC statutory provisions, 2) the presence and
potential duration of SA payments to the unemployed, and 3) annual
cost experiences (including SA costs) in four countries.
Table D.1 shows details of UC programs and other programs that
provide income support for the unemployed in 12 CEE-FSU countries.
As noted in Chapter 5, the 12 were selected in a decidedly nonrandom
manner. Ten have recently joined or been invited to join the EU during
the next few years while the other two (Russia and Ukraine) have the
largest populations of all countries in the CEE-FSU region. With a few
exceptions, the table covers the period from 1991 to 2001, with entries
shown for 1997 along with entries for the starting and ending years.
The table summarizes UC statutory provisions related to entry eli-
gibility, the level of payments, and benefit duration, as well as notes
the presence and potential duration of other support for the unem-
ployed. The latter is most often available as SA. As noted in Chapter
5, a common policy response to the long average unemployment dura-
tion that emerged throughout the region was to modify the preexisting
SA program to serve unemployed clients. In about half the countries,
the latter benefits were still not limited in duration as of 2001.
The UC provisions displayed in Table D.1 are intended to be illus-
trative. Additional provisions could also have been selected, for exam-
ple, the minimum benefit, but many would agree that these four are
key elements for judging the accessibility and generosity of UC bene-
fits. Note that some entries are blank. Information about the provisions
was not secured for the indicated years. The majority of the omissions
occurred in 1991.
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Table D.1 Summary of Unemployment Protection Provisions in CEE-FSU Countries, 1991–2001
Country, year of
present UI law,
and year
Entry
eligibilitya
Statutory
replacement
rate
Maximum
benefit
Maximum
duration
(weeks)
UA or SA
for
unem-
ployed?
UA or SA
maximum
duration
(weeks)
Bulgaria 1989 6 of 12 1.00–0.90 26
1992 6 of 12 0.60 1.4Min. wage 26–52
1997 6 of 12 0.60 1.4Min. wage 26–52 Yes No limit
2002 9 of 15 0.60 1.3Min. wage 17–52 Yes No limit
Czech Rep. 1991 12 of 36 0.65–0.50 1.8Min. wage 52 Yes No limit
1997 12 of 36 0.60–0.50 1.8Poverty 26 Yes No limit
2001 12 of 36 0.50–0.40 1.8Poverty 26 Yes No limit
Hungary 1991 12 of 48 0.70–0.50 3.0Min. wage 52
1997 12 of 48 0.70–0.50 2.0Min. wage 104 Yes 104
2001 9 of 48 0.65 2.0Min. pension 39 Yes 104
Poland 1990 No Require. 0.70–0.40 1.0Mon. wage No limit
1997 6 of 12 Flat 0.36Mon. wage 52–78 Yes No limit
2001 6 of 12 Flat 0.36Mon. wage 26–78 Yes No limit
Romania 1991 6 of 12 39
1997 6 of 12 0.60–0.50 2.0Min. wage 39 Yes 78
2001 6 of 12 0.55–0.50 39 Yes 78
Slovakia 1991 12 of 36 0.65–0.60 1.8Min. wage 52
1997 12 of 36 0.60–0.50 1.5Min. wage 26–52 Yes No limit
2001 24 of 36 0.50–0.45 26–39 Yes No limit
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Slovenia 1991 9 or 12 of 18 0.50 13
1997 9 or 12 of 18 0.70–0.60 3.2Min. wage 13–102 Yes 26
2001 12 of 18 0.70–0.60 13–102
Estonia 1991 6 of 12 Flat 0.6Min. wage 39
1997 6 of 12 Flat 0.6 Min. wage 39 Yes No limit
2002c 12 of 24 0.50–0.40 1.5Avg. wage 52 Yes No limit
Latvia 1991 6 of 12 Flat 0.9Min. wage 39
1997 9 of 12 0.65–0.30 1.6Avg. wage 39 Yes 13
2001 9 of 12 0.65–0.30 1.6Avg. wage 39 Yes 13
Lithuania 1990
1997 24 of 36 Exp.-Linked 2.0Poverty 26 Yes 26
2001 24 of 36 Exp.-Linked 2.0Poverty 26 Yes 26
Russia 1991 3 of 12 0.75–0.45 1.0Ent. wage 52
1997 3 of 12 0.75–0.45 1.0Ent. wage 52 Yes
2002 6 of 12 0.75–0.45 1.0Avg. wageb 52 Yes
Ukraine 1992 3 of 12 0.75–0.50 1.0Avg. wageb 26–39 Yes
1997 3 of 12 0.75–0.50 1.0Avg. wageb 26–45 Yes 26
2001 3 of 12 1.00–.50 1.0Avg. wageb 26–52 Yes 26
NOTE: Entries in bold face type show restrictions from prior period while underlined entries show liberalizations.
a Number of months must have worked in the past X number of months.
b Regional monthly wage.
c Benefit provisions to take place in 2003 for a law passed in 2002.
SOURCE: Data taken mainly from Social Security Programs Throughout the World 2002 and earlier editions.
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238 Vroman and Brusentsev
Table D.1 is intended to highlight instances where changes oc-
curred. The convention used throughout the table is to indicate with
bold typeface situations where a restriction occurred (compared to the
earlier entry in the same column). Underlined entries identify situations
where liberalizations occurred. No change is indicated by entries with
normal typeface (because some entries are blank, the normal typeface
also applies to situations where the direction of change could not be
determined from available data). Because entries are shown for just
selected years, some changes are not displayed, for instance, the in-
crease in the maximum UI benefit in Bulgaria in 1999 (from 1.4 to 1.5
times the minimum wage). The entries displayed in the table were
taken from four sources: various issues of Social Security Programs
Throughout The World (Boeri and Edwards 1998, Tables 2a, 2b, and
3), Paas and Room (2003, Appendix 1.4), and directly from the admin-
istrative agencies in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
Between the initial years and 1997 the main thrust of changes in
the UC programs was towards reduced access and eligibility. Twelve
instances of restrictions are identified while only seven liberalizations
are shown. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia all instituted at
least two restrictions, while Latvia and Slovenia accounted for four
liberalizations.
Between 1997 and 2001, 14 instances of restrictions are identified,
with 2 or more in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Six instances of
liberalizations are identified, with 3 in Estonia and 2 in Ukraine. Fol-
lowing legislation of 2002, it is anticipated that average payment levels
in Estonia will more than triple, mainly a reflection of the very low
level of benefits that were paid previously. Thus, during both periods
when changes in UC were enacted, they were roughly twice as likely
to be restrictions as liberalizations.
As emphasized in Chapter 5, these countries have come to rely on
SA for a second tier of benefit payments to the unemployed. The final
columns in Table D.1 show that such payments were present in all
countries in 1997 and 2001. At the start of the transition, SA programs
were already in place to serve clients of working age not expected to
work (i.e., single mothers and the severely disabled). New provisions
were enacted that expanded the SA programs to include the unem-
ployed. These recipients were required to register with PES offices and
to participate in temporary public service jobs if requested. Because
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the start dates of these programs were not well obtained, Table D.1
shows entries only for 1997 and 2001. The main point to be inferred
from these entries is that SA for the unemployed is a ubiquitous feature
among these 12 countries.
Table D.2 displays time-series data on unemployment protection
costs for four CEE-FSU countries: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, and
Ukraine. Annual UI data are shown for all four (in Panels A, C, E, and
F, respectively) while SA data are included in data displayed in Panels
B and D. As a general rule, SA data for unemployed recipients are
available for shorter periods and are less complete than UI data. No
estimates have been made for either Estonia or Ukraine.
Several issues are encountered in incorporating SA benefits for the
unemployed into the analysis. In Bulgaria, for example, unemployed
SA recipients must be separated from others required to register at PES
offices. Data to make this separation were only available starting in
1999. Estimates for 1996–1998 were derived by the author. In several
CEE-FSU countries, data are simply not available that make this dis-
tinction. A second issue in Bulgaria is the distinction between SA obli-
gations and actual payments. Prior to 2002, SA was partly financed
from municipal budgets. Because the finances of many localities were
inadequate, actual payments made nationwide routinely fell 10 to 20
percent below obligations. While some arrears were paid in subsequent
years, new shortfalls always exceeded the make-up payments. The data
underlying Panel B measured only actual SA payments in the replace-
ment rates, generosity indices, and total cost rates shown in columns
(5), (6), and (7). Third, because SA is means tested, there could be
overlaps between UI and SA benefits. While administrators in both
Bulgaria and Slovakia maintain that such overlaps are rare, the possi-
bility nonetheless exists. To the extent that undetected overlaps exist,
the recipiency rates in column (4) of Panels B and D are too high
(because some individuals are being double counted) while the replace-
ment rates in column (5) are too low. Note that the estimates of gener-
osity and the overall cost rate (columns 6 and 7) are not affected by
such overlaps.
For the UI data displayed in Table D.2, four patterns are note-
worthy.
1) The recipiency rates are low or modest. The average recipiency
rates displayed in Panels A, C, E, and F for the included years
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Table D.2 Summary of Unemployment Protection Costs in Four CEE-FSU Countries
TUR (%)
(1)
Unemployment
(000s)
(2)
Beneficiaries
(000s)
(3)
NBen./
Unemp.
(4)  (3)/(2)
RRate
(5)
G
(6)  (4)*(5)
B (%)
(7)  (2)*(6)
SA cost
share
(8)
A. Bulgaria—UI Alone
1993 21.4 815 211 0.26 0.37 0.09 2.03
1994 20.2 737 185 0.25 0.38 0.10 1.94
1995 16.5 590 133 0.22 0.51 0.11 1.89
1996 14.2 505 132 0.26 0.42 0.11 1.55
1997 14.4 513 171 0.33 0.22 0.07 1.07
1998 14.1 498 116 0.23 0.35 0.08 1.15
1999 15.7 534 151 0.28 0.30 0.08 1.32
2000 16.4 567 188 0.33 0.33 0.11 1.78
2001 19.7 664 157 0.24 0.33 0.08 1.56
B. Bulgaria—UI  SA
1996 14.2 505 167 0.33 0.36 0.12 1.67 0.07
1997 14.4 513 206 0.40 0.21 0.09 1.23 0.13
1998 14.1 498 152 0.31 0.33 0.10 1.40 0.18
1999 15.7 534 224 0.42 0.27 0.11 1.79 0.26
2000 16.4 567 282 0.50 0.29 0.15 2.39 0.25
2001 19.7 664 256 0.39 0.30 0.11 2.26 0.31
C. Slovakia—UI Alone
1993 12.8 306 112 0.37 0.26 0.09 1.21
1994 13.6 333 91 0.27 0.25 0.07 0.91
1995 13.1 324 77 0.24 0.24 0.06 0.75
1996 11.3 284 85 0.30 0.23 0.07 0.78
1997 11.8 297 83 0.28 0.30 0.09 1.00
1998 12.5 317 103 0.32 0.32 0.10 1.29
1999 16.2 417 130 0.31 0.32 0.10 1.61
2000 18.6 485 112 0.23 0.29 0.07 1.23
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D. Slovakia—UI  SA
1995 13.1 324 234 0.72 0.28 0.20 2.66 0.72
1996 11.3 284 227 0.80 0.26 0.21 2.35 0.67
1997 11.8 297 227 0.76 0.28 0.21 2.49 0.60
1998 12.5 317 272 0.86 0.30 0.26 3.20 0.60
1999 16.2 417 367 0.88 0.30 0.26 4.27 0.62
2000 18.6 485 399 0.82 0.25 0.21 3.90 0.68
E. Estonia—UI
1994 7.6 56 17 0.31 0.10 0.03 0.23
1995 9.7 68 14 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.16
1996 9.9 68 17 0.25 0.07 0.02 0.18
1997 9.6 66 18 0.27 0.07 0.02 0.18
1998 9.8 66 18 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.23
1999 12.2 81 27 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.36
2000 13.6 90 25 0.28 0.07 0.02 0.28
F. Ukraine—UI
1995 5.6 1,437 48 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.03
1996 7.6 1,998 74 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.06
1997 8.9 2,330 215 0.09 0.24 0.02 0.20
1998 11.3 2,937 436 0.15 0.24 0.04 0.40
1999 11.9 2,699 594 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.63
2000 11.7 2,708 612 0.23 0.22 0.05 0.58
2001 11.1 2,517 626 0.25 0.22 0.05 0.60
NOTE: TUR is total unemployment rate, NBen/Unemp. is the recipiency rate, RRate is the replacement rate, G is the generosity index,
and B is the total cost rate.
SOURCE: Unemployment and unemployment rate data from the ILO Web site. For Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Ukraine, data collected by
the author from the administrative agencies. Data for Estonia from Vodopivec, Worgotter, and Raju (2001) and Paas and Room (2003).PAG
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were 0.27, 0.29, 0.27, and 0.14, respectively. Note that the low
average for Ukraine is influenced by data from 1995 to 1997;
the 1999 to 2001 average was much higher at 0.23.
2) Replacement rates are also generally low, averaging 0.36 in Slo-
vakia but below 0.30 in the other three countries. For Estonia,
the seven-year average was only 0.08.
3) Because recipiency rates and replacement rates are both gener-
ally low, the generosity indices in column (6) are low. Only 6
of 31 entries for the UI-only panels are 0.10 or larger. These
indices are clearly much larger for Bulgaria and Slovakia than
for Estonia and Ukraine.
4) Because unemployment rates are so high, however, the overall
benefit-cost rates averaged above 1.0 percent of payrolls in both
Bulgaria and Slovakia (1.59 and 1.10 percent, respectively).
Even with UI programs that provide only about 10 percent wage
loss replacement, these two countries have had benefit-cost rates
that routinely exceed 1 percent of payrolls.
While the cost analysis of Chapter 3 was based on much of the
same data as shown in Table D.2, the impression conveyed by these
data is that unemployment protection costs are generally low because
of the modest scale of the UI programs. A different impression emerges
when the costs of SA payments to the unemployed are included, as in
Panels B and D. For Bulgaria, the average recipiency rate increases to
0.37 (compared to 0.27). For Slovakia, it increases to 0.72 (compared
to 0.29) when SA recipients are considered. These higher averages
represent increases in recipiency of 40 percent and 158 percent respec-
tively. The increases in the cost rates are 27 percent for Bulgaria and
158 percent for Slovakia. The lower increase in Bulgaria reflects both
a lower replacement rate for SA benefits (relative to UI benefits) and
that SA obligations were not paid to a measurable share of recipients.
Overall, the share of combined costs of unemployment protection
payments attributable to SA benefits averaged 20 percent in Bulgaria
and 65 percent in Slovakia. In the most recent years covered in Table
D.2, this percentage has consistently equaled or exceeded 25 percent
in Bulgaria. For three of the six years between 1995 and 2000, the SA
share of combined costs was 67 percent or higher in Slovakia.
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Some important inferences should be drawn from this description
of combined UI-SA costs. First, SA costs are an important component
of total combined costs. Second, the importance of SA costs undoubt-
edly varies widely from one CEE-FSU country to the next. Third, al-
though it is more difficult to obtain appropriate data on SA costs, a full
assessment of the costs of unemployment protection payments can be
made only by explicitly including SA costs within the scope of the
analysis.
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Appendix E
Determinants of Long-Term
Unemployment Percentages
The evolution of long-term unemployment percentages depicted in
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 present a vivid picture of high levels and/or large
increases for OECD-20 countries, as well as for CEE-FSU countries.
This appendix reports the findings of regression equations intended to
identify the determinants of these percentages. While the analysis was
undertaken for both groups of countries, most of this appendix will
focus on the OECD-20 countries. The relevant historical periods for
the CEE-FSU countries are so short that little can be inferred from the
regressions.
For 18 of the OECD-20 countries there were at least 15 years of
data on the percentage unemployed 12 months or longer.1 The specifi-
cation used to explain movement in these percentages included three
explanatory variables: the current year’s unemployment rate, the un-
employment rate lagged one year, and a linear time trend. It is well
understood that equilibrium unemployment duration increases when
the unemployment rate increases. However, the short-run effect of
higher unemployment on the long-term percentage also depends upon
the underlying average duration of unemployment and the speed with
which unemployment increases. In countries with long duration, higher
unemployment can initially reduce the percentage unemployed 12 or
more months because the new unemployment inflow adds so many
new spells of short duration.
The lagged unemployment rate was included in the regression
equations because long-duration spells tend to persist even when unem-
ployment decreases. Unlike the current unemployment rate where the
expected sign on the coefficient is ambiguous, the lagged unemploy-
ment rate is expected to have a positive coefficient.
Finally, a trend was included to test for developments in the long-
term unemployment percentage after controlling for effects of the cur-
rent and lagged unemployment rates. A positive coefficient would indi-
cate a secular increase in the percentage of long-duration spells. While
PAGE 245
245
................. 11236$ APPE 04-15-05 08:15:42 PS
246 Vroman and Brusentsev
an upward trend seems to be suggested for all six countries included in
Figure 8.1, this should be tested formally by regressions that include
other explanatory variables.
Table E.1 displays the regression results. Sixteen of the adjusted
R2s range from 0.59 to 0.97 while poor fits were obtained only for Italy
and the Netherlands. Positive serial correlation of residuals is present
in several regression results, with Durbin-Watson statistics below 1.0
in five and between 1.0 and 1.5 in seven. The significance of some
coefficients is probably exaggerated, and some coefficients could be
biased.
The most consistently significant variable was the lagged unem-
ployment rate, entering with a positive coefficient in all 18 regression
results, a significant coefficient in 15 (all but Greece, Italy, and the
Netherlands), and a t-ratio larger than 5.0 in 7. Its coefficient had the
largest t-ratio in 12 of 18 regressions, with the trend coefficient most
significant in the other 6.2
In contrast, the current unemployment rate coefficients are of
mixed signs and only three have significant t-ratios.3 The largest
t-ratio across the 18 regression results was 2.4 (Belgium). For nearly
all countries, a change in the unemployment rate had no significant
effect on the percentage of long-term unemployment spells.
The trend coefficients in Table E.1 present a decidedly mixed pic-
ture. They are equally divided between positive and negative, with six
significant positive coefficients and four significant negative coeffi-
cients. The patterns by subregion are of interest. Four of the significant
positive coefficients are in English-speaking countries (Australia, Can-
ada, Ireland, and the United States). Controlling for unemployment,
the long-term percentage has been increasing in these countries. In
contrast, significant negative trends were present in three West Euro-
pean countries: Belgium, France, and Germany. This trend suggests
that the long-term proportions have been decreasing after controlling
for the effects of the current and lagged unemployment rates. The size
of these coefficients suggests a substantial reduction in the long-term
unemployment percentages in Belgium, France, and Germany.
Note that the countries with the large negative trend coefficients
uniformly have quite high percentages of long-term unemployment,
and the current unemployment rate enters with a negative coefficient
for all three. In one test of the sensitivity of the Table E.1 results, a two-
PAGE 246................. 11236$ APPE 04-15-05 08:15:42 PS
247
Table E.1 Regression Results Explaining the Percent Unemployed 12 or More Months in OECD-20 Countries
Constant TUR (%) TUR laga Trendb Years Adj.R2 Std. error Durbin-Watson MeanCountry
Australia 4.32 0.48 2.82 0.25 1968–2001 0.97 2.02 1.17 20.6
(4.7) (1.3) (7.2) (4.1)
Belgium 67.26 2.79 3.21 0.77 1983–2001 0.66 3.80 0.85 64.3
(7.4) (2.4) (2.8) (3.3)
Canada 9.96 0.26 1.50 0.34 1976–2001 0.91 1.28 0.63 10.4
(6.2) (1.0) (5.7) (9.8)
Denmark 17.15 0.18 1.91 0.29 1983–2001 0.59 3.64 1.87 27.8
(2.8) (0.2) (2.7) (1.4)
Finlandc 14.01 0.36 2.18 0.31 1980–2000 0.82 3.06 1.00 25.1
(6.9) (0.7) (4.5) (1.9)
France 16.01 1.32 5.50 0.75 1968–2000 0.89 3.07 0.54 34.6
(11.6) (1.5) (5.4) (4.6)
Germany 15.86 1.63 5.34 0.54 1983–2000 0.76 2.85 2.02 45.8
(3.2) (1.8) (5.8) (2.8)
Greece 45.23 1.60 0.66 1.24 1983–2001 0.81 2.80 1.07 48.9
(6.6) (1.5) (0.6) (4.3)
Ireland 18.47 0.82 3.10 0.94 1983–2000 0.60 4.76 1.24 58.9
(1.8) (0.7) (3.1) (2.2)
Italy 36.30 0.54 2.32 0.37 1983–2001 0.20 3.51 1.41 64.0
(2.8) (0.4) (1.5) (2.1)
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Table E.1 (continued)
Constant TUR (%) TUR laga Trendb Years Adj.R2 Std. error Durbin-Watson MeanCountry
Netherlandsd 20.20 1.64 1.12 0.71 1983–2000 0.28 4.59 1.17 47.7
(1.0) (0.8) (0.6) (0.9)
New Zealand 3.90 0.32 3.27 0.01 1986–2000 0.95 1.68 1.15 21.1
(2.1) (0.7) (7.5) (0.0)
Norway 10.32 2.55 4.28 0.23 1978–2000 0.90 3.02 1.70 10.7
(5.8) (2.3) (3.7) (1.7)
Portugal 18.09 1.58 2.71 0.23 1986–2001 0.74 3.47 2.23 45.6
(3.3) (1.4) (2.6) (1.1)
Spain 16.91 0.39 1.56 0.06 1977–2001 0.91 3.39 0.75 49.0
(7.2) (1.2) (4.6) (0.5)
Sweden 0.47 1.36 3.39 0.58 1976–2001 0.93 2.49 1.66 16.0
(0.5) (2.5) (5.9) (5.9)
United Kingdom 4.08 0.14 3.91 0.14 1983–2001 0.94 1.81 2.10 39.2
(0.9) (0.3) (7.8) (1.0)
United States 4.78 0.07 1.50 0.17 1968–2001 0.85 1.19 0.76 7.0
(4.9) (0.3) (6.6) (8.2)
NOTE: Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio.
a TUR lag: Total unemployment rate lagged one year
b Trend: Linear trend.
c 15 of 21 years of data were used for Finland.
d 16 of 18 years of data were used for the Netherlands.
SOURCE: OECD Labor Force Statistics, various issues. For Australia and the United States, data from country statistical agencies have
supplemented OECD data.
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year lag on the unemployment rate was added to the set of explanatory
variables. This caused a substantial increase in colinearity, but it did
not improve the fit of the equations or reduce the size or significance
of the trend coefficients.
A second test fitted equations to data measured in first differences,
that is, year-to-year changes. The findings for the 18 countries dis-
played in Table E.2 are remarkably consistent. In first differences, the
intercept coefficient plays the same role as the trend coefficient when
data are measured in levels, as in Table E.1. In Table E.2 not one of the
18 intercepts has a t-ratio of 2.0 or larger (Ireland’s is the largest at
1.8). Thus, the significant trends reported in Table E.1 do not hold up
when data are measured in first differences.4
In contrast, note that the change in the lagged unemployment rate
(analogous to the lagged unemployment rate in Table E.1) continues to
enter significantly. Its coefficient is positive in 17 regression equations
(all but the Netherlands) and is statistically significant in 12. As before,
the current unemployment rate has roughly equal numbers of positive
and negative coefficients, and only 4 of 18 are statistically significant.
In data measured as first differences, the only consistently impor-
tant explanatory variable is the lagged change in the unemployment
rate. When this lagged change is positive, the change in the long-term
unemployment percentage also tends to be positive.
An analysis of the long-term unemployment percentages was un-
dertaken for five CEE countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Slovakia. For these countries, however, there were
only eight or nine data points. Using the same specification as in Table
E.1, four coefficients on the current unemployment rate were negative
in the regression results, but none were significant. All five coefficients
on the lagged unemployment rate were positive, and three were sig-
nificant. All five trend coefficients were positive, and two were signifi-
cant. In data from the 1990s using levels, it appears that there has
been a positive trend toward an increasing long-term unemployment
percentage in these five CEE countries.
Fitting regression equations in first differences further reduced the
small CEE sample sizes by one. Two patterns of note were uniformly
positive coefficients on the lagged change in the unemployment rate
and uniformly positive intercepts. Thus, lagged changes in the unem-
ployment rate entered in the same positive manner as in the OECD-20
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Table E.2 Regression Results Explaining Changes in the Percent Unemployed 12 or More Months in OECD
Countries
Constant TUR (%)
TUR
laga Years Adj. R2
Std.
error
Durbin-
Watson MeanCountry
Australia 0.052
(0.1)
0.92
(2.4)
2.45
(6.3)
1969–2001 0.64 2.11 2.23 0.52
Belgium 0.128
(0.2)
0.64
(0.7)
2.71
(3.0)
1984–2001 0.30 2.96 1.70 0.73
Canada 0.225
(1.1)
0.31
(1.5)
1.33
(6.5)
1977–2001 0.72 0.99 1.92 0.22
Denmark 0.737
(0.6)
0.35
(0.4)
0.99
(1.2)
1984–2001 0.03 4.72 2.19 1.23
Finland 0.960
(0.7)
0.14
(0.1)
0.81
(0.4)
1983–1987,
1996–2001
0.20 3.08 2.29 1.34
France 0.293
(0.7)
1.78
(2.9)
4.66
(7.3)
1969–2001 0.62 2.11 2.49 0.43
Germany 0.372
(0.4)
0.50
(0.3)
4.05
(2.0)
1984–2000 0.32 3.92 2.39 0.58
Greece 0.551
(0.9)
0.04
(0.0)
1.84
(2.0)
1984–2001 0.12 2.49 1.95 1.09
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Ireland 2.126
(1.8)
0.90
(1.0)
1.45
(1.8)
1984–2000 0.28 4.47 1.76 1.11
Italy 0.255
(0.3)
0.26
(0.2)
0.35
(0.3)
1984–2001 0.13 3.83 1.58 0.29
Netherlands 0.942
(0.5)
1.99
(1.0)
1.58
(0.8)
1988–2000 0.07 4.66 1.14 1.06
New Zealand 0.225
(0.5)
0.46
(1.1)
2.68
(6.1)
1987–2000 0.81 1.65 1.31 0.79
Norway 0.217
(0.3)
1.00
(0.7)
4.63
(3.0)
1979–2000 0.40 3.82 2.30 0.23
Portugal 0.394
(0.3)
2.87
(1.6)
1.62
(0.9)
1987–2000 0.28 5.06 2.68 1.04
Spain 0.484
(1.0)
0.66
(3.3)
0.88
(4.1)
1978–2001 0.63 2.40 1.52 0.97
Sweden 0.393
(0.6)
0.52
(0.6)
2.48
(3.1)
1977–2001 0.28 3.09 2.56 0.64
United Kingdom 0.145
(0.2)
0.49
(0.6)
3.66
(4.6)
1984–2001 0.60 2.57 2.95 0.99
United States 0.094
(0.6)
0.39
(2.3)
1.64
(9.8)
1969–2001 0.78 0.90 2.74 0.12
NOTE: Beneath each coefficient is the absolute value of its t-ratio.
a TUR lag: Total unemployment rate lagged one year.
SOURCE: First differences of data used in Table E.1.
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countries. There was also a suggestion of an increasing long-term trend
in the percent unemployed 12 or more months. More data points are
needed, however, before these findings should be given much weight.
At least the finding on the effect of lagged unemployment seems rea-
sonable in light of the findings from the OECD-20 countries. Also, that
there should be a positive trend toward an increased percentage of long-
term unemployment seems to square with both Figure 8.2 in Chapter
8 and a priori notions about labor market developments in the CEE
countries.
Notes
1. Only 11 years of data were available for Switzerland (1991–2001) and just 7
years for Austria (1994–2000).
2. The apparent tie in Sweden is due to rounding of t-ratios to one decimal place.
The lagged unemployment rate has a slightly larger t-ratio than the trend.
3. Significance is present when the absolute value of the t-ratio is 2.0 or larger.
4. One indication of the differences in estimated trends from levels versus first dif-
ference specifications is the correlation of the trend coefficients across the 18
countries. The simple correlation between the trend coefficients in Table E.1 and
the intercept coefficients in Table E.2 was 0.41, which was not significant at the
0.05 level.
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